Problems of COMMUNISM

Stalinism Redividus?

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Soviet Trade and Cultural Diplomacy

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Communism in the USA

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NO. 4 VOL VII
Jul-Aug 1958

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NUMBER 4 JUL-AUG VOL VII 1958

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Outside the United States, *Problems of Communism* may be obtained from the nearest office of the United States Information Service. For sale within the United States by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Price per copy: $ .35. Subscription price: $1.50 a year. Additional $ .50 for foreign mailing.

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Stalinism Redividus?

EDITORS' NOTE: The execution of Imre Nagy and three other leaders of the ill-fated Hungarian revolution, which has produced a wave of disgust and indignation throughout the civilized world, marks a new stage of a process which was set in motion in the aftermath of the Hungarian and Polish Octobers, but which has become particularly accelerated since November 1957—the gradual, if partial, return to the spirit and methods of Stalinist politics. The circumstances attending the execution—the secret trial, the lack of any transcript thereof, the distortions in the official text of the charges, the suddenness of the announcement, the abuse heaped upon the defendants, and the reports of "unanimous" and "spontaneous" approval with which it was ostensibly greeted throughout the Soviet bloc—all bear ominous earmarks of the Stalinist past. It signals a new and probably brutal phase in the Soviet campaign against "revisionism," a term which has earned a place beside "Trotskyism" in the roster of intolerable deviations. For while at first the Hungarian press was seemingly at pains to point out that Nagy and his fellow victims were executed for their "counterrevolutionary" activities, not their views, the press of the other Communist countries—taking their cue from Moscow—did not mince words in linking Nagy's *activities* with the *ideas* of revisionism, thus, in effect, equating revisionism with *treason.* Even Gomulka, whom fate spared from becoming another Nagy, has finally been forced to fall into line (albeit with reservations).

It is still too early to assess the full extent and significance of Moscow's reversion from a policy of ostensible moderation to one of belligerence, from pious renunciation of terror to its blunt renewal. The articles below, however, written in most part before the Hungarian executions, provide the background as well as the rationale of the new Soviet line. In the first, Mr. Bialer analyzes the history of the relations between Belgrade and Moscow, and demonstrates their implications for the entire range of Soviet foreign policy actions. The second article, by Paul Landy, traces the process of "restalinization" in Eastern Europe—the tightening of party controls, the struggle against all manifestations of non-conformity, the new attacks on organized religion, *etc.* Finally, the article by Mr. Zagoria examines the essential ingredients of "revisionism," as manifested in the Communist world at large.

Moscow vs. Belgrade: A Key to Soviet Policy

by Seweryn Bialer

IT IS ALREADY quite apparent that the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict has assumed a lasting character and that it has become more serious than appeared possible even in its first bitter phase. One can now state with certainty that the latest stage of the conflict is a turning point in relations between Belgrade and Moscow not any less profound than the reconciliation between Khrushchev and Tito in the spring of 1955. In fact, it signifies an important turning point in Soviet policy in general, both within the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, and in relation to the world at large.

The direct cause of the renewal of conflict between Moscow and Belgrade in April 1958 was the draft pro-

Thirty-two years of age, Mr. Bialer grew up in Poland, joined the Communist Party during the war, and quickly rose in the ranks to become an important functionary of the Agitprop Department of the CC of the Polish CP, and Professor of the Institute of Social Research (under CC aegis). He defected from Poland in January 1956.

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gram of the Yugoslav Communist Party. It would be naive, however, to suppose that this program was the fundamental reason for the deterioration of relations. Actually, there is evidence that both protagonists had reasons for precipitating another estrangement.

That the Soviet leaders wanted this conflict is quite evident from the tough position they took at the outset. In the Western press one frequently comes across the thesis that the break with Yugoslavia was not Khrushchev's decision. It is alleged that he was forced to agree to it by pressure either from the Stalinist group within the Soviet party's Central Committee (headed ostensibly by Suslov) or from Peiping. A number of things would indeed indicate that relations between Khrushchev and the so-called Stalinist ideologists in the party are bad, perhaps even critical. In a speech delivered at the Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party on June 3, 1958, for instance, Khrushchev hurled acrimony and sarcasm at the so-called pure theorists and defended the position of practical men (like himself), arguing that it was the latter who really enriched Marxist theory and decisively influenced the victories of communism.

Yet the differences between the "ideologists" and Khrushchev seem to center primarily on Soviet internal matters, and specifically, on the reorganization of agriculture and industry carried out by Khrushchev. It seems doubtful that any group in the Soviet leadership could have forced Khrushchev to make so crucial a decision as the reopening of the conflict with Tito. The decision was bound to have far-reaching political effects, and the attendant issues are a matter of such importance that a compromise was almost impossible—just as impossible, in fact, as in 1955 during the struggle of Khrushchev and Molotov. It cannot be ruled out that certain differences on this matter exist within the Presidium—differences relating to the *form* in which the new offensive is to be cast. But there seems little doubt that the chief architect of the new policy is Khrushchev, and the zeal with which he has been carrying it out is hardly that of a man under pressure, but rather that of a man who is doing it full-heartedly, and for very good reasons.

Another problem is the role of China in bringing about renewed conflict with Yugoslavia. It is apparent that the Mao regime's position toward Tito is even firmer and more determined than that of the Kremlin. This probably springs from two causes: first, difficulties in the Chinese domestic situation arising from opposition to the government's policies—an opposition which the regime had at one time underestimated, and with which it can now cope only through the application of the most vigorous measures; second, China's position in the international arena, which makes the regime particularly resistive to closer contacts between Communist countries and the West, particularly the United States. China is afraid that a relaxation of international tension will reduce her standing in world affairs. While an economic and political penetration of Asia is possible for the Soviet Union, China must rely on military means to effect such an aim. In a speech of June 15, Tito—who is no novice in the motivations and compulsions of totalitarian politics—clearly attributed the vehemence of the Chinese attack on Yugoslavia to these causes.

Tito's Motivations

Let us now examine the indications that Yugoslavia simultaneously took the decision to break with the Soviet Union. It would be too much to suppose that Tito announced a revisionist party program without realizing that he was inviting an open conflict with the Soviet Union, and perhaps making it inevitable. For over two years Tito had refrained from publicizing such documents as Central Committee resolutions and party declarations which took "revisionist positions on international matters. He had never concealed his rejection of the Soviet picture of a world divided into two camps—that is, a monolithic Communist bloc *vs.* the rest of the world—but he had refrained from a formal explanation of his theoretical stand; all official references to the problem in Yugoslavia were very casual. It is true that Tito had long promised the Yugoslav party that he would announce a program, and it might have been difficult to postpone its publication indefinitely. This would hardly have been enough, however, to force him to take positions that were sure to arouse Soviet hostility. In fact, he seemed to be inviting Soviet criticism when he sent the draft of his program to foreign CP's.

It is unlikely that such an experienced politician as Tito could have failed to calculate the consequences of his action—despite his atempt to create the impression that he did not foresee the conflict and, what is more important, that he did not want it. To maintain Tito's posture of injured innocence, Western correspondents were told about Yugoslav surprise at the Soviet reaction, about the rooms reserved for Soviet delegates until the last day before the party congress, and so forth. The draft of the Yugoslav program was also amended to soften some of its expressions, but Tito could not have assumed that such concessions would obscure the fundamental discrepancies between his position and Moscow's.

Before inquiring into Tito's motives for precipitating a new conflict with Moscow, it is necessary to turn back to 1955 and to ask why the relations between Moscow

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and Yugoslavia were resumed in the first place. If one does not accept the absurd and incredible explanation that Soviet policy after Stalin's death was based on a revulsion against Stalinist iniquities and "distortions" and on a morally-inspired desire to correct injustices, then one must attribute the Soviet *volte-face* of 1955 to the Kremlin's calculation that its political interests would be served thereby. The political gains expected from a restoration of harmony with Tito had to be very high to induce a Soviet leader of Khrushchev's standing to accept the humiliation of going to Belgrade in May 1955. After all, in this case the march to Canossa was carried out not by the king but by the Pope.

An important factor in the Tito-Khrushchev rapprochement is the fact that Stalin's policy toward Yugoslavia, continued by his successors in 1953 and early 1954, had become completely bankrupt. The character of the Stalinist campaign against Tito was at first offensive; its aim, put simply, was to overthrow the Yugoslav regime. The impracticability of trying to do this without armed intervention, which Stalin could not afford, became obvious as early as 1949. However, the conflict with Yugoslavia, which continued even after it was clear that its original purpose was unattainable, did not hinder Stalin's foreign policy as a whole. On the contrary, it helped to keep the satellites in subjection. Moreover, it was impossible for Stalin to revise his attitude toward Tito, to withdraw from the stand taken in 1948-49, without infringing on the basic principles of his world policy. Even if Stalin could have mastered himself to the extent of forgetting the insult of Tito's defiance, he could not retreat without denying his own methods of conducting foreign policy both inside and outside the Soviet bloc.

For these reasons the conflict with Yugoslavia was sustained by the successors of Stalin through 1953 and early 1954, although its pointlessness was obvious enough to them. Before improving their relations with Tito they had to revise Stalin's whole strategy in international matters. They began to do so in the second half of 1954 and achieved their purpose in 1955.

THERE CAN NO longer be any doubt that the leader in the policy of reconciliation with Tito was Khrushchev. To carry out this policy he had to overcome strong opposition in the Kremlin, primarily from Molotov. In Khrushchev's struggle with Molotov in 1955, the question of Moscow's attitude towards Yugoslavia was only one fragment of a much wider problem, namely, the general political line in international affairs. Molotov came out in defense of continuing, with slight relaxations, the unyielding Stalinist course. Khrushchev wanted to get the Soviet Union out of the impasse produced by Stalin's policy and to lay down new directions for the country's international offensive.

Khrushchev would have had nothing against the Stalinist line *vis-à-vis* Yugoslavia if it could have accomplished the result originally planned, that is, the overthrow of Tito and the "satellization" of Yugoslavia under a new leadership loyal to the Kremlin. He fully realized, however, that this aim was even less attainable after Stalin's death than before it. The opponents of Khrushchev's conciliatory course toward Yugoslavia, chiefly Molotov, also realized this fact. Khrushchev might well have perpetuated the old Stalinist attitude towards Yugoslavia simply to maintain the *status quo,* even with full awareness that it could not accomplish any offensive aim, if he had not realized that this course was a real obstacle to the solution of broader political problems. The fact was, however, that Stalin's intransigent line stood in the way of the domestic and foreign policies upon which Khrushchev intended to build his authority. There remained for him the choice of two roads: either to inflame the conflict with Yugoslavia anew and bring about Tito's downfall regardless of means; or to withdraw from the conflict and find some other way to modify the position of Yugoslavia.

A Yugoslav View of Things



FRESH NEWS

—Quick, give me a 1948 newspaper so I can see what's new in Yugoslavia.

—From Borba (Belgrade), June 8, 1958.

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The first road was too risky; even Stalin could not afford it. Not even Molotov, Khrushchev's most conservative opponent, proposed the selection of this road. The only program Molotov could suggest was negative—to maintain the conflict without a chance of its ultimate liquidation to the benefit of the Kremlin. The promising road was the second, and Khrushchev chose it.

In 1955 Khrushchev agreed to "excuse" Tito and to the end the quarrel with him, not because he disagreed with the aims of Stalin, or because he felt some personal abhorrence for Stalin's methods, but because he regarded these methods as ineffective. The motives behind his change of policy were not "moral" but political. Without some basic changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy, a liquidation of the conflict with Tito in 1955 would have been a political absurdity. What could a reconciliation between Khrushchev and Tito have meant unless Soviet policy changed; to what result could it have led? The answer might be forwarded that it merely indicated a Soviet desire to draw Yugoslavia into the Moscow orbit by means of persuasion and economic bribery. It is absurd, however, to think that Tito, who resisted Stalin's threats, would have succumbed to Khrushchev's siren song and again put the Soviet bit in his mouth after years of independence and with no prospect of long-range advantages for himself. No Soviet politician could have expected Tito to act in this way.

A reconciliation between Khrushchev and Tito in the absence of any basic changes in Soviet policy might also be interpreted as the result of a compromise binding Yugoslavia to the Soviet bloc on certain conditions, such as some form of guarantee of Yugoslavia's independence within the Communist camp. In this case, both sides might conceivably have agreed to abandon open criticism of one another's policies. Again, however, such a solution was impossible, both in theory and in reality. An unchanged Yugoslavia simply could not have fitted into an unchanged Soviet empire. A policy based on monolithic rigidity at home combined with "liberalism" abroad was incompatible with the basic aims and totalitarian ideology of the Soviet state.

An Equitable Bargain

Entirely believable, however, is the theory that both sides agreed to a compromise on the basis of a drawing together of broad policies concerning the status and future of the Soviet empire and the foreign and domestic programs of the two countries. What did each side have to gain by liquidating the conflict with the other and entering on the road to a mutual reconciliation?

The Soviet Union expected several beneficial results. First, agreement with Tito would strengthen the Soviet offensive then planned against the West, which was to take the form of peaceful penetration of the so-called neutral countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, and the strengthening of neutral sentiments among the Western allies. Second, it would facilitate disarming the West and lulling it to sleep through the new policy of "coexistence." Third, it would foster the development of a broad campaign for a tactical alliance with the socialist parties of the West. Fourth, it would bring an end to the anti-Russian propaganda emanating from Belgrade. Fifth, a new approach to Tito would provide Khrushchev, and the supporters of his general policies, with a convenient, specific issue on which to give battle to the adherents of the old Stalinist political course. Sixth, the normalization of relations between the two countries, coupled with the anti-Stalinist course of Soviet policy, would enable Moscow to exert political, economic and ideological pressure on Belgrade, which would in turn result in a greater unity in the views, ideologies and foreign policies of both countries. Seventh, it would not create—or so Khrushchev hoped—any substantial disturbances within the Soviet empire or foreign CP's; in any case, his bold new policies were predicated upon his faith in the basic strength of the Soviet empire and the international Communist movement.

To say that Khrushchev stood to gain from a rapprochement with Tito is not to say that he needed the latter's help. Nor should it be assumed that the reconciliation was a major Soviet policy goal in itself. Rather, it was a reform that was to set the stage for more far reaching reforms, both domestic and foreign, contemplated by Khrushchev. Their success depended, at least in part, on a resolute (if not wholehearted) break with numerous Stalinist dogmas; none of them could succeed without the liquidation of the conflict engendered by Stalin. In this sense, then, the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia was a prerequisite to the realization of Khrushchev's program.

Tito himself must have hoped to gain several advantages from a rapprochement. First, the proffered Soviet concessions reflected basic changes in the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union. By ending the conflict, Tito hoped not only to strengthen Moscow's intent to pursue its new policies, but actually to exert some influence on their future course. Second, he probably wanted to obtain a new foothold within the international Communist movement, from which he had been ejected by the Cominform resolutions of 1948-49. Third, he might even have thought it possible to pro-

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mote the old Yugoslav aim of a federation of the Communist neighbors of Yugoslavia under the aegis of Belgrade, this time without the necessity for a conflict with Russia. Fourth, he might have hoped, while in contact with the Soviet leadership, to help the "liberal" elements within the Kremlin in their battle against the conservative opposition. Fifth, the liquidation of the conflict would bring Yugoslavia direct economic benefits, without fear of Soviet interference in her domestic affairs. Sixth, it would strengthen the Yugoslav party dictatorship, in which rifts had appeared after the break with the Cominform, notably the Djilas affair in 1954. Seventh and last, he could have hoped that the Titoist pattern might evolve gradually in the satellite countries, without threatening the stability of the Communist world.

IN SHORT, the basis of Tito's agreement to a liquidation of the conflict with the Soviet Union was his belief that the changes just beginning in Soviet policy as a whole would lead to greater harmony between the aims of Russia and those of Yugoslavia. The conflict ceased, it must be emphasized, not because Tito drew closer to the old Soviet position, but because the Soviet leaders drew closer to him. The Soviet leaders betrayed no hope of making a satellite of Yugoslavia or of returning to the situation as it was before 1948. The Yugoslavs made no pretense of seeking guarantees for their independence within an unchanged Soviet empire. Had the Soviet Union not altered her position in these matters, there would have been no basis for liquidating the conflict. Since Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade in May 1955, the hopes of both sides have been fulfilled only in part. In a number of essential areas events have fallen short of either Soviet or Yugoslav expectations. Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the period from the reconciliation to the renewed outbreak of conflict in April 1958 may be divided conveniently into four periods.

The first period, from May 1955 to June 1956, was one of developing friendship, made possible by the annulment of the Cominform decision of 1949. Tito visited Moscow; the Soviet press disseminated (and frequently approved) Yugoslav views; Molotov was defeated at the July 1955 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU; the Cominform was liquidated; the "cult of the individual" and many of Stalin's actions were condemned; the plan for economic decentralization in the Soviet Union was announced.

The second period, from June 1956 to April 1957, was one of deterioration in the relations between the two countries. Both sides, however, continued to believe in the possibility of further improvement, minimized growing disagreements before the public, and offered compromise solutions. In June the Central Committee of the Soviet party, contrary to the Yugoslav stand, published a resolution on the "cult of the individual," which marked a departure from the position taken at the Twentieth Congress. Moreover, the Central Committee circulated a letter among Communist parties abroad in which it called attention to the danger of Titoism and to the need for a critical approach to the Yugoslav experiments. There were Soviet-Yugoslav divergences regarding the Hungarian revolution and Soviet attacks on the system of workers' councils in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, several events in this period indicated a mutual desire to avoid a showdown and to work out a compromise. Among these were Khrushchev's meetings with Tito in September 1956 at Brioni and in the Crimea, and Tito's eventual support of the final Soviet intervention in Hungary.

The third period, from April until the fall of 1957, was one of shaky equilibrium in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. These months were marked by an expansion of Soviet credits to Yugoslavia; the complete cessation of public discussions in the USSR on Yugoslav views; Tito's support of Khrushchev in his conflict with the "anti-party group" of Molotov *et. al.*; and Soviet attempts to return to "coexistence" in foreign policy.

The fourth period, from the fall of 1957 to the end of April 1958, was one of movement toward an inevitable decision, both in Moscow and in Belgrade, to abandon the policy of friendship.

High Hopes and Aftermath

As has been stated before, the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, both under Stalin and now under Khrushchev, is merely one—albeit an important—aspect of Soviet policy in general. While the conflict has undoubtedly had its effects on Soviet foreign policy, it has been primarily the course of the latter that has influenced the nature of the former. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to examine the relations between Belgrade and Moscow in the wider context—namely, the strategic plans and direction of Soviet foreign policy. For just as the first outbreak of Soviet-Yugoslav hostility in 1947-48 signified the realization of Stalin's postwar aim, just as its liquidation by Khrushchev in 1955 was a signal for a new chapter in post-Stalin policy, so the exacerbation of the conflict today is probably an indication of still another general change of Moscow's posture in the international arena.

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Let us first consider the course of Soviet foreign policy and particularly the changes which took place in 1955. Soviet international policy should be examined on two levels: first, within the international Communist movement; second, outside the Soviet orbit. On the first level Stalin's postwar policy can be defined very simply. Communist countries outside the USSR were treated as colonies of the Soviet empire. Their task was to serve as a military, economic, and political reserve for the Soviet Union. According to this conception, the only independent power of international communism was the USSR. The functions of other elements of the international Communist movement were also subordinate to the state interests of the Soviet Union. Their role was that of auxiliary, executive organizations, devoid of any initiative. Stalin liquidated international communism as a spontaneous movement and imposed on the Communist parties (including those of the satellite countries) the character of provincial extensions of Soviet state institutions.

THE CHIEF change Khrushchev planned in 1955 was a regeneration, a revitalization of international communism. The very motto he invoked, "Back to Leninism," indicated a desire to return to the dynamic *élan* of Lenin's time. He looked for a revival of the enthusiasm and faith of the initial years of the Russian revolution. Within the Soviet empire, he planned to grant the satellites greater autonomy, and in exchange expected greater achievements from these countries and an abandonment of Stalinist terror in favor of a more "rational" system of political indoctrination. He wanted to bring about a kind of "revolution from above," a gradual destruction of the organizational principles and ideology of Stalinist communism. He knew that his program would result in a tremendous upheaval, but he counted on sound organization and direction to overcome difficulties. Even if his plan temporarily weakened the international Communist movement, he apparently felt that the change would ultimately make it more effective than it was in Stalin's time. The liquidation of the conflict with Tito in 1955 was thus a constituent part of Khrushchev's plan to put new life into the international Communist movement and into the Soviet empire.

In the years 1955-1958 Khrushchev learned that it was very difficult, if not impossible, to carry out the changes he planned in the manner he wished. Within some of the Communist parties Khrushchev's attempted "revolution from above" released strong revisionist and rightist-nationalist currents which pushed the reforms in a direction entirely unforeseen and undesired. It led not so much to a revival of the enthusiasm of the "old days" as to a loss of faith in communism. The relaxation of terror and party controls encouraged the anti-Communist populations of the satellite countries to strike out not merely against Stalinism but against communism itself. The carefully organized revolution from above provoked a revolution from below and the course of events got out of control.

Khrushchev seems to have underestimated how far demoralization and bureaucratization had eaten into the apparata of Communist parties abroad. He thought it possible to transform their bureaucratic activity into political activism. Once the bureaucratic principles and bureaucratic faith of each party apparatus had been upset, however, the party workers lost their bearings and their basis of operation, preventing them from turning their activity into new channels. By the same token, Khrushchev overestimated the "ideological maturity" of both rank-and-file party members and activists abroad, particularly those in the satellite countries. He failed to understand the differences between the situation of the Soviet Communist Party—with its long history of unquestioning discipline and order—and that of the satellite parties. He disregarded the explosive forces which had accumulated in the satellites during the decade after World War II. He overlooked the strength of national resistance to the USSR in the constituent parts of the Soviet empire.

In the period between the Poznan riots in June 1956 and the fall of 1957 Soviet policy was not based on any long-range program. Its chief task was to suppress centers of revolt and to maintain the wavering unity of the Communist world at any price. It was, so to speak, a "fire-department" policy. After the fall of 1957, however, Khrushchev again turned to the fulfillment of long-range plans—but these were no longer what they had been in 1955.

The New Turn

The policy of 1958 is at once a new and an old policy. It is new in comparison with that of 1955; it is old in that it returns to some of the tried and proven ground rules of Stalinist politics. In this situation, harmony between Moscow and Belgrade has become an anachronism in the eyes of both. It can neither fit into the program of Moscow nor fulfill the hopes of Yugoslav leaders.

Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to equate Khrushchev's present line with Stalinism pure and simple; the similarities between the two are legion, but the differ-

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ences are equally numerous and significant. First, party disunity and opposition to Moscow are so great in the satellites, and Khrushchev's authority relatively so small, that the latter is unable to use full Stalinist methods to force unity upon the Communist movement. Khrushchev can use economic blackmail, political pressure, intrigues, even individual murders, but he does not have the strength to return to the mass terror of Stalin's day, at least not now or in the immediate future. Second, Khrushchev's economic reforms can be reconciled only with great difficulty, if at all, with a return to full Stalinism. The opposition to such a return is probably very strong not only among the people but also among a considerable section of the party bureaucracy which supported Khrushchev in his march to power. Moreover, in spite of strong opposition to his economic reforms within the party leadership, Khrushchev seems to be determined to put them into practice.

Consequently, if Khrushchev's policy within the Soviet empire and the international Communist movement can justifiably be labeled essentially a Stalinist—or at least neo-Stalinist—policy, his *total* program is still a far cry from that of his deceased predecessor. At the very least, it is doubtful whether Khrushchev, even if he wanted to, would be able in the near future to restore fully the features of the old regime, particularly mass terror. For this reason, his new course is bound to engender new difficulties, new zigzags, and new strategic retreats. Paraphrasing the words of Lenin, who said that at every important turn in history capitalist countries face "a new round of war and revolution," it can be said that in its present phase the Soviet Union is facing a new round of internal shocks and struggles.[1]

End to the "Thaw"

What of Soviet policy on the second level, that is, toward countries outside the Moscow orbit? We have already mentioned the basic change in foreign policy which took place in 1955—to wit, the *immediate* object of attack ceased to be the principal Western powers. The frontal assault on "imperialism" was replaced by a flanking, encircling, isolating movement, in the form of penetration of the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. The means and methods of battle also changed; the chief emphasis was now placed on political and economic "persuasion" instead of on diplomatic and military pressure.

As far as the principal Western powers were concerned, Moscow adopted a policy of "moderation," designed to lure them into a sense of false security. The catchword became "peaceful coexistence"; negotiations on a variety of matters were urged and trifling concessions magnanimously granted. The purpose of this policy, typified by the Geneva summit conference in July 1955, was not to obtain direct benefits from the Western powers but to gain time and to secure freedom of action in the chief area of Soviet attack, the economically underdeveloped countries.

In the past three years, the Kremlin's new foreign policy has brought it successes never attained by the rigid, uncompromising, and often crude policy of Stalin in the postwar period. (Indeed, this fact may have saved Khrushchev from having to answer for the disastrous consequences of his policy in the Communist countries.) Emboldened by his achievements, Khrushchev has now embarked on a dual policy of greater pressure on underdeveloped areas coupled with a more direct assault on the Western powers. While previously his main goal was to reduce the vigilance of the West, his present aim is to bring direct pressure on it to make substantial concessions. Whereas the Geneva meeting of 1955 aimed primarily at facilitating Soviet activity outside Europe, the edition of 1958 seems to be aimed at obtaining solid material and military concessions from the West. If Moscow should become convinced that these concessions are not forthcoming, it may well back out of the meeting altogether—not of course, without proclaiming its passionate desire for "peace," and not without attacking and distorting the position of the Western powers. In fact, Soviet propaganda needs may well be served better by the Kremlin's withdrawal from the summit conference.

A stiffening of the Soviet position and a sharpening of the cold war may be expected for two reasons. First, the Soviet "sputnik successes" and the evidences of a change in the balance of military power have altered the Soviet picture of the world situation. The new Soviet outlook is reflected in such ideological developments as the attitude now in vogue that "it is no longer proper to talk about the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union." The USSR now considers itself, in relation to the West, not as a second-rate power which wants

[1] The present situation makes the position of Poland especially precarious and not to be envied. It is hard to see how a Polish-Soviet clash can now be avoided. In the light of the new Soviet policy, the Polish attempt to maintain a neutral (or quasi-neutral) posture within the Communist bloc is as unrealistic as the Yugoslav attempts to maintain a neutral position *between* the blocs. If Gomulka should resist Soviet attempts to have him renounce his position entirely (for some concessions can be expected), a showdown will become inevitable.

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mainly to gain time and to reduce the opponents' vigilance, but as an equal, if not a stronger force in the world.

Second, there is a definite correlation between the Kremlin's policy within the Communist movement and its policy in relation to the outside world. A "hard" line *vis-à-vis* the West cannot be pursued without an attendant "hard" policy towards Communist countries. Conversely, acceptance by the Soviet leadership of a sharper course within the Communist movement requires a sharpening of relations with the West. That acceptance seems now to have taken place. It may well be that even without the change in Soviet psychology just mentioned, a deterioration in Soviet-Western relations would have occurred. In that case, however, Soviet policy would have had a defensive character, and would have manifested itself in a return to isolationism and a cessation of all attempts at negotiation. The new "sputnik psychology," however, rules out isolationism and presages new pressures, tougher "bargaining terms," an end to concessions (however minor) and an intensified propaganda campaign.

THERE IS A LINE of reasoning, widely accepted by many observers, that sees Soviet policy as a product of a carefully prepared, long-range plan of action. According to this reasoning, every shift and turn of the Soviet line has a "deeper" explanation, and each new advance or retreat, if carefully scrutinized, will reveal an underlying purposefulness. In reality, not every Soviet action is so rigorously planned. There are transitional periods when one policy is making way for another. At such times Soviet strategy appears to be inconsistent, with elements of the old policy still in evidence on the surface, and the incipient stages of the new still in preparation. At the present time Soviet policy seems to be moving out of a transitional stage that began in the middle of 1956, and into a period of stable, long-range, planned activity. Hence an understanding of all facets of Soviet foreign policy is vitally important at this juncture. The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute is a case in point. As has been shown in this article, there has always been a close and intimate connection between Moscow's attitude towards Yugoslavia and the general line of Soviet foreign policy. The 1955 *rapprochement* with Tito marked a significant departure from Stalinist rigidity, a policy of appeasement of the West, and a broadening of the Kremlin's area of international activity. Similarly, the new rupture in Soviet-Yugoslav relations is probably a signal of a new phase in the Soviet line—a phase that promises to be marked by intransigence, ideological orthodoxy, and belligerence. As far as Moscow is concerned, the cold war is once again on in earnest.

Retreat and Reaction in Eastern Europe

by Paul Landy

THE RENEWED tug-of-war between Belgrade and the Soviet bloc has occasioned a great amount of speculation and analysis concerning the underlying forces which have brought it about and the implications it holds for the future course of Soviet domestic, foreign and bloc policies. There are some who view the break as the outcome or by-product of a desperate power struggle within the top Soviet echelon—a monumental clash in which those forces who advocated *rapprochement* with Tito as a matter of empirical Realpolitik have been defeated by those who persistently held that any departure from doctrinal rigidity would weaken the Communist camp. While there has not been evidence enough either to support or to disprove the actuality of such a struggle, there are certainly plenty of signs that a concerted effort is being made to restrain centrifugal forces in Eastern Europe and to restore the cohesion and unity of the Soviet bloc.

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In the present writer's view, the open warfare between Belgrade and the Communist bloc is both an outgrowth and an expression of a process of partial restalinization which has been going on in Eastern Europe. This trend has become plainly evident only since the Moscow declaration of Communist solidarity last November, but its seeds go back to the aftermath of the Hungarian and Polish Octobers. It went long unnoticed because of the unfortunate tendency of outside observers to focus attention on the surface changes in Communist society, losing sight of the underlying sameness of most of the ruling regimes.

Leaving to others the analysis of the Moscow-Belgrade break as such, the present paper aims at discussing some of the factors in Eastern Europe which both illustrate and explain the reversion toward conceptions and methods of the Stalinist period. These are most clearly observable in what may be called the "genuine" satellites —Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania. East Germany is excluded from the discussion not because it shows any less Stalinist bent—indeed the Ulbricht regime has surpassed its neighbors in some pertinent respects—but because of the complex, specifically German issues which help to determine the nature of Communist rule there. Poland, on the other hand, cannot be considered a "genuine" satellite, since Gomulka—by Eastern standards—is still a "national" leader, and since internal freedom in the country, whatever its limitations, is still infinitely greater than anywhere else in the Communist camp. Yet Poland, too, reflects the trend toward reaction, and in this context must be mentioned.

The Key to Conservatism: Vested Interest

For the ruling parties in the "genuine" satellites, the fundamental issue of the post-Stalin era has been posed in these terms: Can existing tensions in their countries be eased through some relaxation of control without affecting the Communist monopoly of power? Or are limited forms of grass-roots democracy and autonomy in economic management incompatible with the inherent demands of a totalitarian system? What are the limits beyond which—for all the talk of closer ties to the masses—trade unions, popular front organizations and the communications media may not stray?

In answering these questions—as they now appear to be doing—the ruling hierarchies inevitably have been influenced by the inescapable logic of their own position. In each country, the people at the top of the power pyramid have been installed and kept in power by Moscow. Their loyalty and obedience to the Kremlin is a foregone conclusion. At the same time, they have a vested interest in preserving things as they are, and any force or policy which might threaten—however remotely—the internal *status quo* in their countries is bound to raise fears concerning their personal survival.

Thus, whatever the differences in their backgrounds, abilities and personalities, the present leaders of the satellites generally share the one characteristic of self-interested conservatism. There is no popular national leader of the caliber of an Imre Nagy or a Wladyslaw Gomulka among them; in fact, many of them owe their positions to the direct favor of Stalin in times past.

In tiny Albania—which, as one Western observer has remarked, "never even seemed to hear of Stalin's death" —Enver Hoxha, the party leader and Mehmet Shehu, the head of government, have held the reins of power ever since the Communist take-over. They are renowned for their iron rule at home and for their unabated hatred of Marshal Tito. An index of their attitude was their failure—during the period when posthumous rehabilitations were in vogue—to clear the name of Koci Xoxe, former Deputy Premier who was executed on charges of Titoist conspiracy in a notorious case of 1949.

In Rumania, the all-powerful party secretary, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej is generally regarded as the most subtle at the game of Communist power politics, studiously avoiding the dangerous pitfalls of extremist stands in controversial issues. Since last summer, when Joseph Chisinevsky and Miron Constantinescu were eased out of the top hierarchy with a skillful mixture of charges labeling them both revisionists and Stalinists, Gheorghiu-Dej has been sitting firmer in the saddle than ever.

In Bulgaria Anton Yugov as premier and Todor Zhivkov as first secretary have managed to hold their ground against the repeated come-back attempts of Vulko Chervenkov, who lost the premiership more than three years ago. Until recently he held the important post of Minister of Culture and was still rumored to have considerable influence. However, the fact that on June 9 he lost this position and was replaced by party secretary Zhivkov, with the obvious approval of Khrushchev, indicates that Moscow has decisively barred the door to a Chervenkov come-back.

In Czechoslovakia, the present Politburo has consistently excelled in buttressing the conservative line, rather than experimenting with the more flexible Communist policies of the post-Stalin era. The death of President Zapotocky and his replacement by the party

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secretary Antonin Novotny in November 1957 has produced no changes in this respect.

Finally, in Hungary Janos Kadar continues to represent and to spearhead the black reaction which followed in the wake of the 1956 revolution. In the spring of 1957 he stepped down as premier, but he has retained the post of party secretary with undiminished influence. The new premier, Ferenc Muennich is a cautious, Moscow-trained veteran politician who takes no chances when he can avoid them.

NO LESS THAN the leaders the party apparata under their control have a vested interest in preserving the *status quo.* This truism is worth repeating because of fallacious views sometimes heard underestimating the strength and resilience of the large band of career functionaries who people the party hierarchies. This powerful group, which totals many, many thousands in all the satellites together, was never inclined to permit greater freedom and even less to absorb the criticism produced by that freedom. By instinct and by reason, many of them have bitterly protested the trends of recent years toward liberalization or democratization; if any of them ever looked upon the Twentieth CPSU Congress as a *cause celèbre,* its aftermath has surely changed their minds.

The self-interested *apparatchiki*—perhaps rightly—make no distinction between threats to the regime and threats to themselves; in their eyes, probably one of the most dangerous consequences of the "thaw" period has been the bare spotlight of contempt and ridicule which has been turned upon them. The arch-enemies are writers like the Hungarian Gyula Hay, whose famous satire, "Why do I not like Kucsera," made a mockery of the party functionary's presumed right to pass judgment on all matters with equal ignorance; or Todor Genoff, whose unproduced play, "The Fear," is a crushing indictment of self-seeking opportunists in the party bureaucracy; or Poland's Marek Hlasko, whose "Cemetery" reflects the bleak, hopeless and brutal milieu of Communist life in general.

The party leaders and their committed supporters may not want to return to Stalinist excesses—in terms of institutionalized purge—but since the Hungarian eruption they have grasped that what is at stake is the very foundations of their power. Accordingly, a quiet but extremely effective brake has been applied to every manifestation of political-intellectual thaw which might threaten the fundamental totalitarian concept, the supreme authority of party and state. That this concept will be defended as an issue of survival was most pregnantly expressed by the Hungarian theoretical monthly, *Tarsadalmi Szemle,* when it stated: ". . . we would dig our own grave, if we were to deviate from the one-party system." [1]

The Party Supreme

The determined reassertion of the party's role as the supreme and infallible "guide" of society—and the equally determined opposition to any force, real or imagined, which might threaten that supremacy—have emerged, in one form or another, as the dominant keynotes in most authoritative pronouncements of satellite leaders in recent months. A typical statement was that of Dimitri Ganeff, Bulgarian Politburo member, at the recent Bulgarian CP Congress (June 2-7):

To permit the party line and policy to be negated and abused would mean to allow a struggle to be waged against socialism, against the interests of our people.

Elsewhere he asserted:

The Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party liquidated the petty-bourgeois wave of criticism against socialism; [it] made unmistakably clear that all weaknesses and deficiencies in our society may be freely censured, but the party—and the policy of the party—is above criticism.[2]

What "weaknesses" and "deficiencies" *can* still be criticized "freely" has become the question of the hour, since the renewed emphasis on party supremacy has had as its counterpart the relentless assault against "revisionism," a term freely applied to any criticism which the party regimes deem dangerous. In the new line, "revisionism" has come to epitomize the challenge to party rule. This idea was succinctly expressed by Vaclav Kopecky, Czechoslovak Politburo member and theorist, speaking at the Slovak CP Congress (May 16-18):

Contemporary revisionism is directed not against some former faulty administrative measures, but against the essence of party and state guidance in general.[3]

Frequently the point is stressed that any departure from the orthodox doctrine of the leading role of the party would spell the end of the system itself. Hungarian spokesmen in particular have invoked the "lesson" of the 1956 uprising to drive this point home. In

[1] *Tsaradalmi Szemle* (Budapest), March 1958.

[2] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), June 7, 1958.

[3] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), May 19, 1958.

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the recent words of Bela Biszku, Hungarian Minister of Interior:

> **The Nagy-Losonczy group termed outmoded the Leninist teachings concerning the party of the working class and concerning the role of the party; [they] vindicated the right "to develop the teachings of Marxism-Leninism." Where did these views lead in practice? To the disruption of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to a counterrevolutionary *putsch*. . . . There is no place for appeasement, for compromise, for inexcusable concessions to the representatives of these deviations.[4]**

Political Squeeze

Concurrent with the renewed stress on the dogma of party dictatorship, there has been a practical effort to reaffirm party controls over every domain of public activity. Diverse steps have been taken in the various satellites to entrench the party's position and to insure the permanency of its rule, mainly by cracking down on the potential centers or sources of resistance. These trends toward consolidation and reaction have been especially discernible in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, and even to some extent in Poland.

The "new look" of rigidity in particular has affected regime relations with the Catholic Church, with workers and with the intelligentsia. Since, in a paper of this scope, it would be impossible to trace all of the relevant developments in each satellite, the writer will confine himself to selected examples which most clearly indicate the general trend.

The renewal of anti-religious activity, heralded by marked increases in atheistic propaganda, has been most apparent in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. At the recent Slovak Party Congress, the party leadership called for a concerted effort to strengthen the drive against religion, resulting in a flood of leaflets and lectures attacking the retrograde influence of religious belief. In Hungary the authorities defied the excommunication decree of the Vatican and exerted new efforts to build up the despised "peace priests" movement, trying through force, threat, discrimination or persuasion to induce the priests to support the Kadar regime. Church-state relations, it is declared, must be transformed into "an active, positive coexistence," the terms of which "must be determined by the needs of building socialism." Thus "the Church should base its activities on those priests who are proven followers of peace and socialism."[5] Circulars have been issued to local party cadres directing them to organize atheistic lectures and other anti-religious activities. The party organ *Nepszabadsag* has issued a warning that "the party does not need toys of alien ideologies and must be screened of people infected by religious, idealistic ideas."

The crackdown on the labor force has been manifested most clearly in the reimposition and tightening of party controls over the trade unions and other workers' organs in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. In Hungary, some five hundred "factory councils" were created in the fall of 1957 to furnish a pretense of workers' authority, but they have been—as they were intended to be—merely timid executive organs of the party and of the Communist-controlled trade unions (from which "unreliable elements" have been thoroughly purged.) By contrast, the workers' councils set up in Poland were initially expected to assume a genuine degree of participation in factory management—thus the recent rescinding of their functions has constituted one of the most disappointing signs of the retreat from the Polish October. At a Trade Union Congress held last April, Gomulka announced the transformation of the councils into so-called "conferences of workers' self-government"; the title notwithstanding, the effect was to give the party veto power over the proposals of workers' representatives. At the same time Gomulka made strikes virtually illegal and reasserted the Communist principle that trade unions cannot be independent of the ruling party.[6]

With respect to workers' rights, the Gomulka regime has thus reverted in large measure to the situation which prevailed before the "Polish October," erasing some of the most significant gains which had won him labor's support. In announcing these moves, Gomulka openly admitted the Communists' failure to resolve the crucial dilemma: how to give workers a voice in economic direction without ceding to them a measure of the party's power. The fiasco of the Polish experiment in this vital field shows that even a limited form of grass-roots democracy inadvertently leads to the gradual diminution of party authority.

The Resort to Mass Purge

Measures to curb resistive sentiment among the intelligentsia, both cultural and technical, have to some extent merged in the Communists' much broader crack-

[4] *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), April 22, 1958.

[5] Gyula Kallai, speech reported in *Nepszabadsag*, April 19, 1958.

[6] Wladislaw Gomulka, speech of April 14, 1958, published in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) the following day.

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down against "bourgeois" elements among the people at large. Taking no chances, some regimes have been carrying out a massive purge and screening of those segments of the population where they apparently feel their support is shaky, and where the germs of doubt or indifference have been most visible. Prominent among these groups is the large segment of white-collar and bureaucratic workers. In Czechoslovakia, for example, an announced total of some 100,000 employees judged to be "politically unreliable" have been purged from government ministries, nationalized firms and other agencies, and dispersed around the country in production jobs. While this move is in part an economically-motived measure to thin down the top-heavy bureaucracy and to increase the ranks of productive labor, it has clearly been used at the same time to "clean house" politically. In the words of Oldrich Cernik, a secretary of the party Central Committee:

Many politically alien elements have filled various posts on the pretext of possessing professional qualifications. They must be eliminated. Such elements are bearers of bureaucratism; [they] block the initiative of their Communist associates, are anti-Soviet, grovel before all things Western and are used by the class enemy for subversive purposes. . . . They should be offered work where they will be under the direct influence of workers.[7]

The Hungarian regime, which imprisoned tens of thousands of people from all sectors of the population for their allegedly treasonable acts during the 1956 uprising, has shown no inclination toward an amnesty; on the contrary it has continued its assault in other forms, purging, for example, some 20,000 persons from the state apparatus during 1957. The frontal attack on the cultural intelligentsia — including punitive actions against a number of rebellious writers and the expulsion of some 160 editors and newsmen from the Journalists' Union—now seems to have passed its peak, but it has been superseded by an equally vigorous crack-down on other professional fields, including most recently lawyers and physicians.

In a drastic move that admittedly is politically inspired, the regime has announced that the legal profession is to be "nationalized" by August 31 of this year, and that its members may thenceforth practice only in so-called "lawyers' collectives." In justifying this measure, Minister of Justice Ferenc Nezval charged that many lawyers in Budapest and in other sections of the country were guilty of counterrevolutionary activities. Party and mass organization officials have been given the job of "screening" all lawyers in the districts of Budapest to determine their "eligibility" for membership in the collectives. In a similar move, the regime has announced that a new medical code is to be set up by the end of September, entailing a drastic curtailment of the private practice of physicians.

Intellectuals Under Fire

While the campaign against writers and intellectuals seems to have spent its first wind in Hungary, it is still much in evidence in other satellites. In contrast to Rumania, where intellectual unrest apparently never exceeded the limits of party tolerance, there have been some rather remarkable manifestations of discontent and protest in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. In both countries, the regimes have been generally successful in stifling open protest, but there are plenty of signs that passive resistance continues.[8]

The developments in Bulgaria are especially interesting in view of its reputation as a "quiet" satellite. Sporadic reports of intellectual unrest have emanated from the country, but only recently has the regime openly revealed its fear of such undercurrents by launching a full-scale attack of denunciation and disciplinary action against individual recalcitrants. In December 1957 it was publicly charged that about twenty writers—under the influence of Hungarian, Polish and Yugoslav "anti-socialist trends"—had earlier questioned the leading role of the party in the arts and had criticized socialist realism; that some of them even had gone so far as to condemn Soviet intervention in Hungary and—perhaps as their worst crime—had since failed to "draw the necessary conclusions," that is, to see the error of their ways.[9] This last charge, and the attack itself, was an admission that these writers and probably many others have continued to show passive resistance by resorting to the tactic of silence—or what the French have called "the dialogue of the deaf"—apparently sidestepping party exhortations that they amend their views and produce "party-minded" literature.

Between December and April the attack was extended: several editors were dismissed from their jobs, and a number of controversial plays and novels were banned from publication. By early April—when a Congress of the Writers' Union was convened—such pres-

[7] *Zivot Strany* (Prague), as quoted in *The New York Times*, April 13, 1958.

[8] For a discussion of intellectual unrest in Czechoslovakia see Otto Pick's article in this issue.—Ed.

[9] See *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), December 26, 1957, and April 4, 1958.

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sures, plus the threat of expulsion from the Union, finally led the majority of the accused writers to confess and recant their "errors." Hristo Radevsky, secretary of the Union, was able to boast in his report:

> The discussions which we had on the false opinions and erroneous views convinced us that these errors belong to the past and will remain merely as an unpleasant remembrance in our memory.[10]

Recently the Bulgarian authorities also revealed that a quiet purge had been taking place among leading scientists "who have had certain doubts on fundamental ideological issues." The announcement of their expulsion from the Bulgarian Academy of Science included a tribute to the Academy's party committee, which, it was said, "gained great merit by expelling from this supreme institution some pseudo-scientific workers as well as alien and hostile elements who had made their nests in faculties of the Academy." [11]

Even in Poland—where the relaxation of bans on free expression was one of the main marks of the country's revolt from satellite status—a number of disquieting developments have taken place, including a tightening of press censorship, the issuance of new restrictive rules on publishing, and the dismissal of scores of the journalists who were the most outspoken supporters of the October upheaval. This trend toward the restriction of intellectual freedom has picked up speed in recent months, threatening the relatively unhampered cultural climate of the Polish experiment.

The Return to Orthodoxy

The trend of reaction in Eastern Europe thus represents a two-pronged retreat—on the one hand, to the political pattern of total dictatorship, on the other, to the ideological bastion of total orthodoxy. The aforementioned reassertion of rigid dogma concerning the party and its leading role is only one aspect of the new orthodoxy: virtually the entire body of basic Marxist-Leninist teaching has been declared beyond the bounds of question or interpretation. Paradoxically, the party keeps demanding that theorists counter "the slanderous allegations of modern revisionism and bourgeois sociology" by the application of creative Marxism—yet at the same time it sharply rebukes the few theorists who attempt to think or to write for themselves in what they believe is the much-heralded "creative Marxist" vein. Theoretical writers and teachers are thus placed in the unenviable position of "damned if they do; damned if they don't."

Typical of the blind line of official complaint was a recent commentary in the Rumanian party organ *Scanteia*, which at once condemned attempts to "develop" Marxism as "revisionistic" and bewailed the sterility of ideological teaching (specifically at Bucharest University):

> The fight against revisionism is extremely urgent because reformistic and revisionist tendencies are working against the essential dogmas of socialism, under the mask of development of Marxism . . . The theses of dialectical materialism are taught in a stony style without further explanations or argumentation. Attacks are directed solely against the representatives of idealism—*i.e.*, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Mach and Averanius. It is certainly simpler to struggle with these philosophers, for there is at hand the crushing critique supplied by Marx, Engels and Lenin. But what answers do the theories of modern philosophers get? [12]

Marx—Revised or Reviled?



Caption above: The New Revisionism
Caption below: The "Creative Application of Marxism". (Left and right are trees of "socialism" and "capitalism"; the caricatured revisionist reads from Marx.)

—From Becherni Novini (Sofia), May 28, 1956.

[10] *Ibid.*, April 10, 1958.
[11] *Rabotnichesko Delo,* February 16, 1958.
[12] *Scanteia* (Bucharest), March 6, 1958.

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This passage reveals the inherent dilemma in totalitarian ideological conception: any convincing apologia or justification of Marxism-Leninism *must*—if it is to be accepted—reconcile the realities of communism as it has developed in practice with the presupposed stereotypes set forth in theory. Obviously the sterility of ideology cannot be overcome—even by Communist standards—while the absurd logic prevails that the dogma is sacred and untouchable. Whether it could be overcome at all is outside the scope of this article.

That most Communist theorists stick to the well-worn paths of proven safety—however dull the route—rather than venturing the risks of "creative Marxist" exploration is understandable in view of what has happened to braver comrades. The rapidly changing fortunes of Georgy Lukacs, for instance, furnish a discouraging example for those who put stock on personal security. The aging Hungarian scholar, perhaps the single living theoretician who can be called a great Marxist, has been the target of continued attack since last autumn, an experience which is hardly new to him.

The ups-and-downs in Lukacs' long career have, in a sense, provided an index of the prevailing winds in the Communist world; from the 1930's on anti-Lukacs campaigns always have seemed to herald periods of doctrinal rigidity. In 1945 he was extolled as the foremost authority on Communist literature. In 1948 he was ostracized and ridiculed. In the 1954-56 period of prerevolutionary "thaw" he was hailed by the party theoreticians—and among others, by Joseph Szigeti, his eminent pupil—as an outstanding representative of creative Marxism. In November 1956—as a member of the Nagy government—he was exiled to Rumania along with others of Nagy's supporters. In April 1957 he was allowed to return, apparently in the expectation that he would write what the regime wanted written. Hardly six months later, however, the present concerted campaign of invective was launched against him—ironically under the direction of the same Joseph Szigeti, now Deputy Minister of Culture. Szigeti has written two lengthy studies on the deviations of the old philosopher, and as recently as May 6, another regime spokesman attacked him as a revisionist "who became the banner of the enemy in October 1956 and has not been able to separate himself from this banner ever since." [13] Aside from the general trend of reaction, one of the immediate causes for the renewed attacks against Lukacs was his most recent work, a monograph on esthetic categories, in which he again committed the cardinal crime of original thinking.

[13] Gyula Kallai, statement in *Nepszabadsag*, May 6, 1958.

It is not surprising, then, that the regimes throughout the Communist bloc have failed to spur the initiative of the thin ranks of "party intelligentsia" toward the development of "creative Marxism." The truth of the matter is that any *genuine* innovation in Communist theory must contain the germs of new, and therefore "heretical" ideas, and these ideas in turn prove politically infectious. In this situation it is inevitable that the forces of reaction will prevail, that the ideological climate will continue to be what the French writer Raymond Aron has aptly called "ideological terrorism defined by the inquisitor-theologians." [14]

The creed and psychology of the "inquisitor-theologians" was recently put into words by one of their eminent number, the Bulgarian Georgi Dimitroff-Ghoskin:

The statement, "revisionism is the main danger," does not mean that it is already a reality. However, should we wait until it becomes a dominant feature in our party, society and cultural life, and only then sound the alarm? In this case, we would be fatally late. Revisionism has hidden possibilities and appears in half-disguised forms—open deviations are few and isolated.[15]

Tito—Thorn and Threat

The advocates of this simple concept of good and evil, who exist in number at the top and in the middle layers of the Communist hierarchies, greeted the short-lived period of Yugoslav-Soviet *rapprochement* with faint enthusiasm, trying to pay lip service to the Kremlin line but at the same time to hold in check any possible political or ideological repercussions which might threaten their essentially conservative position and policy. This was perhaps the prevailing attitude of the ruling cliques in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania and, of course, Albania. It was true to a lesser extent of Hungary, where the excesses of the anti-Tito crusade of 1948-53 made the *rapprochement* harder both to digest and to explain. It does not apply to Poland, which tried initially—albeit discreetly—to smooth over Moscow-Belgrade differences when they began to develop.

It requires no insight to see that the genuine satellites—especially Albania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia—played an important role in the behind-the-scenes maneuvers which preceded the open rupture with Yugoslavia. The regimes in these countries always have

[14] Raymond Aron, "Soviet Society in Transition," *Problems of Communism*, No. 6 (November-December), 1957.

[15] *Literaturen Front*, February 20, 1958.

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viewed Yugoslav communism as the *bête noire* which brought instability and disruption to Eastern Europe, and they have not forgiven the Yugoslavs their share of responsibility in sparking the Hungarian uprising. It seems fairly obvious that they had had more than enough of Tito's tactics of sniping and veiled allusions, and they may well have urged an all-out frontal battle against Belgrade as the pole of attraction for all revisionism.

The recent reaffirmation of the 1948 Cominform resolution against Yugoslavia has added an ominous push to the satellites' retreat toward Stalinist ideological positions. The resort to increasingly oppressive political and economic measures raises the equally ominous possibility of their full return to Stalinist political methods. For the moment, implications of the new anti-Titoist crusade are a matter of speculation: but it is reasonable to suppose that, barring future upheavals, they can give only new impulse to the restalinization of Eastern Europe.

The Spectre of Revisionism

by Donald S. Zagoria

EVER SINCE THE "summit meeting" of Communist Party national leaders at Moscow last November, the Communist world has been experiencing an intense official struggle against "revisionism." Khrushchev himself, addressing the Supreme Soviet in honor of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, went so far as to equate revisionism with treason [1]—an equation which, in retrospect, may be said to have foreshadowed the recent execution of Imre Nagy. Khrushchev's indictment was promptly followed by the joint ideological declaration, subscribed to by twelve of the thirteen governing Communist parties represented at the "summit meeting," which singled out revisionism as the "main danger" to the international Communist movement.

These developments were the prelude to a vehement and concerted propaganda struggle which has since been waged in the Communist camp against all forms of revisionist thought. The campaign has brought forth striking admissions both of the spread of revisionist ideas and of the extreme gravity with which the Soviet leadership views this phenomenon. *Pravda,* for example, on January 17, 1958, pointed to a "growing tendency" among "unstable elements" in the Communist movement to reject "the basic tenets" of Marxism. The review *Moskva* (No. 1, 1958) underscored *Pravda's* warning with this alarmist declaration:

Revisionism and national communism must be beaten and destroyed ideologically . . . either we bury revisionism, or revisionism buries us. There is no third course.

Thus, after a brief interlude of relative ideological détente in the wake of the historic Twentieth Congress, the Soviet ideological pendulum has been swinging back toward strict doctrinal conformity and monolithic discipline, and "revisionism" has been thrust to the top of the list of Communist cardinal sins. What, then, is revisionism in the present context of the international Communist movement; and what are the most important elements in revisionist thinking which have led Moscow to see in it almost as mortal an enemy as capitalism itself?

Profile of Revisionism

Although denial of Marxism "on the main issues," has been cited in official Communist sources as the chief distinguishing characteristic of revisionist thought,[2]

[1] Khrushchev's address of November 6, published in *Pravda,* November 7, 1957.

[2] *E.g.,* see article entitled, "Error, Deviation, Revisionism, Dogmatism," in the theoretical organ of the Hungarian CP, *Tarsadalmi Szemle,* January 1958.

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most of those accused of revisionism—including many who have either quit or been ousted from their respective Communist parties—continue to profess allegiance to Marxism, and indeed to communism. However, when it comes to the question of the extent and nature of the reforms advocated, the spectrum of revisionist thinking embraces many shades.

At one end are the conservative revisionists who merely advocate further steps to rid communism of what they regard as remaining Stalinist aberrations; in the middle are those who would go somewhat farther and qualify or update some Leninist precepts; at the other end, finally, are the radical revisionists, embracing a majority who would reject the bulk of Lenin's teachings in favor of "a return to Marx," and an extremist minority who dare to challenge even some basic Marxist concepts. The French Communist philosopher Henri Lefebvre, now connected with the review *Voies Nouvelles* (New Paths) published since last April, is representative of the conservative revisionist viewpoint; the Polish revisionist Julian Hochfeld, of the attitude of the middle group; Hochfeld's compatriot, Leszek Kolakowski, and the Italian ex-Communist Antonio Giolitti, of the thinking of the radicals. Kolakowski, though still a party member, is more extreme in some respects than Giolitti, going so far as to question historical determinism, the very heart of Marxism.

Nevertheless, despite individual differences of philosophic viewpoint and approach, revisionist thinking reveals certain common basic assumptions or "common features" on which Moscow has focused its attack.[3] These attacks serve at once as a guide to the ideas of the most prominent Communist dissidents and as an index to those elements of Communist dogma which Moscow considers most essential to the preservation of Soviet hegemony over the world Communist movement.

Perhaps the aspect of revisionism which Moscow has most frequently and bitterly assailed as being "generally characteristic" of the revisionist viewpoint is its rejection of the Soviet concept of "proletarian internationalism." [4] As defined by Moscow, "proletarian internationalism" forms the ideological cornerstone of the world Communist edifice and requires absolute submission by all the national parties to Soviet policy and to the decisions of the CPSU as final, supreme arbiter in matters of doctrine. The revisionists, however, vigorously dispute this conception; indeed, virtually all of them would apply to their own countries the proposition of the purged French Communist, Pierre Hervé, who declared: "The Communist Party is not a church, and France is not the eldest daughter of the church of Moscow." [5] The same attitude likewise inspired the East German reformist, Dr. Wolfgang Harich, jailed in 1957 on charges of treason, to write that "the resistance of the people's democracies to the hegemony of the USSR is part and parcel of the revolutionary class struggle." [6]

On this key issue most revisionists are in accord with the position expressed in the Yugoslav Communists' "draft program" of last April, which stipulated that relations among Communist states should be those of free and equal nations. Neither the CPSU unilaterally nor any forum of Communist parties, they hold, is entitled to make decisions which are binding upon any individual party; and each party must have the exclusive right to judge the suitability and correctness of its own policies and tactics. This denial of the CPSU's claimed role of supreme arbiter clearly constitutes the most important heresy of present-day revisionism, and the one from which all others follow. For without such authority Moscow could no longer fix nor enforce uniform criteria for determining what is heretical and what is not, and this in turn would inevitably mean an end to monolithic discipline in the Communist movement.

The "Separate Paths" Controversy

Closely bound up with the revisionists' rejection of absolute Soviet control over the national parties is their fundamental opposition to the principle that the Soviet political and economic structure and Soviet methods shall be regarded as universally binding for all Communist countries. The issue has very great practical implications, for the laxity or severity of the requirement for adherence to the Soviet model determines the

[3] As typical examples of such attacks published in the Soviet press, see articles by Konstantinov in *Pravda,* February 5, 1958, and by Ye. Kuskov in the monthly *V Pomoshch Politicheskomu Samoobrazovaniyu,* January 1958.

[4] *E.g., Izvestia,* December 28, 1957.

[5] Pierre Hervé, *La Révolution et les Fétiches,* Paris, 1957. (A former editor of the French CP organ, *L'Humanité,* Hervé is now on the editorial board of Auguste LeCoeur's *La Nation Socialiste.*)

[6] From Harich's "Testament," a document setting forth the major "demands" of his revisionist group and smuggled out of East Germany to London, where it was published in *The Observer,* March 17, 1957. Harich, formerly editor of the East German Communist philosophical journal *Deutsche Zeitschrift Fuer Philosophie,* was sentenced in the same month to ten years' penal servitude as the alleged leader of an intra-party "reformist" group conspiring to overthrow the Ulbricht regime.

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limits within which Communist bloc countries can experiment with original, indigenous forms of political-economic organizations and methods suited to local conditions.

Soviet socialism, argue the revisionists, was built in a backward agrarian country ruled by an absolute autocracy and cut off from Western political traditions; hence, the Russian revolutionary experience and the political-economic system that evolved from it cannot be grafted, without change, onto other countries where conditions are vastly different. A typical exponent of this view is the Dutch revisionist, Cornelis Geugjes, accused by Moscow of being the theoretician of an "organized rightwing faction" within the Dutch CP.[7] He maintains that Leninist organizational principles were applicable only to the specific conditions prevailing in Russia and cannot be applied today by other Communist parties acting under different conditions. Similarly, in Poland, the *enragés*—the young intellectuals who have been the foremost champions of revisionism within the Soviet orbit—argued that it was only Stalin's megalomania which gave birth to the idea that the USSR had the mission to tell Communists everywhere what to do; that Lenin never intended the Russian revolution to serve as a model for all other countries; and that the tactics employed by the Bolsheviks in achieving and consolidating power, although for the most part justified, cannot be canonized into a hard-and-fast blueprint for the building of socialism.[8]

Harich has, perhaps, carried this argument farther than most revisionists. In his "testament," he contended not only that the Soviet model cannot be successfully imitated where conditions are different, but that persistent attempts to adhere to it have become a positive deterrent to Communist progress. Since the new hardening of the Soviet ideological line, Moscow has been assailing this particular aspect of revisionism with notable vehemence and is again insisting that most of the Russian revolutionary experience is universally valid. Khrushchev himself has stated that there is only one "high road" to socialism—that taken by the USSR—and that other roads can be only "tributaries" of the main stream.[9]

"Dictatorship" Redefined

Apart from their stand on the broad issues of the relationship of the CPSU to other Communist parties and the universal applicability of the Soviet model, much of the revisionists' thinking has to do with specific aspects of Communist political doctrine and practice. Here, their fundamentalist position in favor of a "return to Marx" expresses itself in demands for a broadening of the narrow Leninist-Stalinist interpretation of "the dictatorship of the proletariat," particularly with reference to the role of the party. The very term, "dictatorship of the proletariat," which under Lenin and even more under Stalin became synonomous with dictatorship of the party, was hardly ever employed by Marx, and many revisionists maintain that the whole concept, as now interpreted by Moscow, is obsolete. The Italian revisionist Giolitti expressed this viewpoint in a 1957 essay in which he urged the need to revise Communist theory to take account of the practical development of "new forms of power which can no longer be defined as either dictatorship of the proletariat or dictatorship of the bourgeoisie."[10]

As Marx conceived it, dictatorship of the proletariat evidently was compatible with varying political forms including a multi-party system, since he used the term in reference to the Paris Commune, in which many parties participated and Marx's own followers constituted but a tiny minority. It is this broader, fundamentalist conception of proletarian dictatorship which the revisionists advocate. Kolakowski, for example, urges tolerance of all ideologies "based on principles of socialism," and his compatriot, Wiktor Woroszylski, recently ousted as editor of the intellectual review *Nowa Kultura,* has argued that a multi-party system is compatible with the building of socialism. These Polish revisionist views were echoed in the May 1958 issue of the Yugoslav Communist theoretical journal *Nasa Stvarnost,* whose editor, N. Pasic, wrote that "a multi-party system as well as parliamentary institutions can be political forms of a system the class essence of which is the dictatorship of the proletariat." Some Canadian Communists, denounced by Moscow as "right-wing opportunists," have even rejected the necessity of proletarian dictatorship, advocating instead that the proletariat share political power with other groups which need not necessarily be anti-capitalist.

In order to prevent the degeneration of any Communist party or regime into a self-perpetuating totalitarian

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[7] *Pravda,* May 23, 1958.

[8] *Po Prostu,* Warsaw, December 2, 1956; February 17, 1957.

[9] Khrushchev's address of November 6, 1957, *op. cit.,* and his speech delivered in Czechoslovakia, July 11, 1957, reported in *Pravda,* July 12, 1957.

[10] Antonio Giolitti, *Riforme e Rivoluzione,* Torino, 1957. This essay subjected Giolitti to heavy attack by the Italian CP leadership as well as by Moscow. A summary of an attack by Italian CP Secretary Luigi Longo appeared in *V Pomoshch Politicheskomu Samoobrazovaniyu,* April 30, 1958.

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system, some revisionists have urged the introduction of definite institutional safeguards, including greater independence for elected parliamentary deputies, both Communist and non-Communist, and guarantees of the right of all sectors of public opinion to express themselves freely on all aspects of regime policy. In Poland, for example, Hochfeld appealed for an alteration of the legislative system which, without endangering the leadership role of the Communist Party, would elevate the status of the legislature so that it could function as a "restraining and balancing" force for democratization. Communist deputies in the Sejm, he suggested, should be allowed full freedom of expression; instead of being mere "adjuncts" of the party executive organs, *i.e.*, the Politburo and Secretariat, they should in fact serve as a check upon these bodies.[11] Addressing the Italian CP's 1956 Congress, Giolitti, too, asserted that eventual party rule in Italy must incorporate similar institutional guarantees:

Democratic freedom in its institutional forms, including *formal and parliamentary guarantees, is not just* "bourgeois" freedom but an essential element of the construction of a socialist society in our country.[12]

The Plea for Intra-Party Democracy

In addition to such extra-party safeguards against the concentration of autocratic power in the hands of the party leadership, the revisionists unanimously insist upon genuine internal democratization of the party. They deny that the Leninist concept of military discipline is any longer applicable to modern Communist societies, and they equally reject Stalin's contribution of the "single alternative"—agreement with the party leadership or excommunication. They demand the elimination of party punishment for "deviation"; they insist that, instead of stifling intra-party debate in the name of "unity," the leadership should encourage unfettered discussion as a means of preventing ossification of the party.[13]

Revisionist demands for inner-party democratization have often been more bold and sweeping in the Western CPs than in their sister parties of the Communist bloc countries. In particular, Western revisionists have demanded freedom not merely to voice minority views within party councils but to express them publicly, including the right to publish their own organs of minority opinion.[14] This general issue evidently lay behind the Netherlands CPs expulsion last April of four leading Communist members of parliament, two of them also members of the party Politburo, on charges of "reformism"; at any rate, the purgees countered with public statements specifically accusing party Secretary General Paul de Groot of stifling open discussion of party policy. In Britain, also, revisionist members of the party's special committee on intra-party democracy, unwilling to accept the committee's innocuous majority report, issued a separate report rejecting "democratic centralism" as "not suited to our party or to present

[11] *Nowe Drogi,* Warsaw, No. 4, 1957.

[12] Giolitti's remarks at the congress, as well as those of other dissidents, were significantly published in the Polish journal, *Zeszyty Teoretyczno-Polityczne,* No. 1-2, 1957.

[13] *E.g., Po Prostu,* December 2, 1956; *Nowe Drogi,* No. 2, 1957.

[14] The principal revisionist organs which have appeared in the West include: in Italy, Giolitti's *Passato e presente* and ex-Communist Senator Eugenio Reale's *Corrispondenza socialists;* in France, *Voies Nouvelles* (edited by LeFebvre and other French CP dissidents), *La Nouvelle Réforme, Tribune de Discussions,* and *La Commune;* in Britain, *The New Reasoner.*

MUCH ADO ABOUT A "WORM" . . .

В КАКОМ НАПРАВЛЕНИИ РАБОТАЕТ ГОЛОВА РЕВИЗИОНИСТОВ.
Рис. М. Абрамова.

Above: The Solidarity of Socialist Countries.
Below: This is the direction in which the head of revisionism works.

—*From Pravda (Moscow), May 7, 1958.*

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British conditions" and demanding an end to Central Committee control of the party press, with recognition of the right of party minorities to publish "independent political organs." [15]

Demands for "broader democracy" have also characterized a strong revisionist current in the largest Latin American Communist Party, that of Brazil. The Soviet writer Kuskov noted in January 1958 (see footnote 3) that the Brazilian revisionists had pressed for democratization of the party statutes, including the specific proposal that "any party organization be granted the right to demand an open discussion of any issue at any time, even by minority request." [16] "Similar opportunistic views," Kuskov acknowledged, were being put forward by revisionist elements in a number of other Communist parties.

Behind the proposals and arguments of many revisionists in opposition to the concept of an all-embracing and monolithic party-state dictatorship lies the basic desire to restrict the party largely to the role of ideological educator originally envisioned for it by Marx. The Polish writer Roman Jurys, for example, pointed to what happened on the occasions of both the Poznan riots and the Hungarian uprising, when the party "quickly disappeared from the surface of social life," as proof that the party's usurpation of an all-encompassing role had thoroughly discredited it. Its true function and basic task, he maintained, should be that of "guide and educator" dedicated to raising the political consciousness of the masses to the level of the vanguard.[17]

The Economics of Communism and Capitalism

Another important aspect of revisionism is its questioning of hallowed Communist economic doctrine and policies. In the area of practical policy, the revisionists are unanimous in rejecting the distinction—introduced by Stalin and still preserved—between the period of building socialism, during which economic hardship and deprivation must be borne, and the stage, always in the future, when the rewards of the Communist Nirvana will at last be attained. They want to enjoy at least some of the fruits of socialism immediately. In concrete economic terms, they want greater emphasis on consumer goods production, a lowering of work norms, profit-sharing, and greater social security benefits. The establishment of workers' councils and the abandonment of forced collectivization, which were among the first revisionist demands granted by the Gomulka regime in Poland, have also figured in the platforms put forward by revisionists in some other Communist bloc countries.[18]

In the view of many revisionists, however, the problem is not merely one of alleviating oppressive Stalinist economic policies in the Communist ruled countries, but of updating certain aspects of Marxist economic doctrine concerning capitalism, which now appear obsolescent. Marx, they point out, failed to foresee a number of important developments that have transformed capitalism: the growth in influence of organized labor unions, the extension of political democracy and of the welfare state, the rise in purchasing power and living standards of the workers, and—most important—the impact of automation. One French revisionist, stressing the need to overhaul Marxist theory, aptly wrote that what matters today is not the poverty of the proletariat in 1850, but the condition of French workers in 1957.

Because of the changes that have taken place in capitalism itself, many revisionists believe with Giolitti that the hegemony of the working class can be realized through natural evolutionary processes, without the necessity of violence. The Western technological revoluiton, according to Giolitti, is the prime moving force in these changes: it is gradually transforming capitalist relations of production into socialist relations under which the working class eventually will "occupy the principal position in the production process, and consequently the central place in the process of social development." [19] Thus, in effect, capitalism is liquidating itself, with an accompanying diminution of the class struggle—and the change is taking place without benefit or need of intervention by Communist parties. Viewing this phenomenon from the dialectical standpoint, some revisionists conclude that it is incumbent upon the working class under capitalism to contribute to capitalism's transformation by helping, rather than hindering, the technological revolution.

All this, of course, has far-reaching implications for Communist political as well as economic doctrine. The revisionist view of the peaceful transformation of

[15] "Report of the Commission on Inner-Party Democracy," published by the British CP, December 1956.

[16] One revisionist faction in the Brazilian CP, led by former party treasurer Agildo Barrata, broke with the party in May 1957. Calling itself the *"corrente renovadera"* (reform current), this group advocated an autonomous national form of communism for Brazil, involving reformed methods of party leadership and a neutralist position in foreign affairs.

[17] *Nowe Drogi,* January 2, 1957; *Zycie Warszawy,* November 23, 1957.

[18] *E.g.,* in Harich's testament, *op. cit.*

[19] Giolitti, *op. cit.*

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capitalism necessarily involves a denial of the traditional Marxist theory of sharpening class struggle leading inevitably to capitalism's overthrow by violent proletarian revolution, as well as of Leninist doctrines concerning the seizure of power. Violence and proletarian dictatorship, the revisionists hold, are no longer necessary, particularly in highly-developed capitalist countries with traditions of political democracy, for there the working class can gain and exercise power through parliamentary means without destroying the bourgeois state apparatus and replacing it by a dictatorship of its own. Harich, in his "testament" cited earlier (footnote 7), even predicted that Communist Party leadership will, in fact, play a negligible role in bringing about socialism in Western Europe:

We hold that capitalism in Western Europe is obsolescent and that socialism is inevitable, but we do not think that the victory of socialism in Western Europe demands a revolution. We think that Western European socialism will take over from capitalism in a peaceful manner.

We are, moreover, of the opinion that the transformation process . . . will not everywhere take place under the auspices of the Communist Party, but that in many countries the Communists will have no part whatever in its direction.

Some American Communist dissidents have reached much the same conclusions as Giolitti and Harich, and have urged even the outright dissolution of the US party. The same idea was also implied in a statement by Bert van Hoorick, formerly secretary of the Belgian CP Central Committee, in April 1956, to the effect that the Communist Party had actually become "an obstacle on the path to socialism." It is hardly surprising that Moscow has been at great pains to refute this fundamental aspect of revisionism, attacking it as based upon a "false theory of the changing nature of capitalism." [20]

The "Indestructible Values": Truth, Morality

Another common element in revisionist thought is its insistence upon liberation of the intellect from the stultifying restraints left over from the days of Stalinism. Instead of demanding blind acceptance of party-prescribed dogma, the revisionists contend, the party must permit a critical confrontation of dogma with the facts, no matter how unpalatable. What Marxism needs, in the words of Lefebvre, is "something like a bath in historical material." [21] Again, Fabrizio Onofri, who quit the Italian CP in 1957 to become, with Giolitti, a favorite target of Moscow's anti-revisionist attacks, decried the setting aside of accepted standards of truth as the chief cause of "the transformation of a revolutionary party into a 'Church'—a rally of men for whom truth is no longer the result of an unending theoretico-practical process, but rather an article of faith." [22] Another French revisionist, Pierre Broué, has specifically urged the necessity of a completely unrestricted and critical reconstruction of Marxist thought:

It is no longer "midnight in the century", and the gigantic statue of Stalin has melted away under the blows of the workers of Budapest. From the time that the workers of Eastern Europe undertook the struggle which brought them to the East Berlin revolt and the Hungarian revolution, we have witnessed a rebirth of revolutionary thought in the countries dominated by the Kremlin. It is this rebirth which the *apparatchiks* have baptized "revisionism". . . . Neither Marx nor Lenin must be taboo . . . in this reconstruction of thought and action.[23]

Perhaps the most telling plank in the platform of the revisionists is their uniform call for a return to the "humanistic" content of Marxism. They reject the amoral legacy bequeathed to the Communist movement by Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin; they contend that the ethical appeal and rationale of the Communist philosophy must be restored, and that this renewal must start with recognition, once and for all, that socialism cannot be built by immoral means. The core of Kolakowski's protest against Soviet-brand communism is clearly moral: as he explains in his major work, *Responsibility and History,* he desires to consolidate "at any price" the "fortress of indestructible values." Similarly, *Le Communiste,* organ of an opposition group in the French CP, declared in a critique of Stalinism, published in its May 1958 issue:

The experience of Stalinism . . . leads us to reaffirm unequivocally that putting an end to the alienation of essential human values is linked, not to the end of private ownership of the means of production, but to the suppression of coercive power in the hands of the state.

Ridiculed by Moscow for wanting to substitute "moral improvement" for the revolutionary aims of communism, revisionists everywhere are nevertheless rediscovering "bourgeois" morality with its emphasis on human dignity. In England, John Saville and E. P.

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[20] *Kommunist,* No. 2, 1958.

[21] "Marxism and French Thought," *Tworszczosc,* Warsaw, No. 4, 1957.

[22] Fabrizio Onofri, *Classe operaia e partito* (Working Class and Party); extracts published in *La Nouvelle Réforme,* No. 1, 1957.

[23] *La Commune,* March 1958.

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Thompson, publishers of the dissident Communist journal, *The New Reasoner,* have formulated a position dubbed "socialist humanism," which places "men and women at the center of socialist theory, instead of resounding abstractions such as the Party, the Two Camps, and the Vanguard of the Working Class." [24] The Italian revisionist Onofri, assailing the "abstract, schematic Jacobinism" of Lenin, asserts in a similar vein that "communism's most serious error . . . lies in the attempt to establish a mechanical and abstract hierarchy of reasons for human existence." [25]

The Impact and the Reaction

Such, in broad outline, are the major currents of thought which make up revisionism and which are under the heaviest fire from Moscow. The intensity of the anti-revisionist offensive clearly testifies to the gravity with which the Communist leaders view the spread of this intellectual virus; it also testifies to their continuing inability to restore discipline in the international Communist movement, so severely shaken by destalinization and the events in Hungary.

In Stalin's day the word of the *Vozhd* was sufficient; now the CPSU—its infallibility questioned—is seeking to reassert its right to command the obedience of Communists everywhere by appealing to first principles which themselves are under revisionist challenge.

Moscow's actions certainly bespeak no inclination to underestimate revisionism because of its character as a movement essentially among party intellectuals. The doubts which these intellectual spokesmen have raised with regard to many of communism's cherished premises both reflect and stimulate less sophisticated, though not necessarily less critical, doubts among the party rank-and-file. Harich's claim in his testament that his group in East Germany represented a broad articulate following, but "an even broader inarticulate" one, probably can be applied safely to the revisionist movement as a whole. The same point has been made by the ex-Communist Polish writer-in-exile, Seweryn Bialer, who distinguishes between "professional" and "amateur" revisionists. The numbers of the former may be small, but it is the "amateurs" influenced by them—the thousands upon thousands of party activists who are beginning to doubt for the first time—that give Moscow its gravest cause for concern.

This concern has now been dramatically underscored by the grim disclosure of the execution of former Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy and some of his leading associates in the ill-fated insurrectionary regime of late 1956. In announcing the executions, the Hungarian Ministry of Justice was careful to stress the inseparable connection between Nagy's "crime" and revisionism: "as a result of their earlier . . . revisionist . . . political attitudes," the announcement stated, Nagy and his colleagues "necessarily had to . . . become traitors to the workers' regime." [26] Thus, the action clearly was intended as a drastic warning that the period of "comradely" criticism of revisionism is at an end, and that those who continue to flaunt revisionist ideas in defiance of Moscow's ideological dictates will henceforth be dealt with as full-fledged "enemies" and "traitors." That the Kremlin has once more reverted to cold-blooded judicial murder—after having so carefully fostered the impression at home and abroad that Stalinist methods of terror were no more—can be taken only as a new and foreboding sign of the present reactionary direction of Soviet policy.

[24] *The New Reasoner,* No. 1, 1957.

[25] Onofri, *op. cit.*

[26] Radio Budapest (Home Service Broadcast), June 16, 1958.

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The New Face of "Socialist Legality"

by Leon Lipson

EDITORS' NOTE: One of the most salient features of the post-Stalin "thaw" in the Soviet orbit has been the relative relaxation of terror and the attendant discussion of the necessity to revise the legal structure of the USSR. The stated purpose of this discussion, which has been going on for fully five years, has been to remove the most objectionable features of Soviet law and to insure a greater measure of "socialist legality" for the citizens of the USSR. What, however, has actually been accomplished during this time in terms of concrete revisions of the Soviet legal system? Has the Soviet citizen finally been insured against the arbitrariness of the secret police, against extortions of confessions, against administrative trials and banishment? Has the Soviet lawyer been granted the right, considered normal in most countries, to protect his client from the power of the state? These and similar questions are probed in the article below. The author's answers shed light not only on the Soviet legal system as such, but on the implications of the entire trend of post-Stalin reforms in the USSR.

OF ALL THE BANNERS that were waved in the rhetorical winds of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the banner of "socialist legality" was one of the largest and bravest. The party, it was stated, had brought to light some crude, though only occasional, violations of socialist legality committed in the preceding twenty years by Beria "and his band" and tolerated under the spell of the cult of personality. Good Communists had suffered. It was now the task of legal science, guided by the party, to strengthen and even to perfect the legal system so that such abuses could not recur.

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This banner was not new; it had only been refurbished. Soviet legal scholars for a generation had used the phrase "socialist legality" as the successor to the "revolutionary legality" of the early 1920's, and an official periodical with the title of *Socialist Legality* had been regularly published long before Stalin's death. The prevailing public interpretation of the concept among Soviet lawyers has stressed the elements of stability of the laws and the protection of socialist property.[1]

Around the time of the promulgation of the Constitution of 1936—and therefore near the climatic phase of the Great Purges—Stalin had said, "We need stability of laws now more than ever." [2] A little army of legal writers, led by Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, gave this slogan a jurisdictional interpretation, reading it to mean respect for the constitutional and statutory distribution of functions among the Supreme Soviet, its presidium, and the courts. Even in this sense, of course, legality was freely violated: the Supreme Soviet was not convoked with anything like the frequency required by the Constitution, and its legislative functions were regularly usurped by the Presidium; the Constitution was several times amended illegally; the Supreme Court occasionally "re-enacted" new laws in the guise of explanatory directives handed down to lower courts; and the secret police often by-passed even the very loose restraints placed on them by law.

[1] See Harold J. Berman, "Soviet Law Reform—Dateline Moscow 1957," *Yale Law Journal,* July 1957, p. 1191; Vladimir Gsovski, "Russia Five Years After Stalin: Law and Justice," *New Leader,* May 5, 1958, p. 16; John N. Hazard, "Laws and Men in Soviet Society," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1958, p. 267.

[2] Report presenting the Draft Constitution of the USSR to the Extraordinary Session, Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets, 1936.

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In the latter part of the Stalin period, the protection of socialist property moved into the foreground as the chief theoretical task of socialist legality. Most Soviet theorists would have had scant sympathy with the comment of the famed American jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, that "for my part, I think it less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." What mattered to them was rather that the citizen should walk a straight and narrow path when dealing with the government. In their eyes, it was precisely this requirement that made socialist legality specifically socialist.

Even in the Stalin era, a few voices were heard to object that there was more to socialist legality than the integrity of governmental tables of organization and function, or the sanctity of socialist property. For these few, the legal order ought also to protect the citizen against arbitrary or cruel persecution by the state. The criminal law, they said, was deficient in procedural guarantees on such points as the right to counsel, control by the courts over police activity, and the pre-trial investigators' independence of the public prosecutors.[3] Theirs, however, were voices crying in the wilderness—indeed, in more than just a figurative sense, for some of them were banished for a time to the remote Russian wastes.

THE THAW THAT FOLLOWED Stalin's death attained its warmest temperature in the legal field, as in several others, in late 1956 and early 1957. Reform of many phases of criminal procedure and of the substantive law of crimes was publicly debated. One of the salient features of the debate was the propensity toward fond recollection of the period prior to the supremacy of Stalin, especially the early 1920's. Mikoyan, at the Twentieth Congress, praised Soviet legal science of the early days, and juridical scholars combed the works of Lenin for quotations to support their particular recommendations and opinions—including their own righteous scorn of "quotationism." When no apt quotation could be found, nor even one capable of being ingeniously warped into pertinence, it was thought sufficient to observe that something like the law or regulation or legal institution in question had existed during Lenin's lifetime, the implication being that no sparrow could have fallen without his remarking it.[4] Many of the proposals for legal reform made in the mid-1950's actually had little to do with the good old days and might well have been vetoed by Lenin; but that is beside the point. Their authors' purpose in invoking, however tenuously, the letter of the older law was probably to evoke the memory of the noble, mythical past when the Revolution was young, the party was virtuous, life was simple, and laws were just.

Even at its peak, the agitation for legal reform was restricted within well-defined limits. There was and is no public question of curbing the party or making the party subordinate to the law. To a Soviet lawyer in good standing, this would be a false issue because (he would say) the law has no other function than to facilitate the execution of policy, and policy is made by the party. Specific measures to achieve greater legality are, in fact, often advocated on the ground that they would guard the party's policy against distortion. For example, it is urged that statutes must be strictly construed and applied because the legislator is supreme; and the legislator is supreme because he enacts the measures decided upon by the party. Thus, contemporary Soviet lawyers have transcended the conflict that appeared to convulse an older generation of scholars, the conflict between socialist legality and revolutionary expediency.

THE LIMITS IMPOSED upon legal reform, however, still leave some room for maneuver. Legality and expediency flow into each other to the point of unrecognizability. What should be done, for instance, about laws that are obsolete but still on the books? Should the trouble be taken to repeal them, should they be enforced according to the letter, or should the prosecutor or the court simply be allowed to ignore them at their discretion? This problem, encountered in all modern societies, can be approached in various ways depending on the relative values assigned to the various institutional processes involved. Vyshinsky said, "If a law has lagged behind life, it must either be amended or, as Comrade Stalin puts it, be laid aside." [5] The more liberal of the Soviet legal reformers of today would insist that the law must be applied until it is formally repealed or amended,[6] which in turn entails recommendations for longer and more frequent sessions of the

[3] Cf. Harold J. Berman, "Law Reform in the Soviet Union," *American Slavic and East European Review*, April 1956.

[4] *E.g.*, see Chkhikvadze, "The Significance of Leninist Views on Questions of Crime and Punishment for Soviet Criminal Law," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (Soviet State and Law), hereafter cited as SGP, No. 11, 1957, pp. 130-45.

[5] Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, *Voprosy teorii gosudarstva i prava* (Problems of the Theory of the State and of Law), Moscow, 1949, p. 240.

[6] Shliapochnikov, "On the Stability of Soviet Criminal Law," SGP, No. 12, 1957, pp. 14, 20.

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Supreme Soviet or recommendations to legitimize the *de facto* law-making of its Presidium.

To cite another example, the conviction of innocent men is attacked, and the virtues of what an American lawyer would call "procedural due process" are stressed, not so much on the ground of humanitarian reasons or principles of justice as for the reason that if an innocent man is convicted and the real culprit goes free, the state is endangered.

An appraisal of the extent and significance of the agitation for legal reform is complicated by several factors which, in combination, are peculiar to Soviet society. First, it is hard to distinguish from outside the USSR and perhaps even from inside, between reforms of major importance and mere technical improvements which are exaggerated for political effect. Second, suspicion naturally arises that the topics most freely agitated about are those of least concern to the party; yet it would hardly be safe to conclude, on this basis, that the party line remains wholly untouched by the agitation. Third, the lack of publicity given to Soviet statutes, edicts, decrees, and court proceedings—many of which have not been published at all—makes it difficult, in the intervals between fits of self-criticism, to assess the practical effect of the laws on the books. Finally, the role of the law as an organizing principle of society is much less important in the Soviet Union than in many other countries, though how much less is difficult to say. For years it was supposed that law itself was about to wither away with the state, with the result that the bar has never attracted a high percentage of talented youth, though some highly capable people may be found in various branches of the Soviet legal profession. Lawyers as mediators between the government and the people, as experts in the complex, interwoven structure of a pluralistic society, as custodians of parliamentary and other political traditions, are almost "technologically unemployed" in the Soviet Union. The reforms sketched in the following paragraphs should be discounted accordingly.

Some Areas of Possible Change

The current debate on socialist legality centers primarily around the preparation of new codes of substantive criminal law and criminal procedure. The present codes of the Soviet republics, patched and seamed by many amending statutes, decrees, and interpretations, are more than forty years old, since the new all-Union codes called for by the 1936 Constitution have never materialized. It has now been ordained that only fundamental principles shall be enacted for the USSR as a whole, and that detailed new codes shall be drawn up separately for each republic.[7] It is likely, however, that the codes adopted by the RSFSR will again serve as a model for the other republics to follow, though perhaps not quite so closely as is true of the present codes. The drafts of fundamental principles and of the new RSFSR codes are reported to be in the committee stage, but many committees are involved.

A basic question for the draftsmen concerned the structure of the new codes. Some favored merely tidying up the old material; others wanted something new under the sun. Soviet experts in criminal law have told foreign acquaintances that they are ranging over the experience of all countries, regardless of social system, and are prepared to borrow whatever seems best, regardless of source.

It may be predicted that, despite this eclectic ambition, the institutional organization of the Soviet legal process will not be radically altered. For instance, the summary military trial procedure previously enforced for certain political crimes—the so-called "Lex Kirov"—was abolished in 1956 for all offenses except espionage,[8] and the Special Boards of the Ministry of Interior (the famous *troikas*) had already been abolished in 1953 by a well-publicized, though still unpublished, edict.[9] Nevertheless, the possibility of the imposition of penal sentences through extrajudicial procedures lacking rea-

[7] *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR* (Register of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), No. 4, 1957 (871), item 63 (February 11, 1957). Hereafter cited as *Vedomosti*.

[8] Sergei Kirov, a prominent Communist Party worker and member of the Politburo, was assassinated in late 1934 under circumstances which, as finally acknowledged by Khrushchev in his Special Report to the Twentieth CPSU Congress, suggested a "frame-up" from above. Using the assassination as a pretext, directives were issued on Stalin's initiative requiring that defendants accused of terrorism be notified of charges only 24 hours before trial, providing for trial without the participation of the defendant, forbidding appeals and petitions for clemency, and ordering execution of the death penalty immediately upon sentencing. These provisions, which were carried into the criminal codes of the various republics (in the RSFSR Secs. 466-70), were repealed in the spring of 1956. *Vedomosti*, No. 9, 1956, item 193.

[9] The Special Boards, established in 1934, appear to have been modeled roughly after the prerevolutionary system of "open police supervision." They were empowered to sentence "socially dangerous" persons to a maximum of five years of exile or "corrective labor." The procedure was secret, outside the court system, with no right of appeal. The unpublished 1953 edict, which purportedly abolished the Special Boards, was mentioned in an editorial in SGP, No. 1, 1956, p. 3. News of the abolition had reached the West as early as 1954.

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sonable safeguards is still very much alive, as will be seen from the description given later of the new law against "social parasites."

Similarly, the procuracy, conservatively reformed in 1955, will probably retain its treble functions of conducting criminal prosecutions in court, overseeing the legality of criminal and civil decisions through the right of protest to higher tribunals, and supervising to a certain extent the legality of executive action. There has been some sentiment in favor of decentralizing the procuracy as far down as the level of the individual republic, in a fashion partially analogous to the recent abolition of the Union Ministry of Justice. Under the proposed system, the procurator of a republic would be responsible to the republic instead of the all-Union Soviet, although his local subordinates would still report to him rather than to their local soviets; and the procurator of the USSR would watch over the conformity of the regulations of the republic governments to Union and republic laws, and to decrees of the Union government.

ANOTHER QUESTION which has arisen is whether the criminal pre-trial investigators should remain functionally subordinate to the procuracy, be restored to their former subordination to the courts,[10] or be empowered to operate independently. This is of some importance, for the ostensible impartiality of the investigators is said to have suffered because of their dependence upon the conviction-seeking prosecutors. An allied question concerns the desirability of continuing the present system of double investigation under which the police make one investigation—before or after arrest, or both— and the investigators make another for the procurator's file and the court. The problem is discussed as if it were purely technical and administrative, unaffected by the extent to which the police are politically under the control of the party.

One proposal concerning organization which has found substantial support among liberal-minded Soviet jurists is the suggestion that trials of major crimes be conducted before an enlarged tribunal. Besides a judge, the tribunal would comprise half a dozen people's assessors instead of the customary two, and it was further suggested that the expanded group of assessors should determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, leaving to the judge the fixing of the sentence in the event of a guilty verdict. This radical innovation, which will be recognized as similar in concept to the foreign (or prerevolutionary Russian) jury, seems unlikely to materialize in the face of regime reluctance.[11]

Not much public attention has been paid to the categories or types of crime. A few acts have been added to the category of separate, criminally punishable offenses, such as hooliganism, which had posed an awkward problem until it was given special status as an offense punishable by a suitably light sentence. Also, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has recently decreed that repeated failure to deliver goods to other economic regions, to other republics, or to the Union government is a criminal offense.[12] Other acts, including absenteeism, train-hopping, and abortion in some circumstances, have been removed from the crime category and are now being dealt with by other measures than criminal prosecution.[13]

Occasionally such changes have been entirely *de facto*. We are told, for instance, that the state is no longer enforcing the notorious provision which subjected the relatives and dependents of deserting servicemen to criminal punishment (five years in exile) even if they had not assisted or even known of the desertion; however, the statute still remains on the books, though it may have "lagged behind life." It is quaintly consistent with this informality that the *de facto* suspension of the statute was disclosed by the Deputy Procurator General of the USSR in an interview in which he inadvertently admitted, by implication, that when the provision had been in effect, it had been misapplied to the relatives of subversive but non-deserting non-servicemen.[14]

Though the list of crimes seems unlikely to be much altered by reform measures, its character promises to be hardened in some measure by the almost certain abolition of the doctrine of Analogy. That doctrine, embodied in Article 16 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and in corresponding articles of the codes of other republics, permitted the courts, in cases of "socially dangerous"

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[10] Shortly after the Revolution, the preliminary investigation of criminal cases was in the hands of people's investigators, who were under the jurisdiction of the "people's courts." See "Polozhenie o Narodnom Sude" (Decree on the People's Court), Art. 30 (October 21, 1926), reprinted in *Sovetskaia Prokuratura v Vazhneishikh Dokumentakh* (Principal Documents on the Soviet Procuracy), 150 (1956).

[11] See Sukhodrev, "Toward a Draft of the Fundamentals of Criminal Jurisdiction of the USSR and the Union Republics," SGP, No. 5, 1957, pp. 85, 87.

[12] *Vedomosti,* No. 9, 1958 (904), item 202 (April 24, 1958).

[13] See Jerzy Gliksman, "Recent Trends in Soviet Labor Policy," *Problems of Communism,* July-August, 1956; *Vedomosti,* No. 5, 1955, item 114; Romashkin, "Basic Problems of the Codification of Soviet Criminal Legislation," SGP, No. 5, 1957, pp. 71, 74.

[14] Berman, "Soviet Law Reform," *op. cit.,* pp. 1191, 1193 and note 11.

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acts not specifically covered by law, to apply the punishment which the law prescribed for the most closely similar offense. Several judicial limitations developed which, had they ever been followed consistently, would have blunted most of the sting of the article: it was held, for example, that Analogy could not be applied where the act *was* expressly covered by some other law, and also that Analogy could not be used as a means of increasing the severity of a sentence. Nevertheless, the article came to stand for arbitrary brutality in the Soviet penal system, and its abolition has figured prominently in the public discussions of legal reform. After a lively dispute, the abolitionists appear to have won out, and the article will reportedly be dropped from future codes. The official explanation is that the cultural level of the Soviet citizenry has now risen so high that "socially dangerous" acts either will not be committed or can be anticipated sufficiently in advance to enable the legislature to outlaw them by specific statute.

The technical importance of the abolition of Analogy will be slight, however, since the same purpose can be achieved, if necessary, by other means—for instance, by enactment of retroactive legislation fixing a criminal penalty for an act which was legal when committed, or by board interpretation of existing legislation, to say nothing of the possibilities of prosecution outside the regular system of the courts. All these expedients have been repudiated by the legal reformers, but they are supported by Soviet precedent and may be resorted to again should the abolition of Analogy prove awkward for the regime. Even more likely is the insertion in the new codes of a catch-all category of crimes, defined with sufficient breadth and vagueness to permit an astute prosecutor and court to fill almost any gap not covered by the new, exhaustive list of specified crimes. Still, to say that the abolition of Analogy will have a mainly symbolic effect is not to say categorically that it will make no difference in the administration of Soviet justice: at least for a time, the courts can be expected to refrain from resorting to substitute devices in order to avoid possible unfavorable publicity.

THE SAME MAY be said regarding the proposed incorporation in the new codes of the principle of the presumption of innocence. On this issue, a three-way debate has been going on, remarkable all round for its dubious logic and its naive attitude toward burdens of proof and the dynamics of courtroom procedure. Some held that the presumption could not exist in Soviet law, because the mere fact that a man was accused in court by a public prosecutor on the basis of a preliminary investigation showed that some responsible officials believed him guilty.[15] Others contended that the right to counsel implied the defendant was presumed innocent until proven guilty, for if he was presumed guilty from the beginning, there would be no point in granting him the right to be defended.[16] The proponents of the latter view, in turn, divided among themselves on the question of whether or not the inferred presumption should be spelled out. It probably will be, but its genuine realization must depend on other unresolved questions, especially the procedural rights of the accused and the extent and character of proof considered sufficient for conviction.

Among the procedural rights of the accused, perhaps the most problematic, in Soviet circumstances, has been the right to counsel. So far, the right to counsel has been confined to the period of actual trial proceedings: counsel has not been permitted, as of right, during the stage of investigation by the pre-trial investigator, nor has it been the defendant's right to have counsel present during review of his case by an appellate tribunal. The absence of counsel during the pre-trial investigation, while not unusual in itself, was especially harmful under Soviet conditions because the investigator's findings, upon approval by the public prosecutor, became the basis of the activity of the court during the trial, which meant that the initial facts placed before the court had not been previously tested by cross-examination or countered by professionally marshalled evidence on the defendant's behalf.

During the trial proper, counsel's role has been restricted by several factors, among which formal statutory restraints have not necessarily been the most important. Time was when defense counsel even vied with the public prosecutor in abusing the defendant, especially in political cases, and there are grounds for belief that this was no mere forensic tactic designed to prepare the way for a plea for clemency, but rather a recognition of the "educational" importance of the trial and the delicacy of counsel's own position.

As for quantum of proof, the Soviet criminal system, like others on the European continent, is roughly accusatorial or inquisitorial rather than adversary. That

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[15] *E.g.,* see Cheltsov, *Criminal Procedure,* Moscow, 1948, p. 182.

[16] *E.g.,* see Strogovich, *Material Truth and Court Evidence in Soviet Criminal Procedure,* Moscow, 1955, p. 193; also Rakhunov, "Soviet Justice and Its Role in Strengthening Legality," *Kommunist,* No. 7, 1956; Viktorov, "On the Criticism of Certain Propositions in the Theory of Soviet Criminal Procedure," SGP, No. 3, 1958, pp. 88, 90-91.

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is, the court, instead of sitting passively in judgment on the evidence furnished by opposing parties, and regulating its decision in doubtful cases with the help of such Anglo-Saxon legal concepts as the "risk of non-persuasion" or the "necessary quantum of proof," is supposed to penetrate to the "objective truth" of the case, continuing the proceedings as long as necessary to establish the facts and taking appropriate initiative to uncover relevant evidence. To what extent it actually does this, except in exemplary cases occasionally publicized for the edification of the profession, is a matter of some doubt. At all events, it now seems to be largely agreed that conviction is improper in the absence of "objective truth," and that the old formulas of maximal, relative, or approximate truth facilitated improper convictions.[17] This latter could well be a retrospective exaggeration of the influence of theory on practice.

THE WARMEST PERIOD of the thaw produced, in particular, a number of attacks upon the emphasis that Soviet legal doctrine used to place on the confession of the accused. The critics recalled that confessions have occasionally proven false and that some—whether true or false—were extorted by improper means. As late as 1950 an official had written, "With what a feeling of moral satisfaction an investigator compiles an indictment when he has the confession of the accused. . . . The accused has confessed—that is a great achievement, especially in a case where there is no direct evidence of his guilt." [18] Now, however, it is felt that this went too far, or at least that the official's choice of words was unhappy. Confessions probably will not be ruled altogether inadmissible in evidence under the new codes, but they will very likely cease to be regarded as the Queen of Proof—an ancient notion which, in Vyshinsky's day, was nearly official dogma. Soviet law still seems far away from developing a distinction between confessions that may be admitted in evidence because they are voluntary, and confessions that are inadmissible because coerced.

The handling of Soviet citizens who have been convicted of crime reflects several interwoven threads in Soviet legal and social thought. Soviet attitudes toward sentencing and punishment have been said by scholars to illustrate the "parental theory" of Soviet law; but this suggestive phrase loses some of its ostensible content when one considers that there are parents . . . and parents. To say that Soviet criminals are considered wayward youths who must be re-educated to take their place in Soviet society, and that the process of trial and sentence is intended to instruct the populace, does help to call attention to that component of Soviet criminological theory which lays stress on the goal of rehabilitation, and to the moralizing consciousness-of-community that has long been observed in Russian history and society. Other notions bearing on the purpose of punishment—the notions of revenge, prevention, and deterrence—also play their role in Soviet doctrine. If we bear in mind the popular bit of Soviet folklore to the effect that the population of the Soviet Union is divided into three groups—prisoners, ex-prisoners, and future prisoners—the situation is worth studying in some detail.

STIMULATED BY MARXIST sociology and Italian penology, early Soviet writers sought to dehydrate the concept of crime by squeezing out its moral element. Traces of the attempt can be found in the existing codes, which (though the wording is not consistent throughout) often use the terms "socially dangerous act" instead of crime, and "measures of social defense" instead of punishment. The typically prescribed measure of social defense was corrective labor, with or without deprivation of freedom. Non-political crimes were attributed at first to the fragmentary survival of bourgeois economic relations of production, and later, when crime refused to disappear after the achievement of socialism was proclaimed, to survivals of capitalist ways of thought in the minds of the criminals. The range of permissible sentencing represented, as it does elsewhere in varying degrees, a compromise between the desire to allow the court to individualize the punishment and the "menu" theory which assumes that a prospective lawbreaker has the right to know the exact price attached to the crime he is about to commit. A special feature was the power given to the regular courts to convict, and sentence to exile, even a defendant who had not committed a "socially dangerous act" if, by reason of his previous activity or present associations, he was con-

[17] Soviet theorists busied themselves for years with questions of judicial epistemology, but they have not always distinguished the problems of quality of evidence, the hazards of fact-finding, and the burden of proof, on the one hand, from the general question of the nature of cognition, on the other. Some of them have also been accused by others of slanting their scholarly assertions in order to make convictions easier (or harder). Several warring theories are reviewed in Starchenko, "The Problem of Objective Truth in the Theory of Criminal Procedure," *Voprosy Filosofii,* No. 2, 1956, pp. 105-17.

[18] Quoted in Viktorov, *loc. cit. supra, SGP,* No. 3, 1958, pp. 88, 92.

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sidered in his own person a social danger. (This provision, though still in the Soviet criminal code, was in effect judicially repealed in 1946.)[19] Places of punishment included prisons, corrective-labor camps, and corrective-labor colonies; in addition, some lesser offenses were punishable by compulsory labor at the offender's usual place of work, without deprivation of freedom. Corrective labor in the camps and colonies was supposedly regulated by a fairly elaborate code in the interests of rehabilitation through work.

ALMOST EVERY ASPECT of this system has come under fire in the past few years. Some of the criticisms may be translated into specific provisions in the new codes; relatively more of them may only contribute to a lingering uneasiness, to a feeling that crime may be intractable even to Marxist-Leninist anaylsis. Some effort may be made to differentiate more sharply the treatment of minors and casual criminals from that of professional, adult, and recidivist criminals. Corrective-labor camps, at which (it is now conceded) economic targets took precedence over the aims of rehabilitation, are being superseded by, or merged into, colonies governed by a looser regime.[20] The use of prisons may be restricted to what might be called "maximum security" cases. Exile or banishment for socially dangerous elements not guilty of specific criminal acts may be deleted from the new codes, and the "objective imputation of guilt" rejected. Rudimentary efforts are being made to study the causes of crime, and unless they are balked by theoretical or political obstacles, these studies should in time affect sentencing practices. It is a promising sign that one Soviet writer, a local prosecutor reporting from the grass roots on the prevalent and troublesome offenses of hooliganism, scoffed at the official habit of trying to attribute crime to vestiges of capitalist consciousness; he states flatly that "the basic reason for hooliganism is drunkenness."[21] Perhaps it is not too much to expect that such a man, or others like him, may begin to inquire into the basic reason for drunkenness.

There is a curious unreality in Soviet writing on the subject of capital punishment. In line with the contemporary emphasis on the humaneness of Soviet laws, the legal analysts try to pretend that the Soviet Union has been consistently opposed in principle to the use of death penalty, though the number of officially-inflicted deaths for such crimes, as well as for other offenses, has been large. This professed humaneness is now being bleakly expressed in the solemn posthumous rehabilitation, apparently on a large scale, of some of the prisoners who died in corrective-labor camps while serving sentences now acknowledged to have been unjust. In the new codes, to judge from discussions in the press, the death penalty probably will be retained for only a few non-political crimes. However, political crimes—sabotage, counterrevolutionary activity, treason, "wrecking," espionage, and "diversionary" activities —are likely to remain punishable by death: some of the reformers appear to have "covered" themselves by coupling their proposals for more lenient treatment of non-political crimes with advocacy of extreme orthodox severity against politicals.[22] The Procurator General of the USSR, speaking before the Supreme Soviet, has already hinted that whatever procedural or sentencing reforms are introduced will make little difference in cases involving enemies of the state.[23]

Conclusion

The changes in Soviet criminal law and procedure will be celebrated by Moscow as new strides in the history of mankind. It will not matter if some of the reforms appear only to bring the Soviet system up to the level of the eighteenth century, for any given principle or institution which would, by definition, be reactionary under bourgeois conditions is, also by definition, revolutionary and progressive when adopted in the Soviet Union. Thus, one Soviet legalist, rediscovering in 1957

[19] The repealer took the form of a directive of the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court of July 12, 1946, which stated in effect that the code provision authorizing the conviction of socially dangerous elements in the absence of forbidden acts had been superseded by subsequent legislation incompatible with it. See notes to Article 7 of the Criminal Code of the USSR. This repealer, of course, did not affect the activity of the Special Boards of the Ministry of Interior.

[20] See Berman's account of an interview with the head of the Scientific Research Division of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, *loc. cit. supra, Yale Law Journal,* pp. 1191, 1196-7.

[21] Sadovnikov, "Some Questions of Responsibility for Hooliganism," SGP, No. 2, 1957, p. 119.

[22] It is highly unlikely that the Soviet leadership would, in the interest of propaganda or as a memorial to the late George Orwell, decide to abolish the death penalty for political criminals in favor of treatment of "a medico-pedagogical character"; Mikoyan would be capable of entertaining the idea, and Khrushchev of laughing at it, but it is more easily imaginable in Communist China than in the Soviet Union.

[23] R. A. Rudenko, Procurator General of the USSR, quoted in Chkhikvadze, "Questions of Codification of Soviet Legislation in the Work of the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR," SGP, No. 3, 1957, pp. 12, 14.

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the principle of *nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege,* reported that it "was inscribed on the flag of the bourgeoisie as it came to power and was vitiated soon thereafter, like all the other principles of bourgeois democracy." He added that it now "can find its consistent and genuine realization only in socialist society." [24]

The paper reforms are unlikely to take account of all the criticisms voiced in the relatively outspoken era of 1956-7, and even then they will be of dubious effectiveness until tested in practice. Soviet writers occasionally concede this. Some of them have shown themselves to be aware of the vast gulf between the *Soll* and the *Ist* in criminal law: between the "issuance of lawful norms" and the "unlawful and incorrect application of the norms," between the pious morality behind the Corrective Labor Code and the grim truth of the camps, between the principle of judicial independence and the facts of judicial practice in some cases, between the ideal of the impartial pre-trial investigator and his actual zeal for conviction. They are aware that a statute means little until (as one of them put it with typical aplomb) it is interpreted "in the dialectical unity of its socio-political content and form."[25]

These qualifications need not, however, prevent us from recognizing what may be a genuine and widespread sentiment for the improvement of Soviet criminal law and procedure in the direction of genuine legality. The mere fact that there is so much smoke does not prove that there is no fire. If the new substantive provisions are buttressed by improved institutions and procedures—more independence for the pre-trial investigator, wider judicial review of executive and administrative acts, a more impartial procuracy, a better-trained corps of judges and people's assessors, fuller and more regular publication of court cases, statutes, and decrees—much may be achieved, at least in the area of non-political cases.

[24] Shliapochnikov, *loc. cit. supra,* SGP, No. 12, 1957, p. 19. Cf. Chkhikvadze, "The Significance of Soviet Views on Questions of Crime and Punishment for Soviet Criminal Law," SGP, No. 11, 1957, pp. 130, 139: "Coercion applied by the Soviet state differs in principle from coercion applied by bourgeois states. The Soviet state applies coercion for the defense of the conquests of the socialist revolution, for the annihilation of exploitation of man by man, for the construction of a classless Communist society; therefore it bears a progressive, revolutionary character. Coercion applied by bourgeois states, on the other hand, is directed toward the subjugation and exploitation of the toilers, the defense of the power of the exploiters; it is directed against the historical development of mankind; therefore it bears a reactionary, anti-popular character." Circular reasoning has—by definition—no gaps.

[25] Shliapochnikov, *loc. cit. supra,* SGP, No. 12, 1957, p. 24.

"ANTI-SOCIAL" ELEMENTS

Posted, upper right, is the recent decree "concerning the growth of anti-social, parasitical elements . . ." (see Mr. Lipson's article). Beggars, wearing signs labeled "Give to a Blind Man," remark: "You read it?"—"I read it." *Krokodil's* comment: "They recovered their sight."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), September 20, 1957.

WHAT THE REFORMERS have not touched and will not touch is the political basis that necessarily prevents "socialist legality," Soviet-style, from meeting the standards of legality upheld by other countries. There will be no sure legal guarantees that the *troikas* and purges will not recur, that the cult of (some other) personality will not again become the religion of the state, and that terror will not lay waste another generation of Soviet citizens; indeed, there can be none as long as the party, and the elements of Soviet society striving for supremacy through or against the party, remain unwilling to grant effective autonomy to the legal system, keeping it above the political struggle as a safeguard of general order and liberty.

The reasons for this unwillingness are almost as complex as Soviet society itself, but that it exists seems

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clear. Its most conspicuous recent illustration is provided by the new law against social parasites, already enacted by statute in several of the smaller republics in 1957 and 1958, though not yet passed in the RSFSR or the Ukrainian Republic.[26] The most remarkable feature of this law is not that it fixes deportation to remote areas for a term of two to five years at compulsory labor as the penalty for "malicious evasion of socially useful work" or living "on unearned income" (but, incidentally, not for ordinary vagrancy, which is specifically excluded from the law's application). Such severity is not unusual in the light of Soviet history, though it is hardly to be reconciled with the current professions of humaneness and parental solicitude. Nor is it particularly astonishing that, in fact, the law has been applied to collective farmers accused of neglecting their work for the collective in favor of working their own plots, and to an artisan who bought, repaired, and sold musical instruments on his own.

The really striking feature of the law is the procedure by which it is enforced. Judgment is pronounced, without court trial, by a public assembly of the defendant's neighbors; the necessary vote is a simple majority of those present, provided they represent a quorum of the neighborhood. The judgment is then reviewed by the executive committee of the appropriate local soviet, but not by any judicial body, and becomes final and executory upon approval by the executive committee.

This procedure, halfway between that of a Nazi people's court and the medieval Russian folk-moot (*Veche*), shows little consistency with the claims and purported aspirations of the Soviet legal reformers. It has encountered some, but not much, public opposition. On its face it seems to be an effort to place a powerful weapon of discipline in the hands of local party leaders, who of course dominate the executive committees of the local soviets and probably are also able to wield the initiative in the public assemblies of the neighborhoods. At the same time, from the party's point of view, it would seem to contain, among other things, a threat of haphazard and inconsistent administration, the danger of "localism" in a special form, which may have to be countered by providing for secondary review in party or perhaps administrative channels. However, that would hardly cure the other vices of the law. So long as such bizarre laws are possible, the concept of "socialist legality," or at least of "Soviet legality," cannot but strike even the sympathetic observer as a contradiction in terms.

[26] For a history of the progress of this legislation as well as the instances of prosecution under it, see *Gsovski, loc. cit. supra,* pp. 18-19. For the text of one version of the law, see *Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe* (Library of Congress, Mid-European Law Project), Vol. V, Nos. 9-10 (1957), pp. 405, 406-7.

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Communism in the Underdeveloped Countries

EDITORS' NOTE: Beginning with this issue, *Problems of Communism* launches a series of articles dealing with Soviet and Communist activities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The first two contributions, by Ernest Bock and Frederick Barghoorn, examine the two major facets of Soviet policy in the countries now under development: the economic offensive, aimed at securing a political foothold through economic penetration on a scale unknown in Stalin's days; and the "cultural" offensive designed to create goodwill and to enhance Soviet prestige through the mediums of cultural exchange, state visits and propaganda appeals. Future issues will carry articles on various other aspects of the new Communist strategy and tactics, as well as discussions of economic and social problems common to particular areas, and reports on the activities of individual Communist parties.

Soviet Economic Expansionism

by Ernest Bock

IN HIS OPENING REPORT to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU on February 14, 1956, Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev made a remark that was little noticed at the time but which, in retrospect, can be seen to have enunciated the basic strategy since pursued by the Soviet Union in its diplomatic effort to achieve the penetration of non-Communist Asia and Africa. Khrushchev, after noting that the former colonies and dependencies in these areas, newly turned sovereign states, were striving to better their economic lot by embarking upon the path of industrialization, went on to say:

> Although they do not belong to the socialist world system, these countries can nevertheless draw on its achievements to build independent national economies and raise the living standards of their peoples. Today they need not go begging to their former oppressors for modern equipment; ***they can get it in the socialist countries, free of any political or military obligations.***[1] (Author's italics)

At the time of this invitation, Soviet economic aid to the less developed countries of non-Communist Asia and Africa was as yet unspectacular. Not only was Moscow apparently incapable of matching American offers of economic and technical assistance, but its policy in these areas had hitherto been oriented almost exclusively along lines of direct political warfare. It was in this field of strategy, in fact, that the Soviet Union had achieved its most striking success to date, *i.e.*, the arms deals which secured for the USSR an initial foothold in the Middle

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[1] *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.

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East. The arms agreements were at first negotiated warily and discreetly lest their premature disclosure jeopardize the success of the Soviet maneuver to leapfrog behind the West's Middle Eastern rampart. Czechoslovakia, instead of the USSR, signed the first arms pact with Egypt, thus enabling Molotov, then still foreign minister, to disclaim the agreement as one between two sovereign governments in which Moscow had had no part.

Despite this disclaimer, Communist arms deliveries served, in time, to provide the Soviet government with a major bargaining counter for launching an intense diplomatic campaign to wrest from the West further strategic advantages in the contested area. Proposals for a moratorium on arms supplies to the Middle East conditional upon Western "disengagement" from the area were first broached by Khrushchev and Bulganin when they visited London in 1956,[2] and were further elaborated in a series of Soviet notes to the Western powers during 1957. The first of these communications, addressed to the United States, Britain and France on February 11, 1957, suggested that these powers agree to relinquish their positions in the Middle East in return for a "reciprocal refusal to deliver arms to the Middle Eastern countries" and a joint renunciation of the use of force in the area. The Soviet claim to a voice in Middle Eastern affairs, which was implicit in the notes, was resisted by the Western governments; nevertheless, Moscow's scheme was not without propaganda effectiveness, particularly in the Middle East and Asia generally, where its professed opposition to military pacts as a vestige of colonialism and its lip-service to "neutralism" struck a sympathetic chord in public opinion.

The New Stress on Economics

At present, the positive encouragement of Asian and African neutralism is clearly established as a cardinal guideline of Soviet diplomacy; and the reason is easily discernible. Given the present realities of the world situation, the Soviet Union cannot but prefer this course to a more blatantly aggressive form of attempted southward expansion, which would risk provoking a major armed conflict. The Soviet change of tact has contributed toward the almost revolutionary transformation that has taken place in the nature and conditions of international power conflicts in the Middle East and Asia. The major element in this transformation has been the intrusion of economic elements into a picture that formerly was predominantly strategic; and it is in the Middle East that the new pattern has emerged in its clearest form to date.

In this key area, the hub around which revolve the defenses of three continents, strategic interests in the old, predominantly military sense have steadily tended to assume a largely economic content. Because of its own immense oil wealth, the Middle East now is of concern not merely to Britain, whose historic involvement has been both strategic and economic, but to Western powers generally as a source of the lifeblood whose unimpeded flow is essential to their economies. At the same time, economics have come to play a key part in Soviet Middle Eastern diplomacy. Here, it is perhaps less a matter of changed policy objectives—for these must be viewed as remaining basically politico-strategic—than of the adoption of economic methods of achieving them. This flows from another vital change in the general world environment, namely Russia's own greatly enhanced economic strength. Her economic backwardness in Tsarist times was the main reason for her earlier failure to secure permanent influence in the Middle East. Now the USSR ranks among the strongest modern industrial powers, and the combination of its own expanded economic capabilities and the intense nationalism of the Middle Eastern and Asian ex-colonies, with their strong aspirations for economic betterment, not only has imparted to the Soviet struggle for influence in these areas a dual dynamic that it lacked in former times, but also has been a major cause of Moscow's shift to economic tactics and weapons.

After the 1955 armaments deal with Egypt was concluded, Soviet propaganda sought to picture it as a mere business transaction whereby Czechoslovakian arms changed hands for Egyptian cotton. Yet, even if viewed in this light, it was a deal whose impact obviously transcended that of an ordinary trade transaction. Through it, the USSR became firmly entrenched in the Egyptian economy: in the 1955-56 marketing season, Communist purchases of cotton accounted for little more than one-third of total Egyptian cotton exports, but a year later they rose to more than one-half, and in the current season are expected to increase still further—to nearly three-fourths of the total. As cotton accounts for 80 percent of all Egyptian exports, the growing Soviet grip on the country's foreign trade is all too evident. Meanwhile, though the size of Communist arms deliveries to Egypt has not been shown in the published trade returns, it is estimated that they amounted in value to about £120,000,000 up to the Suez

[2] See also interview given by Mr. Khrushchev to the Foreign Editor of *The Times* (London), January 31, 1958, as published in the Soviet press on February 16, 1958.

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campaign; since then, according to British sources, additional deliveries have replaced the losses sustained by Egypt in the 1956 hostilities.

For Egypt this adds up to a staggering financial obligation. The official statistics with regard to the country's balance of payments position, though tantalizingly incomplete, reveal that paying for Communist arms all but swallows up the net favorable balance realized in Egypt's non-military trade with Communist countries. Such trade with the USSR alone last year yielded an export surplus, for Egypt, of more than £11,600,000 (Egyptian)—exports amounting to more than £30,000,000, and imports to nearly £19,000,000.[3] Similarly favorable balances were shown by Egyptian trade with other Communist countries: for instance, exports to East Germany in 1957 exceeded imports by an estimated £3,000,000. Still, Egypt's overall net favorable balance of payments with the entire Communist bloc amounted to not much more than this last figure, which points to the conclusion that the bulk of her ordinary trading profits on the Soviet, Czechoslovakian and other Communist markets must have gone to finance the arms purchases.

Political Aims and Inroads

Despite Moscow's assurances that no political strings are attached to Soviet economic arrangements with Middle Eastern and Asian countries, it is quite evident that these arrangements are calculated to yield rich political returns eventually, if not in the immediate future. In Egypt, where the most spectacular developments have thus far taken place, the economic approach clearly provides an effective long-haul strategy for expanding Soviet influence in a situation of political stalemate which renders other methods inoperable and risky. To impute to the Soviet "trade-and-aid" offensive such trivial motives as a mere quest for large commercial profits betrays a dangerous disregard for the long-term implications of Moscow's strategy.

It should be noted, above all, that Communist bulk orders for Egyptian cotton were designed, initially, to raise its price well above the world market level so as to keep out Western buyers. The effects of this maneuver, the cost of which was recoverable simply by adding it to the price of the Communist arms deliveries to Egypt, soon made themselves felt: as the cotton market became increasingly non-competitive, Egypt's foreign currency earnings needed to pay for imports from the West diminished (the Communist countries have obtained the right, beginning with the 1955 arms pact, to settle their trade accounts with Egypt in Egyptian pounds). On the other hand, Communist exports to Egypt were hardly suited to fill the needs of an economy which remained geared to established trade ties with the West; nor did they rise fast enough to make up for the growing shortage of Western goods. Thus, a chain of economic consequences was set in motion from which Egypt has vainly been trying to escape by means of orthodox monetary measures. As one after another of these measures has proved ineffectual in stemming the shrinkage of hard currency reserves which Egypt must have to close its payments gap with the West, the Soviet grip on the Egyptian economy has become steadily tighter. At the same time, the climate of austerity which developed *pari passu* with the cutting adrift of the economy from its Western moorings created an atmosphere highly favorable to Egyptian acceptance of further economic experiments along Soviet lines.

Thus, President Nasser began requesting Soviet aid for economic development programs of the type for which the arms-for-cotton deals had been designed to pave the way. Consultations followed with Soviet specialists regarding an industrialization program for Egypt, and on January 29, 1958, a Soviet-Egyptian economic cooperation agreement was signed in Moscow, providing for a long-term Soviet loan of 700,000,000 rubles ($175,000,000 at the official rate of exchange) to Egypt for execution of the program. Czechoslovakia followed with a loan of £20,000,000 (Egyptian) for the same purpose, and East Germany with one of $20,000,000.

Egypt was the primary target of the Soviet diplomatic-economic offensive in the Middle East, but Syria was close behind. The pattern followed here, too, was the same: the first step was an arms deal (again arranged through Czechoslovakia) which resulted in a transformation of Syria's foreign trade similar to that which occurred in Egypt's, the Communist share of total Syrian exports rising from barely two percent to almost 25 percent between 1955 and 1957, while the share of the West suffered a corresponding decline. (Cotton again figured as the principal export item: according to the Syrian Minister of National Economy, the Communist bloc bought 64 percent of Syria's cotton exports in 1957; and in the current year the proportion is expected to be still larger.) The next step was the negotiation of an agreement for economic and technical cooperation between Syria and the USSR, signed at Damascus in

[3] Reported by the Egyptian government-sponsored Middle East News Agency, January 30, 1958. The total figure of £49,000,000 for 1957 compared with £13,300,000 in 1956.

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October 1957, a few months ahead of the Soviet-Egyptian aid pact.

By these two agreements the Soviet bloc got in on the ground floor of the industrialization of the Arab countries, thus drawing them still further away from the West, and into increasing economic dependence upon the Communist orbit. The political implications of these economic moves soon became apparent when Syria and Egypt joined in forming the United Arab Republic, adhered to a month later by Yemen, which itself had recently been the recipient of a substantial aid program tendered by Communist China, and which already had been receiving extensive help from the USSR.[4]

Travelling Salesmanship

Concurrently with these developments, Soviet economic diplomacy gathered momentum all over the non-Communist East. The starting point of the Asian drive was the 10,000-mile Khrushchev-Bulganin tour of India, Burma and Afghanistan at the end of 1955. While in India, Khrushchev proclaimed to the Indian people from the archway of the Taj Mahal, "Remember, we are your friends, and we will share with you our last crumb of bread." Not long afterwards the Indian public learned that the Soviet Union had undertaken to build a $132,000,000 steel plant at Bhilai, to be financed by a long-term Soviet credit at an interest rate of only 2.5 percent. The originally agreed terms of repayment, moreover, have been relaxed since the conclusion of the Soviet-Egyptian aid agreement last January, payment of the first installments being deferred until after the Soviet-built plants in India, as in Egypt, have gone into production and thus made possible actual savings of foreign exchange.

With Burma, the second stop on the Khrushchev-Bulganin Asian tour, Soviet economic overtures took longer to come to full fruition. The immediate outcome of the Soviet leaders' visit was an offer by Moscow to construct a technological institute, hospital, theater, sports stadium and hotel in Burma, all as an outright gift. For its part, the Burmese Government undertook, likewise as a gift, to supply rice and other commodities to the Soviet Union. It was not until the end of August 1957, however, that a general agreement implementing these mutual gift projects was finally signed.[5]

En route home from their tour, Khrushchev and Bulganin stopped in Afghanistan, which a year earlier had been granted a first small installment of Soviet aid for the purpose of instituting a five-year development plan. Following the Soviet leaders' visit, military equipment worth $25,000,000 and economic help in the form of a $100,000,000 Soviet credit, principally to finance projects which would have an immediate impact on the national economy, were granted. Whereas the relatively small United States aid to Afghanistan had been channeled into long-term agricultural projects which were far from spectacular, though designed—as in the American aid program generally—to yield maximum long-range benefits to the recipient economy as a whole, the Soviet-sponsored construction program was calculated for maximum effect: It included two grain elevators, a flour mill, a bread-baking plant, two hydroelectric power stations, car repair shops, a highway to the Soviet Union, and an airport at Kandahar, potentially one of the most important air junctions for Central Asia. Later, at the height of the Suez crisis in 1956, the Soviet civil aviation concern, Aeroflot, concluded an arrangement with Afghanistan for cooperation in air transport.

New Aid Commitments

Since its inauguration with the Khrushchev-Bulganin tour, the Soviet financial and economic aid program for Asia has steadily been expanded to take in new development projects for the recipients of the initial grants, as

[4] It was announced, on January 15, 1958, that Communist China and Yemen had concluded three agreements: a treaty of "unbreakable peace and of everlasting and sincere friendship"; a trade pact providing for the exchange of Chinese steel, engines, and machinery for coffee, cotton, and other agricultural produce; and an aid agreement under which China will build a 300-mile motor highway in Yemen, as well as a number of light industrial plants for which it will also provide the necessary capital equipment, technicians and skilled labor, and train Yemenites as operators. Yemen had concluded a trade agreement with the USSR in the spring of 1956, and there were later reports of Soviet arms shipments to Yemen estimated at a value of some $15,000,000, the dispatch of Soviet military instructors, oil and mineral prospecting activity by Soviet experts, and, more recently, the Soviet-assisted construction of a naval base and submarine harbor in Yemen, as well as of a commercial port intended to eclipse the British port of Aden. In an interview given to the Middle East News Agency during a visit to Cairo early this year, the Premier of Yemen confirmed that Soviet technical and economic experts were helping to develop the economy "at the request of the Yemenite government."

[5] Such outright gifts actually play a relatively small part in the overall Soviet aid program. As pointed out later in this article, Moscow stresses that the Soviet program is based on "mutual advantage."

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well as additional countries. In November 1957 India was extended a further credit of 500,000,000 rubles ($125,000,000) for the construction of an optical glass factory, a power station, several collieries and coal-processing plants, a mining equipment factory, and a heavy engineering works capable of producing 80,000 tons of machinery annually (including all types of equipment needed for a steel mill of one million ton capacity). In addition, Czechosolvakia offered assistance to India in constructing a foundry and expanding a railway rolling stock plant.

The initial exchange of "gifts" between the Soviet Union and Burma also proved the prelude to further deals of a more businesslike nature. Burma has accepted two Soviet credit grants totalling more than $15,000,000 which are to be used for building an irrigation system in the central provinces and a plant for the manufacture of agricultural implements. Burma has also received a smaller credit from Communist China to finance the erection of a cotton spinning and weaving mill with 40,000 spindles.

Ceylon and Indonesia are both more recent additions to the list of Asian recipients of Soviet economic aid. Having already received an unending stream of cultural delegations from Communist countries, Ceylon at the end of 1957 played host to a "trade-and-aid" mission from the USSR led by the deputy chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Technical and Economic Cooperation; and a trade and payments agreement, concluded in February 1958, opened the Soviet market

Political Strings on Soviet Aid—The Case of Yugoslavia

As part of Moscow's erstwhile reconciliation with Belgrade, the Soviet economic blockade of Yugoslavia, imposed in 1948, was gradually lifted, and a series of economic agreements between the two countries was concluded during 1953-56. The most substantial of these were two credit agreements reached in 1956: on January 12, the USSR contracted to grant Yugoslavia a $110,000,000 credit for the purchase of capital equipment; and on August 1 the USSR and East Germany jointly agreed to extend another credit of $175,000,000 for the construction of an aluminum combine. However, Moscow's willingness to honor these commitments abruptly cooled with Tito's adoption of a critical attitude toward Soviet action in Hungary in late 1956. The Soviet government, in a transparent threat of retaliation, informed Belgrade that it desired "to postpone for five years" the practical execution of the credit accords, to which Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koca Popovich replied (according to *Borba*, February 27, 1957) that such action would be "unacceptable to our government." Tension between the two countries eased somewhat thereafter, but there was a new flare-up in April 1958 with the Yugoslav Party Congress' adoption of a program strongly disapproved by Moscow. On May 9, in an editorial attacking Yugoslav "revisionism," *Pravda* pointedly referred to Yugoslav charges that, "in the first phases of the development of socialism" (*i.e.*, under Stalin), Moscow sought to dominate other Communist states and "to exploit" them; and it went on to announce Soviet readiness to "relieve" Yugoslavia of such "exploitation." "The Soviet people," said *Pravda*, "are far from maintaining a purely commercial attitude toward their relations with other countries. . . . In their policy, in their relations with brotherly socialist countries, they guide themselves by the interests of socialist construction, of the strengthening and development of a world-wide socialist system." This admission of the political motivation underlying Soviet economic aid was soon followed by concrete action. On May 28, according to the official Yugoslav news agency Tanjug, the Soviet government "unilaterally postponed, for a period of five years, the utilization of the credits to Yugoslavia stipulated under the fully valid economic agreements of January 12 and August 1, 1956." Tanjug, on May 31, carried this further comment on the Soviet action:

> **The Soviet press, which so gladly emphasizes that the Soviet Union, unlike the capitalist countries, gives assistance and credits without any political conditions, will now hardly be able to prove its stand before the world. For it follows from the suspension of credits that these were given to socialist Yugoslavia with the hope that definite political aims would be achieved, and that when . . . [the Soviet Union] found that Yugoslavia did not wish to accept the attitude which was being imposed upon it . . . but wished to remain independent, the Soviet Union suddenly reached the conclusion that it no longer 'paid' to give credits to Yugoslavia. . . .**
>
> **The question will be asked: If the Soviet Union is unable to exist side by side with socialist Yugoslavia and to apply the principles of non-interference and equality toward it, if ideological differences are made the cause of political pressure, if it strives to impose its attitude, how then can the Soviet Union exist side by side and cooperate on a lasting basis with countries with a different ideology and with radically different social systems?**

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to Ceylon's primary products such as tea, rubber and copra in exchange for Soviet oil products, rolled and ferrous metal goods, chemicals and chemical fertilizers, and various types of machinery and capital equipment. In addition, an economic cooperation agreement was entered into, which provided for 120,000,000 rubles ($30,000,000) of Soviet credit to finance a development program, including hydro-electric power and irrigation projects in Ceylon's three big river basins, and the construction of a metallurgical plant and a tire factory. A noteworthy feature of the latter agreement was its provision for the dispatch of Soviet economic planning specialists to Ceylon. Communist China, which had previously concluded a barter agreement with Ceylon for the exchange of 200,000 tons of rice for 30,000 tons of Ceylonese rubber annually, has also granted Ceylon a 75,000,000 rupee credit for the rehabilitation of the island's rubber industry.

Until last February, when a $100,000,000 Soviet loan agreement was ratified by the Djakarta parliament, the USSR had had only limited commercial relations with Indonesia under a trade agreement signed in Djakarta in August 1956. The effect of the loan arrangement, however, is to give the Soviet Union a considerable stake in the Indonesian national economy, evidenced by the fact that it provides for Soviet prospecting teams to investigate the country's mineral wealth, and for Soviet construction experts to direct a number of development projects, including the erection of hydro-electric power facilities. During the Indonesian Parliament's debate on the loan agreement, concern was expressed by some members lest the Soviet investigators and technical experts prove instruments for controlling the local utilization of the loan funds. Since then, the anti-government rebellion in Indonesia has led the Djakarta regime to accept Communist proffers of arms, through Czechoslovakia and Poland, which are reminiscent of the earlier pattern of Soviet penetration in the Middle East.

In Afghanistan, which has become tremendously important to the USSR because of its strategic geographical position between the two Baghdad Pact powers, Iran and Pakistan, and its proximity to India, the Soviet foothold was strengthened early in 1957 by the conclusion of a two-year trade agreement. Under the agreement, the USSR obtained a near-monopoly on Afghanistan's supplies of industrial raw materials; moreover, when the Afghan ruler visited Moscow a half year later, further assistance schemes were mapped out, including provision for Soviet aid in prospecting for oil in the northern districts of the country.[6] (In 1952 Afghanistan had granted a license to a French company to search for oil in the same area, but had soon been obliged to withdraw it as a result of vigorous Soviet protests.) A further product of the Afghan monarch's visit was an agreement for joint Soviet-Afghan exploitation of frontier rivers for hydro-electric power development and irrigation projects.

Resistance Through Assistance

Even more than in the assistance programs proffered to the so-called "uncommitted" nations, it is in Moscow's economic overtures to the Western-aligned Baghdad Pact powers that the overriding aim of all Soviet aid offers—namely, the alienation of the recipient countries from the West—stands out in sharpest relief. The USSR launched its campaign to unhinge the Baghdad alliance through economic diplomacy in March 1957, when it held out to Iran, the first target, an unconditional offer to furnish all assistance required for the construction of hydro-electric power plants and irrigation canals in the Arax and Atrak River basins, in the Soviet-Iranian border area. An agreement embodying the proposal and paralleling the similar arrangement with Afghanistan was concluded three months later.

The Soviet initiative signified a novel change of tack toward a neighbor with whom relations had traditionally been strained in the past. To pave the way for it, Moscow had already moved to eliminate outstanding points of past friction between the two countries through a series of unilateral demonstrations of goodwill: Soviet oil rights in northern Iran had been waived;[7] concessions had been made with regard to dis-

[6] Soviet oil prospecting teams were already operating in India under an agreement signed in November 1956. An article published in *Pravda,* March 27, 1957, contrasted this activity with alleged attempts by Western capital to impede the development of the Indian oil industry, and clearly intimated that the goal of Soviet economic assistance is to seal off the economies of the "underdeveloped" countries from the West. The article further stated that "planning and consolidation of the state sector of their economies have become . . . a necessity for Asian countries in their effort to achieve economic independence."

[7] After waiving its own oil rights, the Soviet Union reacted strongly when representatives of American and other Western oil companies visited northern Iran in the spring of 1957. According to a Tass News Agency report on March 23, 1957, the Soviet government had warned Teheran that "the penetration of foreign oil monopolies into Iran's northern regions bordering on the Soviet Union cannot leave the latter indifferent," and that any action of this sort would "run counter . . . to the Iranian government's well-known commitments not to transfer the former Russian concession to any third state."

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puted frontier issues, permitting completion of joint demarcation work on the 1,200-mile Soviet-Iranian border; and the USSR had undertaken, in settlement of Iranian reparations claims, to build grain silos in Iran.

The agreement on frontier river development was supplemented by a three-year trade agreement concluded in the spring of 1957. In addition to reopening the Russian market to Iranian ores, cotton, rice, and other commodities which had been profitably sold there in former times, the trade accord provided a basis for offers of Soviet technical assistance to overcome production difficulties in Iranian mines and to improve the quality of the country's rice, which did not come up to Soviet standards. The Iranian government's reluctance to avail itself of such assistance remained a damper on trade expansion, but was effectively countered by Soviet action opening liberal credit facilities for private Iranian firms willing to buy Soviet goods. As a result, the volume of Soviet-Iranian trade expanded by one-third in the first year of the trade agreement.

While the Soviet effort to develop economic ties with Iran thus scored impressive gains, Moscow continued to have little success in its attempts to make inroads on the economies of the other Baghdad Pact powers or—except for Syria—of the inner ring of Middle Eastern states. The Soviet program for Syria—accounting, together with that for Egypt, for probably the largest civilian aid expenditures yet undertaken by the Soviet Union outside the Communist orbit—has clearly been intended to serve as a model for tempting the other Middle East states, with its port, railway and highway construction projects, electric power and irrigation development schemes, and mining and industrial undertakings. For the time being, however, Soviet economic relations with these states continue to be limited and ambiguous.

Thus, a Soviet offer early in 1956 to plan and finance the industrialization of Lebanon has, to this day, met with no response. Only recently the Lebanese premier declared in parliament that, as a matter of principle, it was not permissible for the government to accept Soviet aid while the country was receiving assistance from the United States. As for Turkey, though its trade with the Soviet bloc has nearly trebled since 1950 and now accounts for almost one-fifth of the country's total foreign trade turnover, Moscow's efforts to draw it into the Soviet aid fold have thus far resulted only in small credit and capital investment arrangements. Nor did Pakistan take advantage of an offer of technical assistance extended recently by a visiting Soviet parliamentary delegation; however, reports persist that the government may turn to the Soviet bloc in the near future to obtain, on a credit basis, heavy machinery and entire plants for manufacturing textiles, chemicals, fertilizers and other needed items.

Of still greater significance, from a long-range viewpoint, is the constant Soviet endeavor to convince the newly developing nations of the Middle East and Asia of the superior virtues of the socialist system of state ownership and centralized economic planning, with the accent on the priority development of heavy industry. The example of the Soviet Union's relatively rapid progress from economic backwardness to the front rank of industrial powers, under the aegis of socialist economic principles, naturally lends these principles magnetic appeal in the minds of the Middle Eastern and Asian peoples. The appeal has been strengthened by the advance of Soviet industrialization into the regions beyond the Urals, particularly the Central Asian republics with their ethnic and religious affinities with the Middle Eastern states; and it is noteworthy that Moscow's propaganda to the latter area and Asia has, of late, laid particular stress on the progress of the Soviet Asian republics as a psychological support for its economic diplomacy. Thus, Khrushchev, in his speech on the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution last November, referred to the Central Asian republics as "beacons of socialism in the East" inspiring the Asian nations.

Economic Aid—Political Dividends

Of course, Moscow's public statements, like that of the Soviet delegation to the Conference on Asian and African Solidarity at Cairo last December, continue to insist that the USSR does not seek "any advantages for ourselves . . . profits, privileges, shares, concessions, raw materials; nor do we ask you to join any bloc, or to change your government or modify your policies." This new disclaimer, however, was placed in somewhat dubious light by the action of the conference itself: in response to Soviet suggestions that the Asian and African countries ought to be devoting to their own industrial development "those large funds which the monopolies are syphoning off in the form of profits," the conferees formally went on record in favor of the nationalization of foreign-held resources. The Soviet initiative was clearly calculated to stimulate new difficulties for the West in these areas, while at the same time the nationalization of resources would foster state capitalism, characterized by Lenin as a step toward socialism.

At Cairo the USSR reiterated its readiness to grant further credits and technical aid, without strings, for

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the economic development of the Afro-Asian nations. But while it is a fact that Moscow does not attach political conditions to its aid grants, the grants themselves are carefully conceived and channeled to produce long-range economic consequences favorable to the achievement of Soviet political objectives. Indeed, if this were not the case, it would be difficult, given the extremely generous terms (long loan maturities and low interest rates) on which Soviet aid is granted, to see how the principle of "mutual advantage" often stressed by Moscow as the basis of its aid program is to be realized.

For one thing, the repayment clauses of Soviet credit grants almost always provide for redemption in the products of the recipient country, thereby tending to result in Soviet domination of the recipient's foreign trade as illustrated in the Soviet arms-for-cotton deal with Egypt. Moreover, the Soviet credits are likewise given only in the form of goods or services and for specific projects which Soviet experts have selected with a particular view to their efficacy as a means of bringing about desired changes in the economic and social base of the recipient country. The decisive role played by Soviet specialists in mapping out the economic futures of Egypt and Syria has, indeed, been openly acknowledged in official Soviet statements concerning the aid programs for those countries.[8] In the case of Egypt, the Nasser government's proposed Five-Year Plan of economic development had to be scaled down to the level and specific projects which the Soviet aid planners were willing to approve: of the original 128 projects proposed, only 45 were initially approved, chiefly projects designed to expand the industrial raw material base of the country. Soviet aid agreements with other countries have likewise given priority to such items as geological prospecting and mining projects.

By bringing about sharply increased imports of capital goods, which in turn require the draining off of an ever larger volume of domestic produce to pay for them, the Soviet aid programs necessarily administer a wrench to the economies of the recipient countries, and this is still further aggravated by the mobilization of local resources for the execution of development plans. The Soviet delegation at the Cairo Conference stressed the decisive importance of such mobilization for the projected revival of the Afro-Asian national economies; indeed, the USSR seems to be practicing a policy of giving aid only in sufficient quantities to trigger off the desired upheaval in the economies of the target countries. This upheaval, Moscow hopes, will eventually produce reverberations in the political sphere, both locally and beyond national frontiers.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, developments in Syria and Egypt, which form the *point d'appui* of Soviet leverage in the area, are in fact already transcending national boundaries and beginning to affect the rural and tribal conservatism prevalent in other countries of the Arab world, and perhaps also to embarrass the West in Africa. The first signs of this appeared last April at the Accra conference of the so-called Ghana powers — *i.e.,* the eight independent African states—where there was clear evidence of mounting anti-Western sentiment. One result of this development is likely to be the formulation of conditions for the acceptance of foreign aid which will smooth the way for a resort to Soviet help in preference to assistance from the West.

For the time being, however, the rise of Soviet influence in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia still owes more to propaganda effort than to actual economic intervention. Soviet propaganda broadcasts to the Middle East and Asia have recently been stepped up, now totaling 349 hours weekly as compared to 271 hours to western and northern Europe, and 161 hours to the Western Hemisphere.[9] In addition to the spoken word, the propaganda effort also embraces such demonstrative gestures as offers of atomic cooperation pacts, gifts of airliners to the Shah of Iran, the Syrian and Egyptian Presidents, and the Prime Ministers of India and Burma, and the donation of clinical instruments made to Arab doctors by the Soviet delegation of opthalmic surgeons who attended an African-Asian conference on trachoma in March 1958.

As used by the Soviets, the term "non-Communist East" embraces both Asia and Africa, and one of the chief aims of Soviet propaganda, which attained climatic success at the Cairo Conference on Asian and African Solidarity, has been to establish the USSR in the minds of the peoples of both areas as an Afro-Asian power. Of course, Egypt, with whom Soviet relations have developed most spectacularly, is an African as well as Middle Eastern nation. But Soviet efforts to woo African opinion and extend its economic diplomacy in the area have not stopped at Egypt. They found expression in persistent overtures to the Sudan, including offers to buy the entire Sudanese cotton crop, to grant economic

[8] *E.g.,* statement by the Soviet delegation at the Cairo conference, December 1957.

[9] Of the total 349 hours of weekly broadcasts directed to Asia and the Middle East, it is the latter which absorbs the lion's share—177 hours, of which 77 are in Persian, 35½ in Arabic, 21 in Tajik for Afghanistan, and the rest in Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Turkish.

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aid, and to assist in a geological survey of the country and in training technicians. Though initially spurned, these overtures have finally borne fruit with the Sudanese government's decision in the spring of 1958 to accept Soviet aid provided no conditions are attached. At the same time, Moscow has recently multiplied its offers to provide African countries with machinery and equipment needed for the investigation and utilization of their natural resources. To Libya the USSR extended an unconditional credit offer of £10,000,000 sterling for development purposes.

The political threat which Soviet economic strategy presents was underscored by the visit to Moscow in May of President Nasser, who as head of the newly-created United Arab Republic is a key figure in the Soviet diplomatic effort to split off the Afro-Asian world from the West. Thus far, more attention has been paid to the threat of Soviet military power than to the expansionist designs implicit in the USSR's burgeoning program of economic assistance. Yet, as this article has endeavored to show, the designs are there, to be ignored by the countries of Asia and Africa only at their peril.

The New Cultural Diplomacy

by Frederick C. Barghoorn

NON-COMMUNIST SCHOLARS and journalists have recently directed increasing attention to the Soviet policy of "trade and aid" as an important aspect of post-Stalin foreign policy. There is no doubt that economic inducements have been responsible in part for Moscow's considerable impact on political opinion in some of the underdeveloped countries since 1953. In the long run, however, Soviet foreign economic policy may be no more significant a factor in world politics than Moscow's foreign cultural policy—that is, its current concerted campaign to "win friends and influence people" through political-cultural appeals and contacts. As avenues of influence, the two approaches seem to be accorded approximately equal importance in the Kremlin's view, and they are usually coupled in major Soviet policy statements.

For example, the slogans issued by the Central Committee of the Soviet CP for the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution called for the "development of economic and cultural relations with all countries." [1]

[1] Slogan No. 40, *Pravda,* October 13, 1957, p. 1.

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Similarly, Anastas I. Mikoyan, in his speech at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in February 1956, emphasized that the Soviet Union needed more experts in the economics and cultures as well as the languages of Eastern countries because of the rapid growth of Soviet contacts with the East.[2]

Keeping in mind the vital link between Moscow's economic and cultural offensives, the present paper will single out for examination those features of Soviet policy which underscore the Communists' cultural strategy *vis-à-vis* newly developing countries, and particularly certain key countries of Asia and Africa. In vastness of scope and subtlety of method the strategy is a new one. In its ultimate objective, however, it is as old as Leninism. The long-run purpose of Soviet cultural exchanges with underdeveloped countries is to smooth the path for the Communists' eventual accession to power. The short-run objectives of the strategy are several. Perhaps the most obvious is to present to the peoples, and particularly to the intellectuals, of these countries an appealing image of Soviet life and culture and of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. A closely related objective is to establish cultural and organizational links between Soviet scientific, technical and academic institutions and

[2] *XX sezd kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskovo soyuza* (Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1956, Vol. I, p. 324.

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corresponding groups or individuals in the target countries. An attempt is also made to use cultural exchanges to influence the policies and attitudes of political leaders. Finally, cultural diplomacy supports other Soviet efforts to reduce and if possible eliminate Western, especially United States, influence in Asia, Africa and even in Latin America.

Since the death of Stalin, contacts of many kinds between the Soviet Union and non-Communist countries, both Eastern and Western, have increased substantially. An important index of Moscow's shifting attitude has been the great increase in foreign visitors to the USSR. According to *Izvestia* for April 29, 1955, only 4000 "guests" had entered the Soviet Union in the decade after World War II, while 1,000 Soviet citizens had traveled abroad. The same newspaper for February 18, 1958, reported that members of cultural and other official delegations alone had amounted to 22,000 visitors in 1954-55 and 25,000 in 1956-57, not counting 34,000 visitors to the Sixth World Festival of Youth in the summer of 1957. Very much larger figures obtain if tourists, officials, businessmen and other groups are included; in fact, *Pravda* for April 4, 1958, stated that over a half million foreigners had been in the Soviet Union during the previous year. The same period has seen a large, though by no means comparable, increase in the number of official Soviet delegations sent abroad.

Direct contacts through visits have been accompanied by growing attention in the press and other communications media to cultural relations with foreign countries. While in sheer numbers of exchanges, Soviet contacts with Western Europe and the United States have bulked much larger than those with Asia, Africa and Latin America, the Soviet press has devoted far more coverage to the latter in terms of percentage of newspaper space. For example, during the four years 1954-57, 196 India delegations visited the Soviet Union, compared to 348 from France and 368 from Great Britain; however, *Pravda*'s reportage on exchanges with India got twice as much space as those with France and considerably more than those with Great Britain.[3]

In the case of the less industrialized countries—Khrushchev has called them the "weakly developed countries"—increased contacts and press attention were accompanied by a dramatic turn toward courtesy and correctness in relations with the "bourgeois" governments headed by such men as Prime Minister Nehru of India, President Sukarno of Indonesia and President Nasser of Egypt. This altered treatment of governments formerly denounced as "lackeys of imperialism" facilitated such events as the Nehru visit to the Soviet Union in 1955, the 1955 visit of Messrs. Khrushchev and Bulganin to India, Burma and Afghanistan, and—as the latest in a long line—Mr. Nasser's recent Russian trip.

[3] These ratios are the author's own calculations, based on available data on exchanges and a careful culling of *Pravda*.

Contradictions in Official Policy

The partial opening of Russia and the accompanying "normalization" of its relations with certain countries has not, however, brought any repudiation of Leninist world revolutionary concepts in Moscow. On the contrary, the period since the death of Stalin has been marked by a return to some of Lenin's most messianic and potentially explosive political concepts. Revolutionary expansionism is again the order of the day, only it is pursued by vastly more subtle tactics, combining high-level diplomacy and the advertisement of selected aspects of Soviet life and culture with an astute effort to exploit the ascendant forces of nationalism, anti-colonialism and social unrest in the underdeveloped countries.

The contrast between Moscow's long- and short-run aims—or perhaps more correctly, its real and professed aims—was aptly demonstrated in Nikita Khrushchev's public speech at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in February 1956.[4] In one section of the speech, entitled "The Collapse of the Colonial System of Imperialism," Khrushchev appealed to assorted sentiments through extended tributes hailing the "rebirth" of India, the Arab East and Southeast Asia, the "awakening" of the peoples of Africa, and the "intensification of the national liberation movement in Brazil, Chile and other countries of Latin America." In a seeming effort to prod racial and anti-western sensibilities, he then contrasted Asia's position today to an earlier period in which, he emphasized, international relations had been determined "primarily by people of the white race." He went on to declare that there were "great opportunities" for the "countries of socialism" in the contemporary situation; specifically, the Soviet Union could assist former colonies in achieving "economic independence," in training a technical intelligentsia and in restoring and further developing their "ancient national cultures."

The sincerity—or at least the permanency—of this professed support for the independence of newly emergent nations ought to be judged, however, against other statements in the speech. Elsewhere Khrushchev bluntly reiterated Communist belief in the necessity of revolution, reminding his audience of Leninism's teaching that established authority does not give up its power volun-

[4] Twentieth Congress, *loc. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

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tarily. To be sure, he added, it might be possible in some countries to elect "socialist" governments "legally." Once in power in any country, the "working class" could convert parliaments "from organ[s] of bourgeois democracy into real instrument[s] of the popular will." [5]

The theoretical and propaganda implications of Khrushchev's speech and its relationship to Communist international cultural policy were set forth with surprising frankness in subsequent articles in the most authoritative Soviet periodicals. One of the most significant of these articles was an eight-page piece by the leading Soviet expert on the Far East, E. Zhukov, who borrowed Khrushchev's title, "The Collapse of the Colonial System of Imperialism." [6] Zhukov clearly inferred that in the present stage of world history Moscow could make good use of Asian, African and Latin American nationalism and anti-colonialism toward its own ends. The "national liberation movement," he stated, was weakening the world capitalist system. Thus the major task of Communist parties in countries such as India and Indonesia was to support measures to strengthen the economic independence and national sovereignty of their countries. In contrast to past directives urging militant subversion and revolutionary tactics, Communist parties were now advised to collaborate "with all progressive social forces" and to display tact toward representatives of "bourgeois nationalist" movements. In this connection, Zhukov praised Prime Minister Nehru, but took pains to stress an earlier statement made by Khrushchev (during his 1955 visit to India) noting that Nehru's proposed "socialist path" for India was different from the Soviet conception of socialism.

Zhukov also included in his article a quotation from Lenin to the effect that the countries of the East had entered a stormy path of development which must intensify the crisis of capitalism everywhere. Perhaps his most significant statement was a confident assertion that:

. . . The active role of the working class and of its militant advance guard, the Communist Party, is increasing everywhere; it is natural, therefore, to expect that in the future the working class will achieve universal predominance in this struggle. This, however, is a long and complicated process.

The Call to Arms

Beginning in 1955 the Kremlin started issuing directives to Soviet experts on Asia and Africa to reorient their work in the light of the new political opportunities that were opening up for Soviet penetration of these continents. The scholars at first responded slowly, perhaps fearful of overcommitting themselves to what, in the light of previous purges, may have seemed like a risky and temporary new line. The regime attempted to spur confidence by sanctioning the reestablishment of *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, a once noted periodical on Asian

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

[6] E. Zhukov, "Raspad kolonialnoi sistemy imperializma," *Partiinaia Zhizn*, No. 16, August 1956, pp. 41-48.

As Policies Change, So Do the "Facts"

The teaching of non-violence was the pivot of the whole ideology of Gandhism and served as an ideological means for the disarmament of the people faced with English imperialism, Indian princes, landowners and bourgeoisie. But having denounced violence against the exploiters, Gandhi did not come forward against violence [used] by the oppressors against the oppressed.

Actually Gandhi, this bellman of the Indian landlords, manufacturers and bankers, was an adversary of factories and machines only in words. The Indian bourgeoisie needed this demagogy in order to take over the mass movement.

—From Modern History of the Countries of the Foreign East *(Published by Moscow University), Vol. II, Moscow, 1952, pp. 299 and 300.*

Gandhi never preached nonresistance, but rather nonviolent resistance; he never called on the masses to refrain from the struggle, but he fought with all his strength to give the actions of the masses a peaceful, nonviolent character . . . Millions of people often took part in the movement . . . This created a threat to the rule of the English colonializers, who more than once were obliged to make concessions to the congress.

Gandhi was a patriot who was unconditionally devoted to the cause of the liberation of his country . . . Gandhi was an unselfish man. Enjoying enormous influence in his country, he never attempted to use it for his private enrichment.

—From "Gandhi's Role in the National Liberation Struggle of the Peoples of India," by A. M. Dyakov & I. M. Reysner, Sovetskoye Vostokovedeniye (Moscow), No. 5, 1956, pp. 21-34.

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and African studies which had been suspended for almost twenty years; its publication was resumed in April 1955. In further exhortations, Soviet orientalists were chided for having denounced Turkish Kemalism and Indian Ghandhism, and for having failed to see the "progressive" aspects of the movement led by Colonel Nasser in Egypt.[7]

The initial lack of response to the new line was scored by Anastas Mikoyan in his speech at the Twentieth Congress. Specifically Mikoyan criticized the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences for its alleged failure to understand its new tasks.[8] After Mikoyan's speech, the Institute was drastically reorganized and expanded, and B. G. Gafurov, a prominent Tadjik politician and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was placed at its head.

Gafurov delivered a report in June 1957 at an All-Union Conference of Orientalists in Tashkent in which he demanded, in effect, that Soviet scholars produce material useful to the Kremlin in carrying out its policy of persuasion and penetration in Asia and Africa. Among other tasks, Soviet scholars were to explode theories, vaguely labeled "bourgeois," alleging "organic backwardness of the peoples of the East." They also were to demonstrate how the "Republics of the Soviet East" had, with the active help of the Great Russian people, overcome their former backwardness in the shortest possible time and had become "the lighthouse of communism in the East." While exposing the machinations of "imperialism" and vigorously resisting "any manifestation of bourgeois ideology," Soviet scholars should express their sympathy and understanding for the "anti-imperialist struggle of the workers," which would be headed *"at a certain stage"* by the "national bourgeoisie".[9]

Ready Smiles and Red Carpets

Spurred by pressure from above, Soviet diplomats, scholars, artists, scientists, athletes and engineers set out to smile their way into the hearts of Asians and Africans. Two major techniques have played a particularly prominent role in this many-sided effort. One combines the aforementioned exchange visits with the publicizing of those Soviet achievements most calculated to impress Asians, Africans and Latin Americans in view of their own needs and aims. The other and closely related technique is the careful cultivation of the predispositions and susceptibilities of peoples whose traditions, aspirations and grievances have been very thoroughly studied.

The reception accorded Prime Minister Nehru of India during his visit to the Soviet Union in May and June 1955 was a major and highly instructive exercise in the new cultural diplomacy. The path toward diplomatic correctness and even toward cordial cultural relations with India had been paved by a number of significant Soviet actions extending as far back as 1951. In that year an Indo-Soviet cultural society was established, following the return of a group of Indian intellectuals from a visit to the USSR; though there was much suspicion of its Communist orientation—at least until the Moscow line toward Gandhi and Nehru changed—the society was quite successful in some of its activities, such as the showing of Soviet films. On another tack, a large-scale Russian translation program of works by Indian classical and modern authors got underway even before the death of Stalin, and was subsequently vastly expanded.

In connection with Mr. Nehru's visit, *Kommunist* (No. 9, 1955), the main theoretical organ of the Soviet Communist Party, published a very favorable review of the Prime Minister's book, *The Discovery of India,* entitling the commentary, "A Book on the Great Indian People." On May 31, a few days before Nehru's arrival, a monument was unveiled to the fifteenth-century Russian traveler to India, Afanasi Nikitin, in the presence of the Indian ambassador and the Soviet Minister of Culture. The Soviet press emphasized that Nikitin had been the first European to visit India "with a friendly purpose." [10]

While Mr. Nehru was in the Soviet Union, everything possible was done to impress him with the friendliness of the Soviet people and their leaders. No small detail was overlooked. For example, Indian songs were sung by Russian youngsters and Soviet interpreters were provided to translate Mr. Nehru's speeches from his native Hindustani.[11] As far as ordinary citizens were concerned, the cordiality displayed toward Nehru was

[7] For surveys of earlier phases in this development see Walter Z. Laqueur, "The Shifting Line in Soviet Orientalogy," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. V, No. 2 (March-April), 1956; and a series of items in *Soviet Culture* (now *Soviet Survey*) published by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, Paris, esp. Nos. 4 and 5, May-June 1956.

[8] Twentieth Congress, *loc. cit.*

[9] B. B. Gafurov, "O perspektivakh razvitiia sovetskovo vostokovedeniia" (On the Perspectives of Development of Soviet Eastern Studies) *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie,* No. 3, 1957, p. 7-17.

[10] See *Pravda,* June 1, 1955; *Sovetskaia Kultura,* June 2, 1955.

[11] *Pravda,* June 8, 1955; almost the whole front page of this issue was devoted to Nehru's arrival.

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undoubtedly sincere; as on many other occasions, the natural hospitality of the Russian people served their rulers to good political advantage.

Perhaps the greatest value of Mr. Nehru's visit to Russia, from the Soviet point of view, was that it paved the way for the resoundingly successful visit Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev paid to India in November and December of 1955. The B-K tour in turn created the climate for a vast acceleration of exchange trips and cultural contacts at lower levels; by October 1956 a travel service had been opened between the two countries, underscoring the new Soviet "open door" policy *vis-à-vis* tourists.

Moscow's elaborate reception of Nehru was duplicated for President Sukarno in August 1956. The Indonesian President was received by the highest officials. Like President Nasser more recently, he was given flowers by children and he was applauded by vast crowds in the streets and stadia. He was granted the degree of Doctor of Juridical Sciences by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and was elected an honorary professor at Moscow State University. First class motion picture and television films were made in connection with both Sukarno's and Nehru's visits, and later were widely shown in India and in Indonesia. The same kind of royal welcome was extended to the Crown Prince of Yemen on his trip to the Soviet Union in June 1956.

All Things to All People

The changed Soviet line toward "bourgeois nationalist" leaders such as Nehru, Nasser and Sukarno—and even to a feudal ruler such as Yemen's prince—dramatizes the Kremlin's present abandonment, or at least soft-pedalling, of Communist concepts of inevitable and relentless class "warfare"; as often in the past when policy aims dictated, Moscow has jettisoned the slogans of militant isolationism and class struggle, and is trying instead to demonstrate its readiness for fruitful collaboration with persons and groups belonging to every social class and even to every religious group. Toward this end, representatives of various elements of what the Communists would call the "national bourgeoisie" in the developing countries have been included in invitations to visit the USSR and have been accorded cordial treatment in the Soviet press. Typical of such press treatment was the homage paid by *Pravda* (of October 15, 1957) to a delegation of Lebanese visitors—in the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace—consisting of lawyers, journalists, writers and other public figures, and headed by a "prominent industrialist" (no mention here of "bourgeois capitalist").

Recently there has also been a steady flow of items in the Soviet press professing solicitude for the religious sentiments of Asian and African Moslems—a considerably bolder if no more surprising about-face, in view of communism's admitted hostility toward religion in general and Moscow's past ill treatment of Soviet Moslem minorities in particular. Today an effort is made to blot out the record of the past by a show of tolerance, and much press publicity is given to such events as the 1954 visit of a group of Indonesian women to a Moslem seminary in Soviet Central Asia, and the more recent (1957) pilgrimage of "Soviet Moslems" to Mecca, Medina and Cairo.[12]

The Appeal to Nationalist Sentiment

The same technique of what may be called "group flattery," by which Moscow attempts to cultivate particular political, religious or other elements, is applied on a national level in its efforts to win over whole peoples or countries. The appeal to national pride is made in many ways. Perhaps the classic Soviet profession of respect for foreign nations and their cultures was formulated by Joseph Stalin at a dinner in honor of a Finnish governmental delegation in April 1948. Stalin said:

> **Soviet people consider that each nation, whether large or small, has its special characteristics, which belong to it alone. These characteristics represent the contribution which each nation makes to the general treasure chest of world cultures, and adds to and enriches it. In this sense all nations, both great and small, are on the same footing and each nation is as significant as any other nation.[13]**

Many peoples under Soviet control have learned by bitter experience what "equality of nations" can mean in Soviet practice. The mass deportation to the East of the Moslem Chechens and other small peoples during World War II for alleged collaboration with the Germans, the subjugation of the Baltic peoples in 1940, and the more recent brutal crushing of the Hungarians in 1956 serve as reminders of the gap between profession and practice in Soviet nationality policy. Nevertheless, a skilled application of Stalin's formula to peoples

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[12] See *Pravda,* August 13, 1945 and *Izvestia,* July 2, 1957. For a discussion of Soviet treatment of the Moslems, see Richard E. Pipes, "The Soviet Impact on Central Asia," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. VI, No. 2 (March-April), 1957.

[13] *Vneshnaia politika sovetskovo soyuza* (Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union), Moscow, 1950, Part I, p. 24.

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who have had little opportunity for firsthand experience of Soviet reality, can, at least in the short-run, pay big propaganda dividends.

The publicizing of Soviet appreciation for Asian, African and Latin American cultural traditions has both a positive and negative aspect: while winning friends for the Soviet Union, it attempts to alienate the peoples of these areas from the West, and particularly the United States. The Communists allege that US "imperialism" and "cosmopolitanism" threaten to destroy native cultures and to substitute for cherished folk values the "decadence of Hollywood" and the crassness of "American materialism."

A good example of this dual approach was an article by the well-known Soviet writer Ilya Ehrenburg which appeared in a Soviet literary magazine in the summer of 1956. After a month of travel in India, Ehrenburg published a detailed and highly appreciative discussion of India's culture aimed at pleasing Indian intellectuals. At the same time he accused the British and the Americans of seeking to create the impression that Indians were adverse to technical progress, that they were quaint but hopelessly backward. He attributed the poverty of India to decades of British economic exploitation. Pointing out that contemporary India seeks and is achieving material progress, he went on to stress that Indians, in contrast to Western Europeans, and in special contrast to Americans, would never be satisfied with mere physical comfort. Indians, he declared, felt that material progress was not sufficient, but must be accompanied by the advancement of human welfare and general spiritual development. In short, Ehrenburg made a calculated effort to interlard just praise for India's achievements and aspirations with half-truths or outright misrepresentation of western attitudes, counting on the receptivity of his audience to the former remarks to make the latter believable.[14]

Ehrenburg, who has often been sent on important foreign cultural missions, was also the star performer in connection with the award of a Stalin Peace Prize to the Chilean poet Pablo Neruda in August 1954. On this occasion he couched an appeal to various shades of liberal and radical sentiment in terms calculated to stir antagonism to the United States: the due tribute he paid to Chile's national heroes, cultural heritage and economic achievement was capped with the message that a people which, like all others in Latin America, had "defended" its national culture and its national independence against "heavy odds," was a great people.[15]

In a similar vein, *Pravda* for August 15, 1954, described the grandeurs of the pyramids of Egypt and praised the "work-loving" Egyptian people who had created them, but at the same time expressed indignation at the poverty to which "foreign exploitation" allegedly had subjected them.

A corollary and implicit aim of such statements is to convince foreign people that *only* in "socialist" countries are their national cultural traditions sincerely appreciated. Toward this end, many other devices are used by Moscow, among them exhibitions in honor of classical—or less frequently contemporary "progressive"—writers and artists of foreign lands, and public commemorative ceremonies in which prominent Soviet political leaders and intellectuals play a major role. These devices are often combined, as on the occasion of a public ceremony in Moscow in November 1956 honoring the Indian national poet, Kalidas.

Language and Area Specialization

The above-mentioned expansion of Soviet "area studies" similarly serves the end of impressing foreigners and increasing contacts, while at the same time training a future corps of Soviet "experts" on Asian and African affairs. In 1955 the party's theoretical organ *Kommunist* issued a directive in the form of an editorial urging that Oriental and African studies be integrated into secondary school and university curricula, so as to furnish all students with a necessary knowledge of Eastern countries. Such studies, it said, must contribute to the "consolidation of friendship between the Soviet people and the peoples of the East." [16] Subsequently, many items appeared in the Soviet press indicating that this directive was being actively implemented, particularly in the area of language study. For example, *Pravda* for January 31, 1958, published an article describing a boarding school in Moscow in which 150 boys and girls are studying the Indian languages Hindi and Urdu. As in a number of other special Soviet schools, the regular classroom work is apparently conducted in the languages in which the school specializes. The establishment of such schools indicates the Kremlin's determination to carry its message effectively to the peoples of the East.

The accelerated program of linguistic and other studies has been accompanied by reestablishment of

[14] I. Ehrenburg, "Indiiskie vpechatleniia" (Indian Impressions), *Inostrannaia Literatura,* Moscow, June 1956, pp. 196-222.

[15] *Pravda,* August 13, 1954; Ehrenburg's address and Neruda's reply dominated the front page of this issue.

[16] No. 8, May 1955, p. 83.

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long-severed contacts between Soviet and foreign orientalists, particularly those of the Eastern countries. Among other efforts toward this end, it was recently announced that a conference of "writers of Asia and Africa" would be held during 1958 at Tashkent. In a speech on December 27, 1957, Party Presidium member N. A. Mukhitdinov called upon Uzbekistan intellectuals to prepare for the conference by writing books on the life of the Soviet peoples of Asia, and by acquainting Soviet readers with the output of the "progressive" writers of Asia and Africa. Mr. Mukhitdinov, who had just achieved the honor of becoming the first Uzbek member of the Central Committee Secretariat, declared that the conference would play a major role in strengthening cultural relations between "the Soviet East" and the foreign "East." [17]

The Signposts of Duality

In a short article such as this it has been possible to deal with only a few aspects of the Kremlin's campaign to win friends among the peoples of the less industrialized countries. Yet even in a study of far greater scope and depth, the task of unmasking the essential duplicity of Moscow's cultural offensive would be a difficult one. For the professed aims of the campaign—and indeed, many of its effects in practice—are, in surface appearance, values and developments to which all thinking men must subscribe: the need for increasing contacts between peoples, for greater knowledge and understanding of other countries and cultures, is manifest in today's world. Nor can there be any doubt that many people participating in various phases of the cultural program—both Soviet citizens and those of the developing countries—are genuinely sincere in their desire to promote mutual understanding and friendship. This fact alone makes the real aims of the Communist leadership the more cynical and the more deceptive.

The signs of deception are there for any who will read them. They are present, first of all, in the statements of the Kremlin leaders themselves—more precisely, in the contrast between those statements made to audiences of Communist "insiders" and the more widely publicized statements made for foreign consumption. It is instructive, for example, to compare the speeches of Bulganin and Khrushchev in India with the aforementioned speeches they and other party leaders have made at such gatherings as the Twentieth CPSU Congress. While in India, the Soviet leaders assured Prime Minister Nehru and the Indian people that differences in ideologies or economic systems constituted no obstacle to the settlement of international problems. All that was necessary, B and K proclaimed, was good will and honorable intentions. They took particular pains to avow that Moscow had no intention and no desire to export Soviet communism to India or to other countries.[18]

As we have seen, Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth Congress a few months later contained little to back up such soothing assurances; instead he proclaimed anew the need for "social revolution" and for the conversion to socialism of "bourgeois democratic" institutions in other countries. His assertion that this end might be accomplished "legally" and "peacefully" seems unimpressive in view of the vagaries of Kremlin semantics: at the same Congress Mikoyan made the statement that Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Poland had taken place by "peaceful means." [19]

In more recent pronouncements Khrushchev has revealed even more clearly his commitment to the Leninist tradition of ceaseless pressure for the extension of Communist power. In a speech of November 6, 1957, for example, he reaffirmed Lenin's prediction that "international revolution" would build socialism on the basis of Soviet experience; in the same speech he attacked party "revisionists" for believing in the possibility of "reconciliation of Communist and bourgeois ideology." [20]

Communism's specific cultural objective for the future has been made just as clear in presumably authoritative statements. In the grand plan, after the "world proletarian revolution" has taken place and the "world socialist system of economy" has been firmly established, the cultures of all peoples are destined to be dissolved and to be replaced by one "single universal human culture." [21] However ridiculous this idea may sound, it enjoys a sanctioned role in Communist theory, and as such belies the Kremlin's present professions of respect for "bourgeois" cultures.

The deceptiveness of Soviet cultural policy is revealed in other ways. Mention was made earlier, for

[17] *Pravda Vostoka,* (Vladivostok), December 28, 1957.

[18] See, for example, Khrushchev's speech to the Indian parliament, published in *Pravda,* November 22, 1955.

[19] Twentieth Congress, *loc. cit.,* p. 317.

[20] *Pravda,* November 7, 1957.

[21] See, *e.g.,* G. G. Karpov, *O sovetskoi kulture i kulturnoi revoliutsii v SSSR* (On Soviet Culture and Cultural Revolution in the USSR), State Publishing House for Cultural-Enlightenment Literature, Moscow, 1954, pp. 76-77.

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example, of Moscow's current pretense of tolerance toward religious beliefs. Yet what has been said to—and about—Buddhist or Moslem visitors to the USSR hardly jibes with statements regarding Buddhism or Islam in writings intended for Communist readers. In 1954, as Moscow was launching its campaign to woo Asians, the Kremlin also began a new domestic drive against religion. An article in the leading Soviet philosophical journal attacked Buddhism, Mohammedanism and Christianity as instruments of social oppression and political reaction.[22] Numerous accounts in Soviet magazines reported the holding of "scientific-atheistic parties" in Houses of Culture. Anti-religious museums were reopened. This writer in 1956 personally visited the Leningrad anti-religious museum, which is housed in a former cathedral and which boasts many exhibits and texts vilifying the Moslem and other religions.

It would be reasonable to assume that not many foreign Moslem visitors have been taken by their Soviet hosts to this or other anti-religious museums. In the main, aspects of Soviet reality which might offend visitors are kept carefully concealed. Through advance scheduling of itineraries, the skillful performance of ever-present Intourist guides, and various devices to keep most visitors away from "touchy" areas such as penal colonies or slums, the authorities aim at showing the side of Soviet life they want seen.

In short, the Soviet leadership has shown two faces both in the aims and in the implementation of its cultural offensive. It should be obvious that men who have persistently pledged themselves to the goal of world communism are impelled by their convictions to regard cultural policy as a fair instrument and camouflage for expansionist efforts.

The intended impact of Moscow's offensive is, of course, not only cultural, but political, social, economic and psychological. Moscow is engaged in one of the most ambitious missionary efforts in history, the object of which is to "win over" the world—and in the first instance, the peoples of the newly developing countries. Yet in the long run the very zeal with which the offensive is being conducted may have beneficial effects outweighing its subversive aims. Certainly the increase in intercountry exchanges and contacts offers a welcome contrast to the extreme Iron Curtain isolationism of the past and—attempts at camouflage notwithstanding—gives more people more opportunity to see for themselves what are the myths and what are the realities of other societies and systems. If such contacts continue to grow, cultural exchange may come increasingly to serve its proper aim—not the promotion of Soviet interests—but the encouragement of genuine international cooperation, along with growing respect for diverse cultures *and* for cultural diversity.

[22] "Nauchnoe i religioznoe mirovozrenie" (Scientific and Religious World Outlook), unsigned article in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 5, 1954.

The USSR and Islam—Two Versions

For Outside Consumption:

In connection with Western propaganda to the effect that there is no freedom of religion in the USSR and that the state interferes in religious affairs, our correspondent asked the Imam to express his views on this subject. The Imam said: "All these allegations have nothing in common with truth. Freedom of religion, *i.e.*, freedom to worship or not to worship, is guaranteed by the constitution. There are special clauses in the Soviet penal code providing severe punishment to all those who obstruct the freedom of worship. In the USSR all religions, including the Moslem faith, are separate from the state. This means that religion does not interfere in state affairs."

—From an interview with the chief Imam of the Moscow mosque, Kamarattin Salikhov, Radio Moscow (Near Eastern Service in Turkish), May 24, 1958.

For Home Consumption:

In forty years . . . the development of culture and science has helped free the wide circles of the population of the Soviet Union from religion. This process was exceptionally striking in the areas where Islam has spread. . . . However, the process of overcoming religious remnants cannot be considered as developing smoothly. . . . These remnants of the distant past must not exist in our socialist state. We cannot reconcile ourselves . . . to the remnants of a society of exploiters which humiliate the dignity of human beings. It is clear, comrades, that under our conditions, Islam, like any other religion, is a remnant of a society which the Soviet people have left far behind.

—From a radio address by Professor L. I. Klimovich, "Modern Islam," Radio Moscow (Home Service), May 22, 1958.

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Communism and Radicalism in the USA

Irving Howe and Lewis Coser
(with the assistance of Julius Jacobson):
The American Communist Party—
A Critical History (1919-1957),
Beacon Press, Boston, 1958.

Reviewed by James T. Farrell

IRVING HOWE AND LEWIS COSER, the first a young literary critic, the second a sociologist, have written a full-length history of the American Communist Party, covering its birth in 1919 and tracing its public record from then to 1957. They are concerned with the public significance of the party and, in the main, rely on public sources. They have not sought the personal testimony of Communists, ex-Communists or anti-Communists. Also, they have remained within self-imposed limits and have not dealt with the underground activities of American communism, with espionage or finances. They sketch the background of American communism in the Socialist movement and describe the early years of the party's history—its factional fights, the fiasco resulting from the Communist effort to capture the Independent presidential candidate in 1924, Senator Robert M. La Follette, Sr., the trade union maneuvers and the policy of dual unionism (*i.e.*, separate Communist-dominated unions), and with these, the gradual Stalinization of the party. Howe and Coser concentrate much attention on the 1930's, treating the "Ultra Leftism" or Third Period Line which was followed up to 1935, the leftward swing of many intellectuals, and the Popular Front years from 1935 to the beginning of World War II. Then, the two authors carry the story down to the present in the best chapters of this study, and conclude with a long theoretical and analytical discussion, "Toward a Theory of Stalinism."

The authors express their regrets that *The Roots of American Communism,* by Theodore Draper,[1] and *The Communist Party vs. the C.I.O.,* by Max Kampelman, "two excellent studies," appeared too late for them to draw on these books. The Draper volume, first of a series, gives promise of growing into the definitive history of American communism, and Max Kampelman's book should be necessary reading for anyone interested in communism and the American labor movement. Both these works, in the opinion of the reviewer, would have helped Howe and Coser enormously, but theirs is still no inconsiderable achievement. While the source material on American communism is already vast, there were no models on which the authors could base their work, and the task of selecting and organizing their data was, in itself, an original one calling for the use of judgment, insight and creative ability. Everyone who is familiar with American communism would, perhaps, have criticisms to make of the authors on grounds of emphasis, and inclusions or omissions.[2] But Howe and Coser have produced a valuable, well-documented and illuminating study and, in addition, one which is exceedingly well-written.

Mr. Farrell, who has thirty-one books to his credit, is probably best kown to readers around the world as the author of Studs Lonigan, *a novel dealing with the life of an Irish family in Chicago, and in particular with the coming of age of an adolescent boy in a milieu of spiritual poverty. The author is now finishing a new book on Israel.*

[1] A review of this book appeared in the May-June 1957 issue of this journal—Ed.

[2] Howe and Coser commit an error of detail concerning this reviewer. On p. 282, they list me, along with other writers and intellectuals, as among those who supported the Communist presidential ticket of Foster and Ford in 1932. I did not support Foster. I never consented to this verbally or signed any statement to that effect. To my knowledge, there is no evidence that I supported Foster in 1932, and if any such exists, it is erroneous. Concerning the Foster-Ford ticket, I said at the time that, by running it, the Communists would only advertise how weak they were, and I didn't take their campaign seriously. I am certain that Howe and Coser made this error accidentally, but at all events it is an error.

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However, while the authors have done quite an admirable and intelligent job in producing a readable narrative, which includes most of the major phases of the history of American communism, they do not, in the opinion of this reviewer, seem to have a sufficiently clear grasp of American life, especially of the periods before they became active as radicals and writers; they do not relate communism to American life in a sufficiently convincing manner. Most particularly, they appear inadequate on the relationship of American liberalism to communism. The same applies concerning the way in which the social and literary atmosphere of the 1920's conditioned the older intellectuals to swing to the left in those days. Currently, many younger literary critics and intellectuals see a chasm between the 1920's and the 1930's, and in consequence they fail to understand sufficiently either of these decades in American culture.[3]

Howe and Coser explain the leftward swing of the intellectuals mainly by applying Marx's concept of alienation in a new context. Yet, if their explanation has a certain validity, it also has its pitfalls—as does every generalization. A number of intellectuals were radical or radically inclined prior to 1929. Postwar disillusionment, the expectation of a second and more destructive world war, the Sacco-Vanzetti case, disappointment in the liberal movement (especially because so many older liberals had supported Wilson in World War I), the strong attraction exercised by the Soviet Union—all were factors influencing some of the intellectuals.

In general, the 1920's have been a much misunderstood decade in American culture. Side by side with the literary men who ignored politics, there was, in the colleges and universities, a coming generation who were interested in philosophy, economics, sociology, political science and history. Some of these naturally gravitated to the left as a phase of their intellectual evolution and had a short experience with communism. Some were inspired by the ideas of liberty and truth and did not consider alienation a burden; in fact, they choose it deliberately, in preference to Babbittry. Howe and Coser, it should be stressed, are not unmindful of some of these factors, but give them less emphasis than they deserve.

Also, in the 1930's and especially up to early 1936, when the Popular Front line was being put into effect, there was constant and quite bitter dispute among writers. In the main, it was the mediocrities who accepted the party line in literature. There were other influences, too. For instance, the prestige of Leon Trotsky was still quite powerful, and he, not Stalin, was considered to be the representative, even the romantic, revolutionary. "All Stalinists are Trotskyites when they're drunk," it used to be said. And in 1934, the Kirov assassination and the subsequent trial and execution of Kamenev and Zinoviev created fairly profound dismay among the party people. There were decided differences among the intellectuals, and much needs to be clarified concerning this period. The issues of truth and independence were being fought out around the Communist Party in the first part of the 1930's. Howe and Coser are not unaware of all this, but they leave many areas in this period still to be explored. This is far less true in their treatment of the 1940's, a period which is obviously more familiar to them insofar as both radical politics and the American scene *in toto* are concerned.[4] Indeed, their final chapters are among the best in the entire book.

In conclusion, Howe and Coser attempt to give some theoretical explanation of Stalinism as a phenomenon. They offer many illuminating and suggestive insights, but they are only groping towards a theory of Stalinism. "Precisely to the extent that the left tradition in the

[3] A cult of hardboiledness and a profound political innocence on the part of many people in the 1920's were two of the main causes determining the influx of many intellectuals into the Communist Party. A further factor was the lack of sufficient critical evidence about the course of events in the Soviet Union. Not only were American visitors self-deceived, but others distorted the evidence in the late 1920's and the early 1930's. A notable instance was the suppression of news about the famine in 1930-1933; and one of the first published references I have found to the existence of labor or slave camps in USSR was in a series of articles by William Shirer, printed in *The Chicago Daily Tribune*. In the material read by the liberal intellectuals especially, the truth was often masked and sometimes ignored. Journalists later confessed to this. Howe and Coser apparently fail to grasp the fact that the relative lack of information was a factor in the intellectual swing to the left. They do recognize the service performed by Max Eastman, but they also have a gratuitous comment about his having become an editor of *Readers' Digest* in his later years; this is the one instance of bad taste I find in their book.

[4] By contrast, in their earlier treatment of the so-called "Palmer red raids" of 1919-20, during which many Communists and radicals were arbitrarily arrested, jailed, and deported, the authors indulged in loose guesswork to assert that these raids "could hardly have taken place without the consent of the Wilson administration as a whole," and "the mere fact that the raids took place on an extended scale must be regarded as adequate evidence that they met with the approval, or at least the toleration, of the President." Not at all. Wilson was battered and ill. R. Mitchell Palmer, the Attorney General, seized on real hysteria as a means of furthering his political ambitions, and the Wilson administration was demoralized, with a sick President. The authors reason better on detailed matters when they write about their own time.

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West did adhere to a simple optimistic theory of progress, it became more vulnerable to Stalinist infiltration." This is dubious, especially when they cite French intellectuals as an example. For the French intellectuals as far back as Renan have been among those who were doubtful of progress and apprehensive about it. France has been fighting progress for decades, as Herbert Luethy brilliantly revealed in *France Against Herself*. Howe and Coser write further: "Given modern technology, total state control, the means of terror, and a rationalized contempt for moral values, you can do anything with men, anything with their minds, anything with the past." Can you? This is the basic issue of Stalinism, of all totalitarianism. It sets the terms of the Stalinist-Communist war on human nature. It is basic in Stalinism as a conspiracy against the human race. Howe and Coser criticize the American philosopher Sidney Hook for treating communism as a conspiracy. They are, in fact, partly right. Communism-Stalinism is more than a conspiracy. But in its complexity, we must single out the various features of Stalinism in terms of their significance—political, moral, psychological, sociological. Hook is on sound ground in his emphasis on communism as a conspiracy, so long as we correctly qualify his emphasis and take note that not *all* members of the Communist Party and fellow-travelers were conspirators. In this sense, the Howe-Coser criticism of Hook is in part justified and in part a quibble.

The authors write of Stalinism in the past tense in their final chapter. This is very effective in a literary sense, but it is apt to give rise to serious misunderstandings. The authors are aware of that, and they are therefore careful to point out that, while there have been changes in the post-Stalin years, Stalinism and its evil effects are not dead. They conclude by declaring that "the answer to these problems, far from being a matter of mere analysis, will in large measure be determined by the human activity, the political behavior of free men."

In their preface, Howe and Coser assert that they have their own "point of view" and "strong predispositions." Actually, this is not evident in the book as a whole. It is unnecessary for the authors of a scholarly history to have and to present a strong point of view and a political perspective. It seems to this reviewer that what Howe and Coser regard as a firm point of view is more a lurking and half-revealed series of contradictions. They are struggling to hold on to the socialist tradition in the face of its terrible defeats, its failure to stem the tide of Stalinism, and the currents of contemporary thinking which criticize or ignore that tradition. They are right in distinguishing Marx from the Stalinists, who have ended up using Marx's phrases merely ritually and applying some of his ideas as empty and bureaucratically imposed generalizations. But their book is valuable, not for any strong point of view or the theoretical capacity and political insight of the authors; its value lies in the fact that it presents a coherent and well-organized narrative of many phases of the American Communist Party, that it is well and seriously written, and that it raises or touches on many important questions.

If, indeed, the authors did write from a certain viewpoint, it is one which not only has not impinged upon their scholarship but, on the contrary, helps to bring some areas of their analysis into sharper focus. For there are still many values in the background from which they see communism, that of the socialist tradition. Too many of those who are interested in the phenomenon of communism have ignored some of the values of that tradition. The socialist tradition was the first one which communism felt the need to attack pitilessly and with all of its now characteristic brutality. Without understanding the essence of socialism, therefore, it is impossible to understand its offspring and bitterest enemy—communism.

Finally, in discussing the question of means and ends, Howe and Coser give fine expression to a truly poetic insight. Perhaps Stalinism has no real end or goal; perhaps the means have become the end. For Stalinism is a movement, driving at all costs for the achievement of power, total and universal. The American Communist Party exerted a strong indirect influence for a period, particularly during the Popular Front days and the war. But it has been an evil influence because the party was a branch of this world movement for total power. Its decline shows the inner emptiness of the movement. And the inner emptiness of communism today reveals the awesomeness, the profound historical tragedy of our century. For the Russian Revolution against the Tsars was a movement for truth and freedom. It produced some of the finest inspirations and examples in history for our own century. It was rich with genius, with brilliant and startling personalities; it gave to mankind all too many martyrs; it influenced and contributed to the formation and development of the exquisite moral sensibility of a Leo Tolstoy. And after the Tsar came the decay, the moral and human failure of the regime born of the noble struggle in Russia for truth and freedom as well as for land, bread and peace. The American Communist Party became one of the foreign branches of that decayed system. As long as it remains a foreign national party, it is evil, whether it be strong or weak.

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A Contrast of Views on Maoist China

Peter S. H. Tang:
Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign Policies,
Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957.

Ygael Gluckstein:
Mao's China: Economic and Political Survey,
George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London,
and Beacon Press, Boston, 1957.

Reviewed by Joseph R. Fiszman

STUDENTS OF MAOIST totalitarianism—its evolution, policies, and impact on the lives of China's hundreds of millions of citizens—will find varied as well as thought-provoking fare in these recent contributions to the literature dealing with the emergent Chinese Communist state. The books by Peter S. H. Tang and Ygael Gluckstein are both scholarly analytical studies of broad scope, in the manner of the earlier surveys of Communist China by W. W. Rostow and Richard L. Walker; yet, while covering much the same ground, the two authors differ notably not only in general approach, viewpoint and area of primary emphasis, but in interpretation as well.

Tang's wide-ranging study is easily the more ambitious of the two scholarly works. It embraces not only the whole spectrum of Peiping's policies, both internal and external, but also the organizational structure and functioning of the party, state and army apparatuses, Maoist ideology and its relation to Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, and a prefatory historical recapitulation of the birth of Chinese communism and its 30-year struggle for mastery of China. However, in view of the many-sided complexity of the Communist experiment in China, it is not surprising, nor to the author's discredit, that his effort to cover every phase of the subject has resulted in a certain inadequacy of depth in some areas of his analysis. Mr. Tang is clearly most concerned with the political aspects of Chinese communism, and most at home when dealing with them; in the equally important sphere of economics he appears less comfortable, and less penetrating.

The emphasis is exactly reversed in Mr. Gluckstein's volume. Though his survey purports to be both economic and political, the author—a research economist—actually devotes less than a fourth of his book to its two "political" sections: one, of a scant 60 pages, skimming over the political highlights of Maoist totalitarianism; the other a 40-page survey of Sino-Soviet political relationships. But if he is perfunctory and often undiscerning in his political interpretations, Mr. Gluckstein's analysis of the economic aspects of Chinese communism is both exhaustive in scope and at the same time deeply penetrating, carefully reasoned, and well supported with facts, figures, and almost over-abundant documentation.

ONE POLITICAL aspect of Chinese communism which gets especially close attention from Tang and only the sketchiest treatment by Gluckstein is the whole moot question of the orientation of the Chinese Communist leadership and the nature of "Maoism." Tang probes into Mao's youthful background to discover the clues to an "enigmatic personality" combining contradictory traits of "rebelliousness" and "conservatism." This innate duality of character, in the author's view, shaped Mao's individual response to the Communist philosophy and thus imparted to Chinese communism its distinctive qualities. On the one hand, Mao's "rebel strain" impelled him to reject the traditional forms of Chinese society and to embrace the alien Communist ideology because of its "revolutionary thoroughness." On the other hand, the "conservative" side of his personality "led him to accept and mold to his own purposes the dominant realities of the society he was rebelling against," and hence to insist on "adapting the ideology to local conditions and limiting factors." This analysis

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may perhaps provide a clue to the apparent tendency of Chinese communism to shed its revolutionary characteristics with relative rapidity and become a conservative bureaucratic force.

Tang, however, vigorously disputes the view that the Maoist adaptations were such as to involve substantive revisions of Leninist-Stalinist doctrine. According to his analysis, Mao made only two theoretical contributions of purely secondary importance, one having to do with "the peasant aspect of the Communist revolution" and the other with the tactics of armed struggle (guerrilla warfare); and both these merely developed and applied to Chinese conditions Leninist and Stalinist revolutionary techniques. The author bolsters his argument by citing—at face value—Mao's own modest public professions of ideological indebtedness to the oracles of Soviet communism, as well as the statements of Ch'en Po-ta, leading popular expositor of "the thought of Mao," to the effect that the guiding spirit of Maoism "is precisely the spirit of Lenin and Stalin." [1]

Thus, argues Tang, Maoism is acknowledged by the Chinese Communists themselves to be "merely an ideological extension of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism rather than a challenge to it." Even while admitting the basic validity of his thesis, however, one wonders if the author has not oversimplified the issues. More specifically, his treatment seems to skirt around perhaps the most crucial question, namely whether Mao's unilateral assumption of the right to interpret and "adapt" Communist doctrine for China did not, in itself, negate what was a cardinal principle of Soviet Communist orthodoxy at least up until the Twentieth CPSU Congress' recognition of "separate paths to socialism." The Congress action may be said to have eliminated this past sore point, but one still may question whether the "separate paths" doctrine will not open the door to more, rather than less, ideological divergence between the two partners in the future.

NOR IS TANG altogether convincing when he discusses the complex question of the relationship between Maoism, Titoism and "national communism." The author bases his whole analysis on a postulated definition of national communism as "presumably" signifying "a type of regime in which the national leaders would be concerned only with building up communism in their own country, irrespective of the fate of the movement in other countries." Under this definition, of course, he can reasonably argue that not even Tito was ever a "national Communist," let alone Mao or, for that matter, Gomulka. On the other hand, if one defines the term more normally, *i.e.*, as a viewpoint which insists upon the right of each Communist country to forge its own independent path toward socialism, free from Soviet interference, then it would seem hard to deny that both Mao and Tito, in varying degrees, have been guilty of national Communist heresy.

Tang's chapters on the internal structure and policies of the regime show that Communist China, though still in the first, or "people's democratic dictatorship" stage of its socialist revolution, is following essentially in the footsteps of Soviet totalitarianism. He also sees a close communion between the two partners in all phases of international policy and rejects the likelihood of any serious threat to their unity as a result of frictions between them. The author examines several frequently-broached sources of possible discord, such as rivalry for leadership of the lesser Asian Communist parties, conflicts of interest in the Sino-Soviet border regions, and the inadequacy of Soviet aid to the Chinese industrialization program. However, in his opinion, all these are far outweighed by the two Powers' wholehearted dedication, and subordination of their particularistic interests, "to a common ideology which stresses above all the goal of achieving world communism."

ALTHOUGH GLUCKSTEIN, too, in his final conclusions, discounts the prospects of Axis disintegration, he pictures the Moscow-Peiping relationship as a far more complex, cold-blooded, and basically unstable affair than the firm association of ideological comrades-in-arms painted by Tang. The two authors' views are, indeed, a striking lesson in the flexibility of historical evidence. As against Tang's version of a "Soviet-oriented" Mao long since accepted into the Kremlin's confidence, Gluckstein offers contrary evidence purporting to show a strong mutual distrust and animosity between Mao and Stalin, and asserts that "Mao rose in spite of Moscow, and not thanks to her." He also specifically rejects the view (of Tang and others) that the Chinese Communists benefited from Soviet assistance in their postwar takeover of Manchuria, and points to further evidence that Soviet policy remained anchored to Chiang until the very eve of the Communists' final victory.

Dealing with present as well as potential frictions, Gluckstein again sees much more of a real competition between Peiping and Moscow for hegemony over the Asian Communist movement than does Tang. The latter favors the thesis of a friendly understanding whereby Peiping is allowed by Moscow to play the outwardly leading role in Asia, but actually serves as a mere

[1] Although Gluckstein makes no comparable analysis of Maoist ideology, it is curious that he quotes from the same Ch'en Po-ta in support of the statement that Mao "gained little ideological inspiration from Stalin."

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transmitting agent for directives from the Kremlin; Gluckstein, on the contrary, holds that the Chinese Communist leadership need take no such orders and has forged ahead on its own to the point where its influence eclipses that of Moscow in all the Asian countries except, perhaps, in India and North Korea. The author also views rival Sino-Soviet ambitions in the long-contested border regions as very much alive, though held in leash for the present because of more urgent considerations of economic and political self-interest.

Thus, states Gluckstein categorically, "If China is in the orbit of Moscow, it can only be because her own needs constrain her in that direction." These needs, according to his analysis, are primarily economic, the decisive factor being China's total dependence upon the Soviet Union for the capital equipment demanded by the Chinese industrialization program. Since industrialization will require a long time—the author hazards the guess that it will take China until 1980 to reach the Soviet economic level of 1950—there will be no early end to this dependence, and Peiping will perforce have to remain faithful to its alliance with the USSR, as well as content itself with the role of "junior partner." Gluckstein further speculates that, while Soviet willingness and ability to continue aiding Chinese economic construction will thus be an "overriding" determinant of the future of the alliance, Moscow, for its part, is unlikely to risk jeopardizing the partnership—both because of its positive value to the USSR in the context of the "world struggle of the powers," and because of the negative fear that Mao's China, if alienated, "would be a much greater menace to Moscow than Kuomintang China could ever have been."

GLUCKSTEIN'S TENDENCY to explain everything in terms of economic causes with little or no regard for ideological and other socio-political factors is also quite apparent in his analysis of the internal features of the Chinese Communist regime. Thus, he seems to consider Maoist totalitarianism as a phenomenon divorced from its base in Communist doctrine, and to view its many brutal features as the product primarily, if not exclusively, of basic economic facts and drives. According to his reasoning, the fundamental fact is that the Mao regime inherited a weak, predominantly agricultural economy even more backward than was the Russian in 1917; yet, on these weak foundations, it is determined to transform China into a modern industrial power and to accomplish its leap into the "supersonic age" regardless of the cost in human life and social values.

The greatest obstacle in the path of the regime's industrialization goal is the problem of accumulating capital savings. Here, Gluckstein points out, China finds herself "in the clutches of a vicious circle":

Her national income is too low to provide for significant capital accumulation. But without such accumulation, her national income cannot grow rapidly. The possibility of breaching this circle, and the way of doing so, are crucial for Mao Tse-tung's plans for the economic development of China.

The author explains that the regime must necessarily rely upon agriculture as its main source of capital accumulation; but with population pressure sharply mounting, agriculture is incapable of producing the necessary surpluses. Moreover, although agricultural output might be expanded through the reclamation of wastelands (all arable, and even marginal land already being cultivated) and by the use of fertilizers, these measures themselves require capital investment and hence prior accumulation. Consequently, the regime finds in forcible collectivization its only effective means of breaching the vicious circle and extracting the "savings" it requires.

While Moscow's extension of credits for the purchase of Soviet capital equipment helps ease China's immediate difficulties in this direction, Gluckstein points out that the credits are "niggardly" relative to China's needs; moreover, they do not overcome the basic problem since the loans, as well as other forms of Soviet economic aid, must eventually be repaid by Chinese exports to the USSR. Here again, he finds, Peiping suffers from the sharp trading practices of its partner, being obliged to pay exorbitant prices for imported Soviet machinery while receiving such low prices for Chinese agricultural exports to the USSR that the latter can and does make handsome profits by reselling them on the world market at less than world market prices! China, however, must submit to these harsh terms because of her extreme economic dependence upon the Soviet Union.

THE REGIME ENCOUNTERS another dilemma in its industrialization policies. As Gluckstein points out, the realization of the ruling clique's ambitions to make China "an independent economic-military power" demands the concerted expansion of heavy industry. This, in turn, dictates raising the living standards of the city workers so as to stimulate production enthusiasm, but the only way to do this would be to divert capital investment to light industry and thus provide more consumer goods. The regime's refusal to sacrifice its ambitions underlies the extreme severity of its labor policies, which impose rigid discipline and prohibit strikes, reduce the trade unions to mere state agencies for boosting

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production, and enforce a 12-hour workday with all kinds of Stakhanovite "emulation" drives. Despite this, Gluckstein cites Chinese Communist press reports of absenteeism, tardiness, defective work, and slow-downs, which testify to the workers' apathy and resistance. The same process, he indicates, extends to the system as a whole:

The greater the pressure of industrial advance and the greater the emphasis on heavy industry, the stronger becomes the resistance of the people—especially the peasantry—to the regime. Also the greater the international, economic, political and military tensions, the more insistent is the need for heavy industry, the more totalitarian becomes the regime, and the more extreme the means it uses to control the populace.

Perhaps Mr. Gluckstein's most interesting chapter is that in which he discerns the emergence, less than ten years after the birth of Mao's supposedly egalitarian regime, of a new elite, a new class stratification. W. W. Rostow and others have viewed the status of the Chinese Communist bureaucracy as much closer to that of the Soviet bureaucracy of the 1920's than of its highly-privileged successors of today.[2] Mr. Gluckstein, however, sees a strong tendency in the Maoist bureaucracy to revert to the traditions of the Imperial Mandarinate and maintains that the economic gulf between the ruling elite and the masses—though differences in income are still relatively small—is widening much more rapidly than it did in the corresponding period of Soviet development. The differences, he finds, are thus much greater in Communist China today than they were in Russia ten years after the revolution.

Just as a new class of "rich peasants" is emerging in the countryside, so in the cities the "new privileged" comprise party and government officials, industrial managers and technicians, university professors and intellectuals who hew to the party line, and "model workers." There are even salary differences between urban and rural party cadres, and signs of stratification are also apparent in the army where, in the days of revolutionary struggle, distinctions of rank and privilege were almost non-existent.

IN CONCLUSION, the author puts forward some highly interesting speculations concerning the attitudes of Moscow and Peiping toward the advance of communism in Asia—attitudes which he views as "rent with deep contradictions." For Moscow, a Communist-dominated Asia would bring certain advantages in its drive for world domination—notably bloc control of more than half the world's oil resources, virtually all its natural rubber, and vast quantities of other strategic materials—but, on the other hand, it could also "heighten the tensions within the Russian system to the breaking-point" by swelling the number of under-developed countries demanding Soviet capital equipment, thus aggravating the Soviet "crisis of under-production" and intra-bloc dissension. The latter considerations, Gluckstein believes, may impel Moscow to stick to its present tactics of trying to disengage the neutral Asian countries from the West by means of economic aid much smaller than it would have to give them as full-fledged members of the Soviet bloc.

Similarly, for China, the spread of communism in Asia would bring increased power and prestige to Peiping as its center; but the Peiping leadership must also consider the danger that its industrialization program would suffer from a partial diversion of Soviet and East European capital resources to the communized Asian countries. Also, since Communist expansion in Asia would sharpen international tension, China as well as the Soviet Union would have to devote still more of their industrial resources and efforts to armaments—for China especially, an already onerous burden.

[2] See, *e.g.*, W. W. Rostow, "Russia and China under Communism," *World Politics*, Vol. VII, No. 4, 1955, p. 519.

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Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: The March-April issue of *Problems of Communism* carried a symposium on the respective roles of ideology and power-politics in Soviet policy determination. In the May-June issue, the contributors to the symposium further developed their viewpoints in short rebuttals of their colleagues. Below we offer several comments received from readers, as well as a further observation by Richard Lowenthal, one of the participants.

IDEOLOGY AND NATIONAL POLICY

In the discussion between Messrs. Hunt, Sharp, and Lowenthal, nothing has been spared by all participants to obscure the issue. No reasonable person has ever claimed that ideology can play no role in historical decisions; nor does the other side contend that the Soviet government alone is guided by the dynamics of its faith. The Crusades of all ages were neither preached nor conducted by totalitarians; some of them were utterly irrelevant to the interest of the participants; others were cynically exploited for material purposes. In all historical situations, the power constellation and the ideological conflict appear as a bundle, with a pre-formed image of the enemy as hostile to the material and spiritual survival of the nation. A classical example of ideology pushing policy to the point of foolishness was recently described by an American scholar, Paul Kesckemeti, in a study of "unconditional surrender"; but the author did not deny that this policy may have been determined by two considerations governing the conduct of World War II—it kept the alliance from falling apart, and it guaranteed the anti-fascist ideology of the war effort.

Totalitarian governments, being complete masters of internal communication and information, are less likely than democratic countries to be swayed by ideological commitments of this sort. American policy toward Communist China is a case in point where a government, beset by strong propaganda of the opposition, was pushed into a position which is costly to maintain and from which it can extricate itself only with considerable loss of face. Russian policy toward China is even more interesting; Stalin had no use for a Communist revolution in China; he hoped for a friendly Kuomintang regime and looked on idly when it crushed the Shanghai revolution in blood; he excommunicated Communists who refused to join the Kuomintang; when Chiang Kai-shek betrayed him, Mao continued the fight with means and with an ideology officially condemned by the Comintern and against the advice of his Russian commissar. Stalin kept him supplied just enough to maintain Chiang under pressure to deal with Moscow. At Yalta he agreed to recognize the Chiang government and continued to look at the civil war in China not like the leader of a world revolution but as a Russian statesman. Mao but not Stalin rejected General Marshall's conciliation attempt, and only the paralysis of Western diplomacy allowed Stalin to tie the ideological strings which now make the Moscow-Peiping axis the strongest power constellation in Asian policies.

The example, if properly analyzed, suggests that for a long time Russian state interests outweighed Communist solidarity in China; at a certain point, however, the two became identical, and from then on, the nature of Far Eastern policies, their conception and the style of their execution, underwent a fundamental change. The result was the formation of a well-cemented politico-economic and ideological bloc which no longer can be broken apart as easily as a mere coalition of two states.

Vice versa, a greater effort will be made to maintain such a well-integrated unit than in the case of a more tenuous link; not the nature of bolshevism but the structure of the bloc made the intervention in Hungary unavoidable. The same goes for the bloc's relations with Yugoslavia. There can be no intermediate position between integration (or complete submission) and independence (or even friendly neutrality) for an extended time. Tito must be either in the fold or outside it, just as deviationists cannot be mere proponents of different policies but must be enemies of the party. This follows from the claim of the party, represented by its leadership, to be all-wise and all-powerful at all times. It also follows from the claim of the bloc to be monolithic: even the possibility of dissent must be excluded, for fear it will lead to doubt in the stability of the system. Legitimize doubt, and the tightly integrated machine is threatened by dissolution.

Whether this unique relationship be called a consequence of the ideology or of the structure of the state, it results in political decisions and in a style of political maneuvers which are considerably different from the political behavior patterns of non-totalitarian governments. Even so, the

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ideological dynamism of the Comintern never appears to be independent of—or separated from—the power drive of the Soviet bloc; if that were not the case, we could not explain the many periods of coexistence, however precarious, which we have enjoyed so far. But they never last; the masters of the Kremlin are sorcerers' apprentices who cannot deny the dynamism of the forces they call up. Or, to change the image, they have a bear by the tail, and whoever wishes to deal with them must either feed or chain the bear, too—at best an unpleasant choice.

In trying to analyze Soviet policies, therefore, we should not ask for motivations, nor for metaphysical essences such as "communism" or "total state," but at all times address ourselves to the concrete situation. In other words, the question is not whether Soviet policies are determined by ideological considerations or by the rationality of the state alone, but when and where the one or the other applies. An intelligent policy *vis-à-vis* the Soviet bloc and the uncommitted nations, it seems to me, is possible only if the irrational factor can be minimized and the rational factor maximized. Since Soviet policy is not independent of Western policies but may be influenced by them, the strategy must be to force Soviet policies into positions where they must deal within the rationality of the state rather than the irrationality of the ideology. In short, the question as to whether Soviet policies are determined by communism or by Russian state interests may be answered, not by pondering over the essence of the Soviet state, but by the rationality of our own policy.

New York City **Henry Pachter**

Mr. Lowenthal replies: Mr. Pachter charges the participants in the symposium with "obscuring the issue," but his real complaint seems to be that we have not concentrated our discussion on the issue which happens to be in the forefront of his interest: in his own contribution, he seems to have mixed up "his" and "ours" in a way that badly needs disentangling. His basic concern, I take it, is with the possible influence of Western diplomacy on Soviet expansion; he argues that periods of "peaceful coexistence" and of revolutionary expansion have alternated throughout Soviet history, and that it is up to the Soviets' diplomatic opponents to contain them within the limits of "coexistence" by denying them the opportunities for expansion. That certainly is sound doctrine, but it is not really strengthened by calling Soviet policy in periods of "coexistence" more "rational" and less "ideological," on the grounds that in such periods—as illustrated by Stalin's China policy in the 1920's—Russia refuses to take risks for the sake of the ideology of world revolution. For on one side, an expansive revolutionary policy may be just as "rational" in a different situation, and on the other even the policy of coexistence uses the specific "ideological" techniques of party coalitions, infiltration, *etc.*, as I point out in my article.

This terminology does, in fact, belong to another issue—that of the specific difference between the politics of a totalitarian great power and other powers. In discussing the ideological and structural needs of Soviet bloc cohesion, Mr. Pachter seems to accept my thesis about that specific difference. But he immediately obscures the issue again by saying that we should not worry about metaphysical essences such as communism or the total state. The total state, far from being a metaphysical essence, is an institutional structure which has precisely the consequences admitted by Mr. Pachter in the previous paragraph; the ideology of communism, bound up with that structure, calls up the dynamic forces—in Mr. Pachter's words, the bear the Soviet leaders have got by the tail. In addressing ourselves to the concrete situation as he urges us to do, we should not therefore forget his preceding advice that whoever wishes to deal with them must account for this—surely unmetaphysical—animal.

IDEAS AND ACTIONS

I would like to make two comments:

First, Dr. Sharp's article, "National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics" was attacked by Mr. Lowenthal as though its author had denied any effect of Communist theory upon the decision of Soviet leaders. However, Dr. Sharp correctly seems to be reacting against many people who feel that if the Communist Party, its leaders and theories were to vanish from Russia there would no longer be serious conflict between the United States and the remaining Russian empire.

Overemphasis upon the theory of communism as a predicator of Soviet action leads to the conclusion that Communist theory alone is the menace to democratic countries. By stressing the continued influence of historical Russian aims upon Soviet leaders, Dr. Sharp may be saying that the present situation primarily reflects the apparent inevitability of international tension between two giant power blocs, regardless of whether they have ideological differences or not.

On the other hand, Lowenthal is justified in chiding Dr. Sharp for using as a basis for his position the ambiguous, equivocal, and hotly-contested phrase "national interest."

Secondly, apparently the symposium participants did not attempt to agree upon a common meaning of "ideology." But the fundamental question of the relationship between *anyone's* fundamental beliefs and his behavior—which would have shown the real futility in using exegetics of Marxism to predict Soviet behavior—was never considered.

Behavior does not result from a rational equation between a theory and a specific situation. Neither the Russians nor democratic nations act strictly according to Hoyle (or Marxism-Leninism). Behavior is essentially unpredictable on any grounds because it is *not* the ideology

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as such that makes the decisions, but individuals acting and reacting upon a constantly changing plane of history where no two identical situations ever occur.

This is not to say that a knowledge of Communist theory is meaningless to an understanding of the Soviet system. On the contrary, it is an indispensable element. But the method has not yet been devised that can invariably predict complicated behavior, and Marxism-Leninism cannot do as a substitute.

But do the leaders of the Soviet Union really believe the theoretical aims which they appear to sponsor? This remains an essentially irrelevant question because the relationship between statements, actions, and real beliefs is never direct and absolute but always proximate, derivative, and arguable. This is especially so when aspirations are institutionalized. Pure theory, unrelated to actual experience, may be defined exactly. But the institutionalization of an idea and its subsequent career in history defies a scientific demonstration of the relationship between the institutionalized theory and the individuals behaving in the institution.

Analyze the development of Christianity from its Judaic roots through time to the present and show how twentieth-century — or thirteenth-century — or even second-century Christian behavior could have been predicted from first-century Christianity. Or trace the development of ideas of any revolution and observe how they change as they develop in history. The means *always* eat the ends because the ends are never static. Political theories have no life independent of men who hold and mold them. No idea remains the same in definition or nuance as it goes from person to person, time to time.

If early Christianity (or Mohammedanism) had been subjected, by local scribes, to the same scrutiny that Russian communism gets today I doubt not that these observers too would have wrestled long and inconclusively with the questions: Do these people believe what they say? Are they really out to conquer the world?

Alexandria, Virginia **James Allen Dator**

NATIONAL INTEREST: TWO-EDGED SWORD

In his contribution to the symposium on "Ideology and Power Politics" (No. 2, March-April 1958), Mr. Sharp maintains that ideology is of no help in understanding Soviet policy, and that "national interest" is the only reliable clue.

It may be true that Soviet policy is dictated by self-interest, but this of itself does not prove that its sole motivation lies in mere survival, uninfluenced by long-term ideological goals. Are not the Communist leaders still committed to destroying other forms of social organization in the world, and to becoming a world power—to the extent, at least, that they will no longer fear the overthrow of their own social system?

To admit that they have learned the value of caution, that their use of power is empirical, that their every action is motivated by self-interest, that they have learned to distribute some of the fruits of the Communist heaven this side of the grave—none of all this leads, directly at any rate, to a denial of the possibility that they still have the destruction of non-Communist social systems as their objective. Could it not be that they have discovered, empirically, that the courses of action which they have tried so far do not work, and that they are withdrawing now for another assault? Self-interest may, indeed, be the reason for short-term changes of tactics when these no longer serve their original ends, but cannot successive short-term phases of tactical policy still add up to a general scheme?

Clearly, the more the Communists announce that they are bent on the destruction of the rest of the world, the more the rest of the world will be on the defensive. Hence, their leaders probably deem it wiser to agree, for a change, to play the game of international politics according to "traditional rules"; but even if they do this, and make some important concessions in the bargain, how are we to know that self-interest will not dictate a fresh shift of tactics as soon as there appear to be greater chances of realizing their long-range ideological goals? Already there is evidence of success in their policies of infiltration rather than open revolution. The stronger their internal economy, the better equipped they are to use economic weapons of penetration. Communists are not ashamed to admit their readiness to make use of established social institutions in order to overthrow them eventually.

One may admit, then, that self-interest has led the Communist leaders to change their tactics. But this does not mean that their "means" have "eaten up their ends." Rather, as Mr. Lowenthal put it in his part of the symposium, the Communists "are convinced that history is on their side, and that they need not risk the survival of their own regime in any attempt to hasten its final triumph."

The important question for Mr. Sharp to answer, then, is whether the Russians have abandoned their ideology or whether they use it merely in retrospect to justify their actions. But when and by what authority were those ideals abandoned? There is no indication on the record. Furthermore, even retrospective justification implies a reconciliation of means and ends, and therefore the presence of ends.

The important practical aspect of this contention concerns the central theme of international communism—the destruction of other forms of society. Stalin warned the rest of the world of the fate that would overtake it when it had been lulled into a false sense of security by the greatest peace the world had ever known. Can we ignore the warning? Conversely, can we credit its refutation? Can a nation exist without ideals if its purpose is to serve the national interest?

Cambridge, England **D. W. Eddison**

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